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Moral Positivism and Moral Aestheticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

E. F. Carritt M.A.
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Extract

Mr.Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (p. 161), says: “Sentences which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood.... Aesthetic terms are used in exactly the same way as ethical terms."

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Type
Articles
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Philosophy , Volume 13 , Issue 50 , April 1938, pp. 131 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1938

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References

page 133 note 1 He says “stealing.” I have substituted “taking” as he is clearly not entitled to a dyslogistic word.

page 133 note 2 My italics throughout.

page 142 note 1 Or to “some more complex whole.” It is hard to discuss this suggestion till it is made more explicit. It may mean just what I do.

page 142 note 2 Mod. Painters, IV, x, § 8.

page 143 note 1 K. d. U., § 16.

page 144 note 1 Review of the Principal Questions in Morals.

page 144 note 2 Ross, , The Right and the Good, p. 128 n.Google Scholar