^{page 286 note 1} And in spatial relations as well if the implications of contemporary astrophysics are to be accepted.

^{page 287 note 1} It is no doubt impossible to date an event without also placing it, and vice versa. We note this complication merely to ignore it, as it does not appear to be incompatible with the argument in the text.

^{page 287 note 2} The observant reader will note that we are not using the Method of Extensive Abstraction at this point. We do not do so because (i) it is far above the level of the commonsensical; (ii) it appears to presuppose the notion of extents, whether surfaces, volumes or durations, and therefore the notion of boundaries.

^{page 288 note 1} In what follows it will be obvious that we are adopting the commonsensical assumption that there is one uni-dimensional time series, or “absolute process,” by reference to which all events can be dated. If the complications connected with this are to be met, the argument has, no doubt, to be restated into something much more sophisticated.

^{page 288 note 2} It is interesting to inquire whether or not this nonsensical supposition is entailed by one of the most famous answers to our question, viz. the one contained in Genesis. Prima facie, it does appear to be entailed because of the analogy between God and an individual craftsman making something.

^{page 288 note 3} Should Uncle Tom ask “where did the Universe come from?” as I once heard “a plain man” ask Mr. Russell at a public meeting, the answer is that in any straightforward sense of the word “where” the “question” cannot be answered, as it is not a question, but a collection of noises. This should be obvious by analogy from the argument in the text. It is misleading to answer “Nowhere,” as Mr. Russell did on that occasion.

^{page 289 note 1} It is fashionable at this point to ask the following further query. Is the question about the beginning of the Universe merely one about the use of language? or does it purport to be about empirical matters of fact? If it is the latter, are there any observational steps that can in principle be taken to answer it? See, for example, Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic. We do not propose to use this fashionable technique. For it has to be applied at a level far too far above that of common sense, and, in consequence, is much more likely to confuse than to enlighten Uncle Tom. Moreover, the analysis of significance presupposed is still sub judice. Hence, it is better for our purposes to tackle Uncle Tom's question with presuppositions that are likely to command a wider measure of agreement. This is what we propose to do.

^{page 290 note 1} The knowledgeable reader will notice that in what follows we are merely offering in a crude way the analysis that Mr. Russell has given us. It is sufficient for our commonsensical purposes.

^{page 291 note 1} The sense in which it “follows” will be settled when the relation between “non inductiveness” and “reflexiveness” is determined. It need not bother us here.

^{page 295 note 1} It is with much hesitation that we venture into this thorny and complex field. We shall try, however, to keep as much as possible to the level of analysis adopted so far, and to put up with the consequent sacrifice of precision.

^{page 295 note 2} There is not much to choose between these two names. The latter is perhaps preferable, in spite of its own difficulties. For the word “substance” usually arouses confusing images of things like plum puddings, pots and pans. This is confusing because it is often the case that something is a substance though not a continuant.

^{page 296 note 1} The plain man may be able to extract some comfort from the fact that the mathematicians are still quarrelling quite vigorously over the nature of infinite numbers. For a short survey and further references see Max Black, The Nature of Mathematics.

^{page 297 note 1} Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, the chapter on The Antinomy of Pure Reason.

^{page 297 note 2} See, for example, Hegel, Science of Logic, vol. i, bk. i, sect, I, chap. ii.

^{page 298 note 1} As we have indicated all along. See, for example, pp. 293 and 294.

^{page 298 note 2} It is this sort of tour de force, coupled with the assumption in public of the identity of the two questions, that provoked Bradley's celebrated attack. Appearance and Reality, chap, xxvii.