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The Momentariness of Simples

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2004

Roy W. Perrett
Affiliation:
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa
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Abstract

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Many philosophers have supposed that while most of the objects in our immediate experience are composed of parts, at some point we must come down to those fundamental impartite objects out of which all partite things are composed: the metaphysical simples (usually conceived of as enduring, even eternal, entities). I consider what reason we have to believe that there really are simples, then we also have good reason to believe in their momentariness.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2004