1 Ludwig, Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F., Pears and B. F., McGuiness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).Google Scholar

2 But the first allusion to the distinction is in 2.171-2.172.

3 See e.g. Bernard, Williams, ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, reprinted in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 163, and Jonathan, Lear, The Disappearing “We”’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 58, (1984), 242. I have tried to develop this line of thought in ‘Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning’, in Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1985).Google Scholar

4 This example is derived from an unpublished lecture course given by Ron, Williams at Colorado State University.Google Scholar

5 I believe that there are also some useful examples to be gleaned from mathematics; see e.g. my 'set Theory, Skolem's, Paradox and the Tractatus’, in Analysis 45 (1985).Google Scholar

6 5.634 is also relevant here.

7 Max, Black makes this point in A Companion to Wittgenstein's ‘Tractatus’ (Cambridge University Press, 1964), 190.Google Scholar

8 Immanuel, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933).Google Scholar

9 Cf. also Wittgenstein's Notebooks: 1914–1916, G. H., von Wright and G. E. M., Anscombe (eds) and trans. G. E. M., Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 74, where the idea that I am given the world is expressed explicitly and linked in an interesting way to the will. See Colin, McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford University Press, 1983), 101-104, for one attempt to unpack the idea.Google Scholar

10 Martin, Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S., Churchill (Indiana University Press, 1962), 31, my emphasis.Google Scholar

11 Arthur Schopenhauer, , The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J., Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), 3.Google Scholar

12 For evidence for this influence, see Allan, Janik and Stephen, Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Touchstone, 1973), passim, and Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford University Press, 1958), 5.Google Scholar

13 J. G., Fichte, The Vocation of Man, ed. and trans. Roderick M., Chisholm (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 74.Google Scholar

14 See e.g. Donald, Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

15 Ibid. 183.

16 ‘The World Well Lost’, reprinted in his The Consequences Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), 14, his emphasis.Google Scholar

17 Critique of Pure Reason, B157, Kant's emphasis. Cf. also his Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White, Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1956), 101.Google Scholar

18 See e.g. the Critique of Pure Reason, B165.

19 Cf. Charles, Taylor, ‘The Validity of Transcendental Arguments’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1979), 154; and Gareth, Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford University Press, 1982), 161-162, and ‘Molyneux's Question’, in his Collected Papers (Oxford University Press, 1985), esp. 371 and 396-399.Google Scholar

20 See e.g. the ‘General Note on the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology’, in the Critique of Pure Reason, B428-432, and the Critique of Practical Reason, 101. For more on the connection, see Anthony, Holiday, ‘Wittgenstein's Silence: Philosophy, Ritual and the Limits ofLanguage’, in Language and Communication 5 (1985).Google Scholar

21 For an interesting echo of this idea, see Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1981), 136.Google Scholar

22 In David, Pears, Wittgenstein (London: Fontana, 1971), 89-90, this is related back interestingly to Wittgenstein's ethics. Cf. also H. O., Mounce, Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 91, where he claims that the truth behind the solipsistic remarks is that I (the subject) have a neighbourless point of view on the world.Google Scholar

23 See esp. the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, A341-405, and differently in the second edition, B399-432.

24 Cf. Thomas, Nagel, Part I (‘The Mind’) of ‘The Limits of Objectivity’, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values: 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1980), ‘The Objective Self in Knowledge and Mind: Essays in Honour of Norman, Malcolm, Carl, Ginet and Sydney, Shoemaker (eds) (Oxford University Press, 1983), and The View From Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986), Ch. IV.Google Scholar

25 Brian McGuiness develops this idea in an extremely helpful way in his ‘The Mysticism of the Tractatus’’, in Philosophical Review 75 (1966).

