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How Can I Know Myself?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

David Dewhurst
David Dewhurst
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania
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Extract

To the Socratic injunction ‘Know Thyself’ one wonders how to respond. Presumably Socrates is asking us to attempt a project at which we are supposed to have some chance of success and this leads one to ask ‘Can I know myself?’ One is led to ask it, but the question can seem rhetorical. Many would reply that of course one can do this because there is nothing easier for me to know than my own self. I do, therefore I can. I know it simply by being myself. Not only this, one might regard knowledge of oneself as unavoidable so that the answer to the question ‘Can I know myself?’ is ‘Yes’ and the answer to the question ‘Can I avoid knowing myself?’ is ‘No’. Now if we cannot avoid knowing ourselves, if Socrates is asking us to do somethingwhich we inevitably do anyway, then he has certainly earned his reputation for irony.

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Type
Articles
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Philosophy , Volume 59 , Issue 228 , April 1984, pp. 205 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1984

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References

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