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Some More Thoughts About Thought and Talk: Davidson and Fellows on Animal Belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2002

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Abstract

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Donald Davidson's argument that non-linguistic creatures lack beliefs rests on two premises: (1) to be a believer, one must have the concept of belief, and (2) to have the concept of belief, one must interpret the utterances of others. However, Davidson's defense of these premises is overly compressed and unconvincing. In a recent issue of Philosophy, Roger Fellows provides new arguments for these premises. In this paper, I explain why I'm not persuaded by Fellows' attempt to bolster Davidson's line of reasoning and cast doubt on Davidson's and Fellows' overall strategy of attaching special significance to the concept of belief.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2002