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Intentions, Motives, and Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2002

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Abstract

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I criticize the ‘Humean’ view of reasons for actions, the view that the reasons for an action can be stated in terms of desires and beliefs. I point out that this view must ignore concepts which are central to our understanding of human actions, namely, intention, motivation and associated concepts such as decision. One can then see just how inadequate the Humean view is.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2001