^{page 72 note 1} A simple and definite term is needed to distinguish the theory of action sub ratione boni from Ethics, the theory of moral action. Aretaics, which is used by John Grote for the science of virtue as distinct from duty, is too narrow for our purpose; virtuous action being only one form of action sub ratione boni. Unless its meaning be unnaturally stretched, it excludes the pursuit of truth and beauty. Eudamonics is the best term I can think of, so long as ε?δαιμον?α is freed from association either with ?δον? (pleasure) or with (felicity) self-realization as the ultimate Good. The difficulty arises from the fact that the distinction between the two types of action was never clearly grasped before Kant.

^{page 73 note 1} See the discussion on his youthful robbing of the pear-tree, Conf. ii. 4 ff. The sin here was sheer rebellion; there was no advantage desired or gained in the act. Hence this seemingly trivial incident becomes significant for Augustine of the essential nature of sin as sin, and accordingly receives lengthy treatment in the Confessions.

^{page 73 note 2} Rom. vii. 19. The “good” here is the law of righteousness, rebellion against which is provoked by the opposing (positive) “law of sin.” The context shows that St. Paul is thinking of something very different from action sub ratione boni or from evil as defect of good. On the religious (as distinct from the moral) plane, the conflict is overcome and evil loses its positive reality; see Rom. viii, esp. 31 ff. But such a solution lies outside the scope of ethics. Reference will be made to it in the concluding article.

^{page 74 note 1} Croce: Philosophy of the Practical (E.T.), Part I. Sect. I. c. 3; cf. also Alexander, : Space, Time, and Deity, vol. ii. pp. 118 ff. 31 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 74 note 2} On the whole question of the definition of good as “object of desire or interest” and the dependence of good on “desire,” see Ross, : The Right and the Good, chap, iv, pp. 80 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 75 note 1} If it be objected that the bad desire is desire for a lesser good, it remains true that the fact of the illusion by which the lesser good appears the greater is itself evil.

^{page 75 note 2} Not “what ought to be desired,” for this would make goodness dependent on Tightness.

^{page 75 note 3} Letter of August 18,1645, Adam and Tannery, iv. 275 (quoted by Gilson in his Commentaire on Descartes’ Discourse, p. 255). Cf. Aquinas, Sum. Th. Ia-IIae, 2. 7. ad. Resp, “beatitudo est aliquid animæ; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam.” Of course Descartes accepts the traditional doctrine that all action is sub ratione boni (see letter to Mersenne, A. and T. I. 366).

^{page 76 note 1} See Moore, : Principia Ethica, § 59.Google Scholar

^{page 76 note 2} For self, that is to say, as well as for others. Of course every desire is the desire of the individual who desires, but this is a trivial statement. The question is what the desire is for.

^{page 76 note 3} Cf. Questions of King Milinda, iii. 5. 10: “The Blessed One passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains for the formation of another individual. The Blessed One has come to an end, and it cannot be pointed out of him that he is here or there.” For the Madhyamaka school of Buddhists, nirväna is neither a positive state of being nor a negative state of non-being; even the knowledge that phenomena have ceased to appear is absent; bondage, liberation, and Buddha himself are phenomenal. Parallels might also be found in Persian Sufism.

^{page 78 note 1} Rep., 475D—480A.

^{page 78 note 2} Rep., 523A—525E.

^{page 79 note 1} Rep., 547B—548C.

^{page 79 note 2} There is no suggestion here that self-assertion is temporally prior to social co-operation. The point is that conscious reflection, on the part of an intrinsically social being, begins with self-assertive revolt against social restraints. This truth is implicit in the Jahvist's version of the story of the Fall in Genesis iii, as Hegel realized (Logic, Wallace, E. T., pp. 54–57Google Scholar).

^{page 79 note 3} On the concept of “humanity,” see Bradley, —Ethical Studies, pp. 205, 231–2,343–45.Google Scholar Bradley distinguishes its relevance forreligion from itsrelevance (or irrelevance) for morality.

^{page 80 note1} On the use of the term “infinite” I follow Bradley, —Ethical Studies, pp. 74–78.Google Scholar I am well aware that mathematicians’ refuse to admit the term in any sense save that in which it is defined in mathematics. But I can appeal to a noble array of philosophers in declining to submit to this restriction.

^{page 80 note 2} On religious experience, see the next paper. I hold that the religious life can be distinguished alike from the moral life and from the life sub ratione boni, though it presents close affinities with the latter.

^{page 81 note 1} Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, ad init.

^{page 81 note 2} Barth, Karl, The Word of God and the Word of Man (E.T.). pp. 137–8Google Scholar; cf. pp. 138–9.

^{page 81 note 3} Rep., 474C—475C.

^{page 82 note 1} See Professor Taylor, A. E., Knowing and Believing (Presidential Address to Aristotelian Society, 1928), esp. pp. 19 ff.;Google Scholar and my article on Logic and Faith (Journ. of Phil. Studies, October 1926).

^{page 83 note 1} See Bradley, , Ethical Studies, pp. 74 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 83 note 2} The Good must be real, yet evil is a positive fact; and, over and above positive evils, defect of good is everywhere to be found in the world of finite experience. For ethics the ideal value remains unrealized, an ideal over against fact. This severance of fact and value is overcome in different ways, both by religion and by metaphysics. But for moral experience, and also for action sub ratione boni, the severance presents an unsolved and insoluble antinomy. See Ethical Studies, “Concluding Remarks,” esp.s pp. 313,322,326.