26 Even in his later work, where Wittgenstein recoils from the importance which he here attaches to these thoughts, he still speaks of the general form of a proposition as a ‘frame through which we look’ (Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M., Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §114-see also §§134-136).Google Scholar

27 See e.g. §20 of the second edition version.

28 The phrase ‘transcendental solipsism’ is borrowed from P. M. S., Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience (Oxford University Press, 1972), e.g. Ch. III.Google Scholar

29 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis, White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950).Google Scholar

30 An alternative approach to the question of why there should be this connection between (so-called) transcendental solipsism and logical form is to be found in J., Hintikka, ‘On Wittgenstein's “Solipsism”’, in Mind 67 (1958), where he argues that Wittgenstein ‘is interested only in what can be said to be mine necessarily; for otherwise he would be doing empirical psychology. But the only necessity there is … is the empty tautological necessity of logic’ (89, Hintikka's emphasis). Hintikka claims that the metaphysical subject must therefore be identified with language; they have the same limits.Google Scholar

31 See e.g. ‘On Concept and Object’ in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Peter, Geach and Max, Black (eds), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952). Cf. also in this connection Plato's Sophist, 261c6-262e2, and Plutarch, Platonic Questions, X, 1011c.Google Scholar

32 See the Critique of Pure Reason, B72.

33 Op. cit., 238.

34 Cf. Michael, Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973), 227, and The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy,129; Gareth, Evans, The Varieties of Reference,26; Colin, McGinn, ‘The Structure of Content’, in Thought and Object, Andrew Woodfield (ed), (Oxford University Press, 1982), 223; and, in a somewhat different way, my ‘Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning’, 138-139.Google Scholar

35 Cf. the paper cited in note 34, where I try to explore these ideas in the light of Wittgenstein's later work.

36 Cf. again the passage from Michael Dummett cited in footnote 21.

37 See e.g. the Philosophical Investigations, §109 and §§122-128, and The Blue Book (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 26-27.Google Scholar

38 Cf. again the works cited in footnote 3.

39 Cf. Jonathan Lear, op. cit., 240-241, where he writes, ‘Post-neurotic consciousness is fundamentally more complex than a healthy consciousness that has never suffered disease or cure’. (Another helpful paper by Lear which casts light on many of these issues is ‘Leaving the World Alone’, in Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982).)

40 One could speak here of elucidatory or illuminating nonsense. Cf. Peter Hacker, op. cit., 1-4.

41 Cf. the following quotation from an unpublished early draft of John McDowell, ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, in Synthése 58 (1984): ‘No doubt there is something right in finding a kind of idealism in the [Wittgensteinian] thought that we are guardians or trustees of meaning, not its puppets or slaves—so that, to put it in … [a] dangerous way, we are involved on the right-hand sides of statements like ‘“Diamonds are hard’ is true if and only if diamonds are hard”. But if there is a kind of idealism here … it is probably something we should do well not to try to state as a thesis at all; but perhaps we can say that it shows itself in the relation between language, or thought, and reality’.

42 Consider in particular some indefinite ‘transcendent’-sounding uses which he makes of the pronoun ‘we’, as argued convincingly by Bernard Williams in op. cit. Two examples might be the Philosophical Investigations, §200, and, better, Philosophical Grammar, R., Rhees and trans. A. J. P., Kenny (eds) (Oxford: Blackwell,1974), Part II, §42.Google Scholar

43 Cf. Morris, Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 1972), 389, and Carl B., Boyer, The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development (New York: Dover, 1949), 223.Google Scholar

44 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G. H., von Wright, R., Rhees and G. E. M., Anscombe (eds) and trans. G. E. M., Anscombe (Oxford:Blackwell, 1978).Google Scholar

45 Zettel, G. E. M., Anscombe and G. H., von Wright (eds) and trans. G. E. M., Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), §314.Google Scholar

46 Cf. Kant, , the Critique of Pure Reason, A298/B354-5.Google Scholar

47 This quotation is from the Sophist, 230c-d, trans. F. M., Cornford. The opening quotation was from the Letters 7, 341c-d, trans. Frederick, Copleston.Google Scholar

48 I should like to thank Philip, Turetzky for many valuable conversations on these topics. Thanks are also due to Timothy, Crane, Naomi, Eilan, Ross, Harrison, Philip, Percival and the editor of Philosophy for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.Google Scholar