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Flew on Aquinas
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Extract
Prof. Flew's main purpose in God and Philosophy (Hutchinson, London, 1966) is ‘to develop and to examine a case for Christian theism’ (1, 1). But in next to no time he shows his reader that here, as with the New York Commissioner for Air Pollution, ‘for’ really means ‘against’. For Flew's aim is to attack Christian theism and to develop the argument against it. One of his fellow-humanists rightly reviewed this book under the title ‘A Case for Atheism’. As the case for atheism is being developed one quickly loses faith in the assurance that this ‘philosopher of religion has … no business to be counsel for either the prosecution or the defence’ and aspires to resemble most of all the examining magistrate (2, 3). Soon we are told that an attack should and shall be launched against the heart of the quinta via of Aquinas (3, 19, etc.). This is not just a slip of the pen for indeed the book contains a number of attacks on Aquinas. Of course Aquinas is not the only Christian theist who is attacked but he is Flew's chief individual target.
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1 I omit Flew's discussions of omnipotence and of evil not because ‘to the Christian the issues … do not appear as primary’ (3, 1)Google Scholar but because Flew's discussions of them do not so appear. If the problem of evil ‘seems to attract bad arguments as jam-making attracts wasps' (2, 42), it must be said that not all the wasps are theistic wasps. To say that the privation analysis of evil amounts to saying that evil is really nothing is a poor argument which betrays incomprehension of the Aristotelian Steresis and of its use by Christian theists. And no one aware of Thomas’ discussion of divine omnipotence and autonomy of the creature (S. T. I, 19, 8)Google Scholar can ignore the crucial distinction made there with the simple-minded disjunction ‘If creation is in, autonomy is out’ (2, 39).Google Scholar
2 3, 20: ‘We shall, in piety, follow Bayle and Hume in using the awkward form Stratonician …’ Flew explains that Strato, next but one in succession to Aristotle as head of the Lyceum, was the first to formulate the presumption that whatever characteristics we think ourselves able to discern in the universe as a whole are the underivative characteristics of the universe itself. It was this ‘Stratonician atheism’ which was received by young Hume as emancipating revelation (ibid.).
3 Elsewhere he states that there are other types of ‘grounding’.
4 Does Flew think that the quinta via is identical with the argument from/to design, which Kant apparently regarded as ‘the oldest, the clearest and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind’? (cf. MacPherson, , Philosophy of Religion, London, 1965, p. 76)Google Scholar. It would seem so (cf. 3, 3). Few theists would agree with either the identification of Way Five with the Argument to Design or with this assessment of its appeal.
5 S.T. I, 2, 3Google Scholar: ‘Quinta via sumitur ex rerum gubernationes’. However, this is not an argument from the concept of guidedness to The Guide.
6 Grene, M., A Portrait of Aristotle (London, 1963), pp. 133–4Google Scholar; cf. Phys. II, 8Google Scholar. The ‘ut consequantur’ clause in the quinta via is a consecutive clause, not a final one; cf. McDermott, 's translation loc. cit., p. 16.Google Scholar
7 St Anselm is credited with being its parent. It is true that in Anselm, 's ProslogionGoogle Scholar words may be found which, out of their context, are very much like the Ontological Argument. However, when we pay attention to Anselm's declared intentions we see that his argument is unlike that of Descartes. This is why it seems misleading to suggest, as Flew does (4, 2), that Anselm's argument is like that of Descartes, only less easy to follow. For further elucidation of the difference see, for instance, Macpherson, , op. cit., ch. 4Google Scholar and Grave, S. A., The Ontological Argument of St Anselm in Philosophy XXVII (1952) 30–38.Google Scholar
8 S.T. I, 2, 3Google Scholar ‘prima … et manifestier via’. Flew's historical discussion of the background (4, 31–33, pp. 91–2) seems to aim chiefly at discrediting the argument by suggesting that there is a connection between holding it and being in favour of punishment of heretics.
9 McPherson, , op. cit., pp. 58–9.Google Scholar
10 S.C.G. 1, 13Google Scholar: ‘Procedit autem Philosophus alia via in II Metaphys. ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus …’ Cf. Met. 994 a 5Google Scholar. The fact remains that Aristotle himself did not have the medieval concept of causa efficiens. For a discussion of this point cf. Gilson, E., Avicenne et la notion de cause efficiente in Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale de Filosofia, Vol. IX, 121–30 (Florence, 1960).Google Scholar
11 4, 27: Flew attacks further Way Four in 5, 39–43. His discussion is again characterised by hostility and incomprehension of the text. In order to avoid dwelling on these defects of Flew's criticism I have omitted an examination of these five paragraphs.
12 These are:
(2) One is therefore forced to suppose some first cause.
(3) One is forced to suppose something which must be, and owes it to no other thing than itself.
(4) There is, therefore, something which causes in all other things their being, their goodness and whatever other perfection they have.
(5) Everything in nature, therefore, is directed to its goal by someone with understanding.
13 ‘The term “second” means “having secondary or dependent status” and “first” means “having an independent or primary status”. The distinction between “first” and “second” is therefore not mathematical.’ Hunter, J. F. M., Note in Mind, 73 (1964), 439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14 One can raise about any of the Ways Flew's question (cf. 3, 11) “Why conclude to a single entity?” Moreover, we are given here no formal proof that the entities at the end of the Ways are identical. Only much later in the Summa does Thomas try to prove formally the unity and the uniqueness of God.
15 S.T. I, 2, 2 ad 2Google Scholar: ‘… demonstrando “Deum esse” per effectum accipere possumus pro medio quid signified hoc nomen “Deus”.’ Even more striking is S.C.G. I, 13:Google Scholar ‘… ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio hujus nominis “Deus”.’
16 S.C.G. I, 5Google Scholar: ‘Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est’. Cf. also De Pot. 7, 5 ad 14.Google Scholar
17 S.C.G. I, 9Google Scholar: ‘… praemittendum est, quasi totius opens necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur “Deum esse”. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis necessario tollitur.’
18 Dz 1785 and 1806. Thomas also appeals to Rom. 1, 19 (S.T. 1a, 1, 2 ad 1).Google Scholar
19 By saying this I do not intend to assert that ‘Deum esse’ is only an article of faith. It is one of the stepping stones to faith which is accessible to the believer's reason even when his mind makes no direct use of biblical teaching. It is a judgment that can be (in two different ways) the fruit of either reasoning or believing (cf. De Ver. 14, 9 ad 9Google Scholar; S.T. 2a2ae, 1, 5 ad 3)Google Scholar. My point is that no Stratonician will regard this judgment as a stepping stone to faith and that his unwillingness so to regard it cannot be corrected by arguments alone. When Thomas affirms that a Christian disputing with those who do not accept the Christian scriptures as the final court of appeal must have recourse to ‘natural reason’ (S.C.G. I, 2)Google Scholar he does not mean that philosophical arguments alone will affect any man's position (cf. S.T. 1a2ae, 68, 2)Google Scholar. What Aquinas means by ‘natural reason’ cannot be discussed here. He is well aware of the fact that ‘natural reason’ can (but need not in every case do so) ‘reach’ God only under certain conditions (cf. S.C.G. I, 4).Google Scholar