^{page 1 note 1} Cowling, Maurice, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1963).Google Scholar

Rees, John, Mill and his Early Critics (University of Leicester Press, 1956)Google Scholar. Also the following articles in Political Studies: ‘A Phase in the Development of Mill's Ideas on Liberty’, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1958, 33–44)Google Scholar; ‘A Re-reading of Mill on Liberty’, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (1960, 113–129)Google Scholar; ‘Was Mill for Liberty?’ Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1966, 72–77)Google Scholar. There is also a reference to the short piece on Mill by Ryan, Alan, The Listener, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1908 (10 21, 1965, 620–622).Google Scholar

It ought, perhaps, to be made clear that the article ‘Was Mill for Liberty?’ is a critical review of Cowling's book.

^{page 2 note 1} This survey is compiled from the two articles, ‘A Re-Reading of Mill on Liberty’ and ‘Was Mill for Liberty?’. Rees is revising his interpretation of the principle to include more consideration of ‘rights’ and how they connect with Mill's idea of justice. Some of my criticism may in this sense be premature.

^{page 3 note 1} Principles of Political Economy, Book V, Ch. XI, Section 2 (University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 938Google Scholar. All quotations and references in the article are from the editions of the works cited.

^{page 3 note 2} On Liberty (Everyman Edition), p. 135.Google Scholar

^{page 3 note 3} Utilitarianism (Everyman Edition), p. 45.Google Scholar

^{page 4 note 1} On Liberty, p. 69.Google Scholar

^{page 4 note 2} The introduction indicates the influence of Bentham's view of what a true principle consists in. See Chapter 2 of The Principles of Morals and Legislation. It also confirms what Mill said elsewhere; that the effective restraints on freedom of opinion and discussion stem ‘from the general habit, both in opinion and conduct, of making adherence to custom the rule of life’. Principles, p. 935.Google Scholar

^{page 5 note 1} ‘A Phase in the Development of Mill's Ideas on Liberty’, p. 39.Google Scholar

^{page 5 note 2} Autobiography (World's Classics Edition), p. 163.Google Scholar

^{page 6 note 1} Representative Government (Everyman Edition), p. 217.Google Scholar

^{page 6 note 2} The Principles of Political Economy, p. 936.Google Scholar

^{page 6 note 3} Op. cit., p. 937.Google Scholar

^{page 7 note 1} Ibid., p. 938.

^{page 7 note 2} See for instance Wolin, Sheldon S., Politics and Vision (London, 1961), Ch. 9, p. 349Google Scholar. He interprets Mill as proposing ‘that the tyranny of opinion be invoked in order to promote some of his own pet causes’.

^{page 7 note 3} Principles, Bk. II, Ch. XIII, Section 2, p. 372.Google Scholar

^{page 8 note 1} On Liberty, p. 132.Google Scholar

^{page 8 note 2} Letter to Sterling, London, 24th May 1832. Letter 50, p. 101, The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, ed. Mineka, F. E., Collected Works, Vol. XII (University of Toronto Press).Google Scholar

^{page 9 note 1} Mill on Bentham (Leavis) London, 1959, p. 71Google Scholar. The survey of Mill's argument is taken from pp. 70–74. See also pp. 66–68.

^{page 9 note 2} Listener, p. 620Google Scholar. This may be unfair to Ryan. I have only seen the (reduced?) Listener version of his account. Nor does his interpretation rest solely on this point, but he cannot use the essay on Bentham to show that Mill made morality concerned with preserving minimal forbearances.

^{page 10 note 1} Reprinted as Appendix B in Bulwer, Edward Lytton's England and the English (Paris, 1834, 376–388)Google Scholar. Mill wrote this piece at Bulwer's request and, contrary to expectation, it was reprinted ‘ipsissimis verbis’. For Mill's comments on this criticism see letters 72 (p. 152), 82 (p. 172) and 111 (p. 236) in The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill.

^{page 10 note 2} On Liberty, p. 135Google Scholar, ‘unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness’.

^{page 11 note 1} Op. cit., p. 134.Google Scholar

^{page 11 note 2} Ibid., pp. 134–135.

^{page 11 note 3} There are many problem passages. In particular, perhaps, those on the theories of social right advanced by the United Kingdom Alliance (the temperance pressure group) and the ‘illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual’ achieved by Sabbatarian legislation. On Liberty, pp. 144–147Google Scholar. It should be stressed, however, that the interpretation being offered is not intended to exclude the clear distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding ‘areas’ and conduct; it suggests only a modification in how this might be approached.

