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On Equivocation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2003

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Abstract

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Equivocation is often described as a fallacy.In this short note I argue that it is not a logical concept but an epistemic one.The argument of one who equivocates is not logically flawed, but it is unpersuasive in a very distinctive way.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003