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Not Going to Hell on One's Own
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
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Liberalism, or at least twentieth century liberalism, is today out of fashion amongst the electorate of the United States and Britain. Even within the academy—often, contrary to liberalism itself, one of the last institutions to reflect major shifts in ideology—it appears to be losing its grip. The rise of neo-contractarianism in social and political philosophy and neo-conservatism in economics are only two pieces of evidence of its demise. Nevertheless, reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated in some quarters of social philosophy; in particular, it still thrives as the received opinion whenever the issue of paternalism is raised. And, of course, the single most important liberal standard-bearer here is John Stuart Mill.
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References
1 John, D. Hudson, ‘The Principle of Paternalism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 14, No. 226 (January 1977Google Scholar),61.
2 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XVII, J. M., Robson (ed.) (University of Toronto Press, 1965Google Scholar), 223; hereafter referred to as C.W.
3 Amy, Gutmann, ‘Children, Paternalism and Education: A Liberal Argument’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, No. 4 (1980Google Scholar), 340-341.
4 In some cases involving children there need not be so serious a risk as death. See In re Sampson, 317, N.Y.S. 2d 641 (1970); noted by William Ruddick in ‘Parents and Life Prospects’, in Having Children, Onora O'Neill and William Ruddick (eds) (Oxford University Press, 1979), 132. And, at the other extreme, a New York Supreme Court Justice refused to order a needed transfusion for a dying, unconscious Jehovah's Witness parent against her husband's wishes. Noted by Joel Feinberg in ‘The Child's Right to an Open Future’, in Whose Child?, William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (eds) (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1980), 130.
5 C.W. XVII, 294.
6 Ibid.
7 See, for example, Kai, Nielsen, ‘Justifying Revolution’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37, No. 4 (1977), 518, and Frank Cunningham, ‘Pluralism and the Class Struggle’, Science and Society XXXIX, No. 4 (1975–1976Google Scholar), 391-393. The distinction between subjective and objective interests is similar to one drawn by Hodson between one's empirical will (sometimes encumbered by ignorance, stress, compulsion, etc.) and one's hypothetical, unencumbered empirical will. But it differs in one important respect. Hodson says: ‘The Principle of Paternalism allows intervention only when the hypothetical unencumbered decisions of the person to be coerced are supportive of the intervention. This means that if the person were not in the encumbered circumstance, he would expressly consent to the intervention’ (p. 66, his italics). But if the person were not in the encumbered circumstance, i.e. not under stress or ignorant, etc., then presumably intervention would not be necessary.
8 In this paper I do not deal with the problem of distinguishing cases where paternalism is morally permissible from cases where such intervention is morally required.
9 Satisfaction of both our subjective and objective interests requires that, on most occasions, we be allowed to ‘do our own thing’ in matters primarily selfregarding. Why? Among other reasons, people are, as Mill pointed out, often mistaken about the concept of others’ objective interests, and so there is a real danger in their having a ‘moral carte blanche’ to satisfy what they believe to be our objective interests. How blanche the carte should be will be briefly discussed later.
10 For those who object to my committing Mill to a controversial distinction and doctrine on the basis of one brief passage in one brief book, consider Mill's discussion of the nature of utility in Utilitarianism. Here, it will be recalled, he insists that in striving to maximize utility, utilitarians are obliged to consider the quantity and quality of pleasure. And his distinction between the two employs in part the distinction between subjective and objective interests. ‘If I am asked what I mean by difference in quality of pleasure, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as pleasure, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there is one to which all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. … It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they know only their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides (Collected Works, X, 211).
11 Ten, C. L., Mill on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1980Google Scholar), 112.
12 Ethical non-cognitivists might here object to including the question of the sinfulness of blood transfusions among the ‘facts’ or ‘information’ relevant to determining an individual's objective interests. We could, therefore, instead speak of the fact that the acceptance of a blood transfusion is not disapproved of by any supernaturally powerful Creator and inspirer of the Christian Bible. I owe this point to Danny Goldstick.
13 ‘The above-quoted scripture applies to animal blood’, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Question of Blood (Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 1977), 6. And surely it must apply only to animals and their blood; Genesis 9:3-4 is not intended to sanction cannibalism on condition that human blood be drained before human flesh is eaten!
14 Ibid., 8.
15 Ibid., 10. Note that the very phrasing of the question, ‘Does this proper aversion apply to human blood also?’ implies that Leviticus 17:10-14 deals exclusively with animal blood.
16 For additional argument on this matter, see Anthony, Hoekema, The Four Major Cults (W. B. Eerdemans Publishing Co., 1963Google Scholar), 251-252, and W. R., Martin and N. H., Klamm, Jehovah of the Watch Tower, 2nd revised edn (ZondervanGoogle Scholar, 1963).
17 Some supporters of some of these laws have argued that such support does not entail a commitment to paternalism in so far as drug abuse, riding without a motorcycle helmet or seat belt, etc., are likely to have other-regarding consequences which justify laws against such behaviour. If this is taken to be a claim about the motivation of legislators who passed such laws, it is, I believe, histori-cally false. If it is a claim about the justification of such laws, it is dubious As Mill himself insisted: ‘If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than undei the pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering tc society benefits which society does not pretend it has the right to exact’ (Collectei Works, XVIII, 282).
18 Discussion with Frank Cunningham and Danny Goldstick has helpec clarify my thinking about subjective and objective interests.