¹ The next two paragraphs owe much to Louis, Pojman, ‘Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis,’ Behaviour and Philosophy 23, 2: 127,Google Scholar and ‘A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism,’ Faith and Philosophy 8, 4: 481–504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² The phrases are Michael, Rosenfeld's, Affirmative Action and Justice (New Haven: Yale, 1990);Google Scholar also see Peter, Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1993).Google Scholar For Rosenfeld, ‘[T]he normative proposition that all individuals are morally equal qua individuals … does not depend for its validity on any empirical proof of the existence of particular (descriptive) equalities’ (20), and he cites Amy, Gutman, Liberal Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1980) to the same effect. It is noteworthy that Gutman rests her ‘presumption in favor of human equality’ on a ‘presumed universal rationality,’ including the equal capacity of all to ‘abide by the law’ (43-45). That law-abidingness is decidedly ‘descriptive,’ and highly variable, shows how easily (a2) morphs into a version of (al).Google Scholar

³ David, Gauthier, a Hobbesian, concludes (Morals by Agreement, Oxford University Press, 1984, 231) that those superior in ‘technology’ and ‘rationality’ need not bargain with their inferiors as equals, although in his view the appearance of greater rationality is always illusory because technical superiority is always an historical accident.Google Scholar

⁴ Convicted recidivist felons appear deficient in all three.

⁵ Cp. the US Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws, which cannot require the law to treat everyone alike. Rather, it forbids ‘arbitrary’ legal classifications, where ‘arbitrary’ must be specified independently (as, say, ‘unrelated to any legitimate government function’).

⁶ Nor paradoxical, although it might seem to be, for if B decides to subordinate himself to A because he regrets his own decisions, mustn't he regret that decision? As elsewhere one must stratify, distinguishing type-0 decisions (which concern matters other than decisions) from type-(i+1) decisions (which concern type-i decisions). B's self-subordination, prompted by the perceived faultliness of all his past O-decisions, is a 1 -decision he can consistently endorse. Stratification also solves ‘blindspot’ problems.Google ScholarAs Roy Sorensen observes (Blindspots, Oxford University Press, 1988, 379ff.)Google Scholar, no-one can regret a choice at the moment he makes it. Hence, , B cannot regret all his 0-choices at the moment he makes a 0-choice, since he cannot regret the 0-choice he is then making. However, he can regret a string of past 0-choices, view them as evidence that his future 0-choices will be regrettable, and as a result (l-)choose to let A 0-choose for him in the future. B can and will endorse this (l-)choice when making it.Google Scholar

⁷ IIi does not require A and B to interact.Google Scholar

⁸ When archaeologists unearth a previously unknown culture, people always want to know whether it had writing and the wheel.

⁹ This phrase is Eugene Valberg's.

¹⁰ A strengthening is (∀B)(A≠B⊃ A naturally dominates B).Google Scholar

¹¹ James Bayley and Nickolas Pappas both pointed out this ambiguity to me.

¹² In effect, the mean of inventiveness within A is shifted two standard deviations to the right of the mean of inventiveness within B, a major displacement. I assume the variance within both populations is identical.Google Scholar

¹³ This point cuts more deeply than the truism that sufficiently high probabilities are practical certainties. Imagine a group of atoms, a random 80% of which are in an excited state at any one time, that makes a detector flash ‘On’ whenever 70% of the atoms are excited. No atom is necessarily excited, and no one microstate is causally necessary, but every microstate prompts an ‘On’ reading. The relation of the group to the detector is invariable, hence, so far, ‘natural.’Google ScholarSee the classic discussion in Nagel, E., The Structure of Science (Harcourt, Brace and World: NY, 1961), pp. 313–315.Google Scholar

¹⁴ This temporal dimension resembles the modulus of stimulation for ‘stimulus meaning’; see Quine, W. V., Word and Object (MIT: Cambridge, 1960) chapter 2.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Assuming determinism, two organisms that develop differently after exposure to the same post-natal environment must have differed at the moment of exposure, i.e at birth.

¹⁶ ‘Innate’ here does not mean ‘heritable’ as used in population biology. In principle, a trait T can be congenital without being genotypic, although I minimize this possibility where groups are concerned.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Again assuming determinism, organisms exposed to e that display P in E must differ from those that that do not by a trait T' which precedes exposure to e.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The argument is reminiscent of the familiar deduction theorem. If, given contingency e, (O is exposed to E⇒P(O)) then (‘e & O is exposed to E]⇒P(O)), where ⇒ is causal implication.Google Scholar

¹⁹ ‘Bonano died of natural causes. Four bullets entered his heart, so naturally he died.’ Breslin, J., The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight (Ballantine, NY, 1964).Google Scholar

²⁰ Janet Radcliffe, Richards' suggestion in The Skeptical Feminist (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980)Google Scholar

²¹ Larry Wright proposed this analysis of function in ‘Functions,’ Philosophical Review 82 (1973), 139–168,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Teleological Explanations, (Berkeley, CA, 1976.)Google Scholar There are thought to be definitive counterexamples to Wright inChristopher, Boorse, ‘Wright on Functions,’ Philosophical Review 85 (1976), 7086Google Scholar and ‘On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1975), 49–68;Google Scholaralso see Mark, Bedau, ‘Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?,’ Journal of Philosophy 88, 11: 11 1991, 647–655Google Scholar and Alvin, Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 198–209.Google Scholar A generalization of Wright's analysis meeting these counterexamples is sketched in Michael, Levin, ‘Homosexuality, Abnormality and Civil Rights,’ Public Affairs Quarterly 10, 1 (1996), 31-38;Google Scholar a more detailed version will appear in ‘Plantinga on Proper Function and the Theory of Evolution,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1997. The usage suggested here is beginning to spread among biologists.Google Scholar

²² The environments in which (I)-(IIIiii) hold (because of natural traits) must be restricetd. As deposited naked on Mars need not be able to conquer a comparable force of Bs. It may be enough that (I)-(IIIiii) hold in the union of A's and B's ancestral environments, or in all environments which permit human society.Google Scholar

²³ The dependence of man on animals, which explains animal husbandry, is innate.

²⁴ The primary/secondary distinction is less clear for artworks, whose purpose is elicitation of responses. A song can be legitimately criticized simply for grating on listeners' ears. Even so, artworks must have intrinsic qualities—pitch of the notes, for instance—that are responded to. Evaluation of artworks predictability centres on these ‘primary’ qualities.

²⁵ Primary/secondary confusions occur in other contexts, (i) many opponents of the death penalty argue that the efforts of abolitions make it too expensive and time-consuming to carry out. But if capital punishment would be just and deterrent, these delays discredit abolitionists, not capital punishment, (ii) The Volstead Act is said to have been a bad idea because it did not stop drinking and strengthened organized crime. True enough, but would Prohibition have been a good idea if compliance had been extensive—if, that is, people had observed it by refraining from alcohol? If so, Prohibition was a good idea; the bad idea was making it mandatory.

²⁶ Ayn, Rand, as I understand her, faults socialism for frustrating certain aspects of human flourishing essential to man's nature. But if the flourishing is essential, how can socialism or anything else impede it?Google Scholar

²⁷ It is often argued that egalitarian democracies are more stratified by ability than traditional caste-bound societies, where intelligence, leadership and other personal qualities have a smaller role in determining status.