¹ Erica, Jong, Fear of Flying, (Panther Book 1974), 221–222.Google Scholar

² Bernard, Williams, ‘Moral Incapacity.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1993), 59–70;Google Scholar reprinted in: idem, Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 46–55.Google Scholar

³ ‘Moral Incapacity,’ Philosophy 70, No. 272 (04 1995), 273–285.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Williams, , op. cit., 60 (47). Henceforth all page numbers in the text refer to Williams's ‘Moral Incapacity,’ first number to the original publication, second number to the reprint, see note 2.Google Scholar

⁵ Aristotle might be interpreted as taking the view that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is, at least in some cases, a decision; see Anthony, Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will, (London: Duckworth., 1979), esp. 142–143.Google Scholar Robert Audi holds that the conclusion is a practical judgment which has the power ‘to produce, or at least to trigger, intention, decision or action.’ See his Practical Reasoning (London: Routledge, 1989), 99; cp. 18–19.Google Scholar

⁶ Cp. Audi, op. cit. 94-95, 118.

⁷ David, Wiggins, ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason,’ Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Amelie Oksenberg, Rorty (ed.) (Berkeley: University of California Press), 233.Google Scholar

⁸ See Oberman, Heiko A., Luther: Mensch zwischen Gott und Teufel (Berlin: Severin, 1982), 216. Note that the order of Luther's words is not as is usually assumed.Google Scholar

⁹ Cp. Anthoy, Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 123–129.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cp. Mele, Alfred. R., Autonomous Agents. From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 60–61.Google Scholar

¹¹ Both the passive nature of a moral incapacity and the emphasis on the third-personal point of view somehow reflect Williams's sympathy with ‘the Greeks’ and his acknowledgement of similarities between ‘Greek [ethical] conceptions and our own,’ Bernard, Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 2, 10; cp. 81–84, 103, 135–139.Google Scholar

¹² Cp. Aristotle, : ‘We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done,’ N.E. 1112a31;Google Scholarsee also Richard, Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame. Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London: Duckworth, 1980), 227–242.Google Scholar

¹³ Cp. Geach, P., God and the Soul (London: Routledge, 1969), 123.Google ScholarSee also Aristotle, , N.E. 1103a31-1103b3.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Taylor, , ‘Moral Incapacity,’ 277. All further page numbers in the text refer to this article (for details, see note 3).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Taylor identifies, rightly I think, the considerations which play a role in Williams's account of deliberation leading up to the discovery of a moral incapacity, with so called ‘internal reasons’ as explained in : Williams's ‘Internal and External Reasons,’ in: Bernard, Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–113.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Let it be noted that there need not have been a prior connection between that moral ground and R's motivational set (his dispositions or whatever).

¹⁷ See Velleman, J. David, ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’ Mind, 101 (1992), 476–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Eleonore Stump has identified the agent with her reasoning faculty, see her ‘Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will,’ Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 410.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For more about the conditions of self-control, see Mele, Alfred R., op. cit. (see note 10).Google Scholar

²⁰ Cp. Velleman, , op. cit. 479. It might be obvious by now that I am not paraphrasing Aristotle in his own terms.Google Scholar

²¹ John, McDowell, ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ In: The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 52 (1978), 26–29.Google Scholar

²² Op. cit. 27-28.

²³ Op. cit. 28

²⁴ Of course, if we take the course of action mentioned to an agent or crossing his mind to be an abomination, a real incapacity may be involved. Think, for example, of moral abominations such as having sexual intercourse with a dead body, or with an animal. Most of us, I presume, are psychologically incapable of doing these things. Note that these incapacities have nothing to do with deliberation. They are a matter of sheer impotence.