^{page 12 note 1} Was Mill for Liberty?, p. 76.Google Scholar

^{page 12 note 2} On Liberty, p. 139Google Scholar. Cowling does give full weight to this in chapter five of his book. Much of Mill's point, however, is obscured by arguing, as Cowling does, that to understand ‘the nature of Mill's purpose, it is essential to avoid detailed entanglement in the principles by which relations between government, public opinion and individual action are to be regulated’ (p. 98).

^{page 12 note 3} On Liberty, p. 133.Google Scholar

^{page 12 note 4} Mill's ‘purpose’, says Cowling, is to ‘make the world safe for “rational” education, “rational” thinking and the assured leadership of the “rational clerisy”.’ This accounts for his fear of democracy and his love of individuality (p. 105).

^{page 13 note 1} Rees does appreciate Mill's dislike of learning by cram and his support of any activity as ‘educational’ which draws out the different faculties of the mind. Rees, Pappe, H. O. on Mill, Political Studies, Vol. X, No. 2 (1962, 199)Google Scholar. As far as I know, he has never specified the implications of this for the self- and other-regarding category. The review of Cowling discusses Mill on education in the context of the ‘overwhelming importance’ attached ‘to individuality and diversity in general conduct and opinions’ (p. 73).

^{page 13 note 2} Principles, Bk. V, Ch. IX, Sect. 7, 903–904.Google Scholar

^{page 13 note 3} Chapters on Socialism (American Book Exchange, New York, 1880), p. 266.Google Scholar

^{page 13 note 4} Op. cit., p. 396.Google Scholar

^{page 13 note 5} This needs to be stressed to indicate how far away Mill was from the popular evolutionary understanding of choice and character. Evolutionary theories of ethics characteristically asserted man's determination by inherited experience of utility. It is both significant and interesting that Darwin thought Mill's ‘most serious blemish’ was his belief that the moral faculties were acquired and not innate. Descent of Man (2nd Edition, London, 1877) Ch. IV, p. 98Google Scholar. Mill's notion of an adequate epistemology is relevant here; what was needed was a ‘more complete analysis’ of the psychological process by which ‘original tendency’ is modified by ulterior or interpreted experience. See ‘Bain's Psychology’, Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. III (2nd Edit. London, 1875), in particular, pp. 146–148.Google Scholar

^{page 14 note 1} Principles, Bk. IV, Ch. VII, Sect. 4, p. 768.Google Scholar

^{page 14 note 2} Ibid. Sect. 2, p. 763.

^{page 14 note 3} Ibid. Bk. II, Ch. VII, Sect. 2, p. 280. My quotation follows the MS and the '48 and '49 editions of the Principles. The edition does not, however, affect the general point.

^{page 15 note 1} Autobiography, pp. 197–198.Google Scholar

^{page 15 note 2} Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy, p. 386.Google Scholar

^{page 15 note 3} The Subjection of Women is the most revealing essay I know of for Mill's general arguments on social mobility. See, in particular, Ch. 1, Sect. 13–15, pp. 44–47 (Stanton Coit edition, London, 1906).

^{page 16 note 1} London, 9th February 1830. Letter 29, pp. 48–49. The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill.

^{page 16 note 2} Representative Government, pp. 266–267Google Scholar. It should be made clear the élite will not be a separate ruling ‘group’ or ‘party’; it is simply a means of persuasion (education) institutionalised in government.

^{page 16 note 3} Cowling argues the reverse of this on p. 159. For Mill's considerable scepticism concerning the practicality and desirability of élite rule, see the review article ‘Centralisation’, Edinburgh Review (04, 1862), pp. 323–358, in particular pp. 349–350Google Scholar. Also the review of ‘Guizot's Essays and Lectures on History’, in Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. II, pp. 218–282Google Scholar. See in particular p. 238.

^{page 16 note 4} A good deal of the relevant evidence for Mill's views on positivism in general and Comtism in particular has been assembled in chapter seven of Simon, W. H.'s European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century, Cornell, 1963.Google Scholar

^{page 17 note 1} A System of Logic, Vol. II (7th Edition, London 1868), pp. 454–455.Google Scholar

^{page 17 note 2} Mill's clearest statement of this is, perhaps, with regard to Political Economy. See his speech on ‘Maguire's Motion on the State of Ireland’ (03 1868)Google Scholar. This is reprinted in Chapters and Speeches on the Irish Land Question (London, 1870), pp. 108–125Google Scholar. See in particular pp. 117–118.

^{page 17 note 3} Mill believed that social and political experimentation was educational; it made possible the improvement of individual conduct and character. A ‘socialist’ was anyone committed to questioning the system of private property and competition with this end in view. See in particular his review of Newman, 's ‘Lectures on Political Economy’, The Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, 10 1851, Vol. LVI, pp. 83–101.Google Scholar