^{page 99 note 1} A work which I found very helpful is: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie by Helmut Coing (1950)Google Scholar

^{page 99 note 2} Cf. Report on the International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, 1959, pp. 187–197.Google Scholar

^{page 100 note 1} My references are to the French version, Justice, Droit, État, Études de philosophie juridique, 1938.Google Scholar

^{page 100 note 2} Op. cit.

^{page 100 note 3} Op. cit., p. 73.

^{page 102 note 1} Op. cit., p. 274.

^{page 102 note 2} Op. cit., p. 281.

^{page 104 note 1} For a criticism of Spencer, see Maitland, , Collected Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 267–313,Google Scholar and Hobhouse, , Elements of Social Justice, Ch. IV.Google Scholar

^{page 104 note 2} Principles of Ethics, Vol. 2, p. 46.Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 1} Einleitung in die Rechtslehre, Werke, Gassirer edition, Band VII, p.31.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 1} Compare Hartmann, Ethics, II, 237: ‘The lower goods as being the minimum conditions of the higher need a stronger weapon of defence. The good will, so easily deficient, is not an adequate security.’Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 1} Mill, , Utilitarianism, Gh. V.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 2} Sidgwick, , Methods, Book III, Ch. IV.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 3} Sidgwick, , Elements of Politics, p. 114.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 4} Mill, J. S., Examination of Hamilton, p. 508.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 2} The Right and the Good, 1930, p. 58.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 1} Theory of Good and Evil, 1924, I, p. 257.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 2} For a Christian view see Quick, O. C., Christianity and Justice (p. 9-10): ‘It cannot be due to a man to injure him. But punishment, ideally and in its essential nature, is not an injury at all. Punishment recognised as just awakens the wrongdoer's conscience to the fact that he has done wrong and also enables him to feel that he has purged his offence.’Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 1} Cf., Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, 6.5: ‘We do not allow an individual to rule over us, but reason or law: for an individual is apt to take more for himself and to become a tyrant’.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 2} Deut. I, 17.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 1} Methods of Ethics, Book IV, Ch. 3.4.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 2} Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p. 133.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 3} Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 58.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 1} III.12.

^{page 111 note 2} IV. 12.

^{page 112 note 1} Cf. Sir Ross, D., Aristotle, p. 211.Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 2} Nicomachean Ethics, V, 4.3.Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 3} ‘Particular justice is directed to private individuals, whose relation to society is analogous to that of part to a whole. Now every part admits of a twofold relationship. There is first the relationship of one part to another and to this corresponds the relationship of one individual to another. This order of relations is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned with mutual dealings between two persons. Second is the relationship of the whole to its part, and to this corresponds that of the society with each of its members. This second order of relations is directed by distributive justice, which is concerned with distributing common goods proportionately.‘Google ScholarSumma Theologica, IIa, IIae, q.61, a.l, cited: The Church and Social Justice, J. Y. Calvez, J. Perrin, p. 158.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 1} GfCalvez, J. Y. and Perrin, J., The Church and Social Justice, 1961,Google Scholar and Fogarty, M., The Just Wage, 1961, especially the Appendix on the Scholastic Theory of the Just Wage.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 2} Cf., Ihering, Zweck im Recht, 1.287: Welchen Wert hat die Gleichheit unabhängig von jeder inhaltlichen Bestimmung derselben. Gleichheit kann auch Gleichheit des Elends sein.Google Scholar