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Moral Justification and the Idea of an Ethical Position

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2005

Avner Baz
Affiliation:
Tufts University
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Abstract

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In this paper I develop a critique of Kantian ethics, and more precisely a critique of a particular conception of moral reasoning. The fundamental assumption that underlies the conception that I am targeting is that to justify (morally or otherwise) an action is (perhaps with an ‘all things being equal’ clause) to settle its value, in such a way that all rational participants would have to acknowledge that value. As an alternative to the Kantian conception, I propose a conception in which the basic unit of moral reasoning is not an action but rather what I call an ‘ethical position’—where an ethical position is where, at any given moment and with respect to the matter at hand, you stand, and where moral reasoning consists in the articulation of ethical positions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2005