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Making More Sense of Retributivism:Desert as Responsibility and Proportionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2003

J. Angelo Corlett
Affiliation:
San Diego State University
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Abstract

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This paper is an elaboration of my previous paper published in Philosophy, ‘Making Sense of retributivism,’ which was a criticism of John Rawls' attempt in ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ to develop a rule utilitarian theory of punishment wherein utilitarianism is best construed as a justificatory basis for the institution of punishment and retributivism is best construed as serving as a justificatory basis for particular forms of punishment. I challenge this claim, arguing that retributivism must and can provide a justification both for the institution of punishment and for particular forms of punishment. In the end, I develop an analysis of the nature of desert as responsibility and proportionality. This notion of desert makes the best sense of retributivism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003