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On the Identity Theory of Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2000

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Abstract

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In his recent ‘A Prolegomenon to an Identity Theory of Truth’ (Vol. 74, 1999) Stewart Candlish discusses the so called identity theory of truth.His aim in the article is to clear away initial difficulties that apparently stand in the way of developing the budding theory.There is one difficulty, however, that, by Candlish's lights, cannot be overcome—at least not easily.My aim in this paper is to help the identity theory by showing that, pace Candlish, the given difficulty is merely apparent. I do not ‘solve’ the alleged problem; I dissolve it.Dissolution, however, is solution enough.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000