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On Not Being Sorry About The Morally Bad

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 May 2005

Saul Smilansky
Saul Smilansky
Affiliation:
University of Haifa, Israel
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Abstract

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Bad things often happen, and morally good people ought to be sorry that they happen. What could be more obvious to a good person than that one ought to be sorry about the occurrence of bad things? And even more so, it would seem, if the bad things occur in one's vicinity, or one is involved with them. I argue that sometimes it is morally permissible not to be sorry when bad things happen. Perhaps it is even permissible to be happy about it.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 80 , Issue 2 , April 2005, pp. 261 - 265
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2005