¹ Hume, DavidA Treatise of Human Nature, II, iii, 3 (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911 (1962)), Vol. 2, 127.Google Scholar

² Penner, Terry, ‘Thought and Desire in Plato’, Plato, II, Vlastos, G. (ed.) (London: Macmillan, 1972), 96–118.Google Scholar

³ Plato, , Republic, 436b–c.Google Scholar All translations from the Republic are taken from The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Jowett, B., fourth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953).Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid., 439b.

⁵ I shall use ‘desire’ as a generic term and ‘appetite’ as the name of a sub-genus of ‘desire’, but I will not explain the difference, i.e. explain how some desires may be non-appetitive, until section II below.

⁶ This is acknowledged, however obscurely, in the statement of the general principle: ‘the same thing cannot act or be acted upon (poiein e pascheiri) in the same part or in relation to the same thing (kata tauton ge kai pros tauton)…’.

⁷ Op. cit., 108–111 and 113–116.

⁸ Republic, X, 603d.Google Scholar

⁹ Penner, , op. cit., 110.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid., 113–116.

¹¹ Ibid., 115–116.

¹² Plato, , Protagoras 356a–bGoogle Scholar, translated by W. K. C. Guthrie (Penguin Books, 1956), 93

¹³ Hume, , op. cit., III, i, 1, 167.Google Scholar

¹⁴ I owe my understanding of this passage of the Republic to Penner (op. cit., 106–108), who in turn gained his understanding from Murphy, N. R., The Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1951), 28–29, 45–47.Google Scholar

¹⁵ It seems perfectly possible for the desire to play well not to be linked to such a rational calculation. If a case could be made out for holding that, nevertheless, such a desire is not (logically) another appetite, then one would be able to answer Penner's contention (op. cit., 111–113)tnat Plato had ‘no logical or psychological argument for going beyond two parts of the soul’. I will not attempt to answer Penner here, apart from pointing out that material for answering Penner's contention that Plato had no psychological basis for the three-part soul may be found in Gosling, J. C. B., Plato (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), Ch. III.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hume, , op. cit., II, iii, 3, 126Google Scholar: ‘It is obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction.’

¹⁷ Ibid., III, i, 1, 168.

¹⁸ Ibid., II, iii, 7, 139.

¹⁹ Ibid., III, iii, 1, 278.

²⁰ Ibid., II, iii, 3, 129.

²¹ Ibid., 130.

²² Ibid., III, iii, 1, 279.

²³ Ibid., II, iii, 3, 129.

²⁴ Ibid., III, i, 1, 169.

²⁵ My argument does not require, and it is no part of my thesis to maintain, that there is in every situation exactly one rational choice. If appetites may directly conflict, I see no reason why a person may not find himself in a conflict between the outcomes of two ways of determining what is the best thing to do.

²⁶ Ibid., III, iii, 1, 279.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., III, i, 2, 180.

²⁹ Republic, 430e–431a.Google Scholar