^{page 1073 note 1} For a concise statement of Hegel's conception of the object of philosophy, see Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1925), pp. 471–472, and Wm. Wallace, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially of His Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), pp. 172, 271.

^{page 1073 note 2} W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, A Systematic Exposition (London: Macmillan and Co., 1894), p. 308.

This famous footnote may be found in Ed. Georg Lasson, Hegels Sämtliche Werke (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1930), v, 211.

A defense of Krug and an attack on the philosophy of nature as conceived by Schelling and Hegel appear in Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, 3d Ital. ed. (1912), trans. by Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan and Co., 1915), pp. 170–173.

Further interesting comment on Krug and a very lucid exposition of Hegel's conception of nature appear in Wallace, op. cit., pp. xii, 50, 77–79, 87.

^{page 1074 note 3} Stace, op. cit., pp. 298–299.

^{page 1074 note 4} In this regard Croce makes the following comment on Hegel:

Error was confused with particular truth, and, as philosophical error had become for Hegel particular truths, so particular truths were bound to be associated with errors and to become philosophical errors, to lose all intrinsic measure, to be brought to the level of speculative truth, and to be treated as nothing but imperfect forms of philosophy.

For this reason, Hegel did not completely succeed in recognizing the nature of the aesthetic, or of the historical, or of the naturalistic activity; that is to say, of art, or of history, or of the physical and natural sciences.

Op. cit., pp. 120–121.

^{page 1074 note 5} Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking, ii, 6–7, ll. 4, 24–27.

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the writings of Whitman, including those quoted from other writers, are to the ten-volume Paumanok edition, The Complete Writings of Wall Whitman, ed. by R. M. Bucke, T. B. Harned, and H. L. Traubel (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902). Although these volumes are in two sections, Leaves of Grass, in three volumes, and Prose Works, in seven volumes, for convenience the references are to Volumes I–X; the first volume of the Prose Works becomes Vol. IV of the set. In the poetry, when possible, lines are numbered by sections; otherwise, from the beginning of the poem. In the prose, the lines are numbered from the beginning of the particular page cited.

^{page 1075 note 6} Ibid., ii, 13, ll. 165–173.

^{page 1075 note 7} One's Self I Sing, i, 1, ll. 4–5.

^{page 1075 note 8} Beginning My Studies, i, 10, l. 3.

^{page 1075 note 9} Song of Myself, i, 46–7, 13: 8–9.

^{page 1075 note 10} See especially By Blue Ontario's Shores, ii, 121–124, Sec. 15, 16, 17.

^{page 1075 note 11} For Whitman and Romanticism, see Newton Arvin, Whitman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938), pp. 174–185; Jos. Warren Beach, The Concept of Nature in Nineteenth Century English Poetry (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936), pp. 370, 394; Bliss Perry, Walt Whitman, His Life and Work (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1906), pp. 277–280; Ed. Norman Foerster, American Poetry and Prose (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), p. 885; Robt. P. Falk, “Walt Whitman and German Thought,” JEGP, xl, no. 3 (1941), pp. 329–330; F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 543, 547.

For Hegel's rejection of romanticism, see Croce, op. cit., p. 49, and Wallace, op. cit., pp. 52–54.

^{page 1076 note 12} On abstract and concrete, see Thilly, op. cit., pp. 467–468; Wallace, op. cit., pp. 302–304; Stace, op. cit., pp. 104–105.

^{page 1076 note 13} See, for example, Stace, op. cit., pp. 302–311; Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Hegelianism and Personality (Edinburgh and London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1887), pp. 101–141; Croce, op. cit., pp. 193–201.

^{page 1076 note 14} Beginning My Studies, i, 10,l. 5; Letter cxlvi (to W. S. Kennedy), Ed. Emory Holloway, Walt Whitman, Complete Poetry and Selected Prose and Letters (New York: Random House, Inc., 1938), pp. 1045–1046.

^{page 1076 note 15} The mystic element in Whitman has been long recognized. See, for example, Mody C. Boatright, “Whitman and Hegel,” Univ. of Tex. Studies in English, No. 9 (1929), 145; Beach, op. cit., pp. 378–379, 383, 385, 389; Arvin, op. cit., pp. 172–175, 181, 183, 197–198, 219–229, 257–259; Wm. S. Kennedy, Reminiscences of Walt Whitman (London: Alex. Gardner, 1896), pp. 83, 86, 95, 99–100, 138–139; Wm. M. Salter, Walt Whitman (Philadelphia: S. Burns Weston, 1899), pp. 6, 19; Geo. R. Carpenter, Walt Whitman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909), pp. 49–56; John Bailey, Walt Whitman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 10, 55, 73, 77, 79–81, 139, 142, 143–144, 146, 159–160, 180–182, 213–214; Henry Bryan Binns, A Life of Walt Whitman (London: Methuen and Co., 1905), pp. vii, 69–78, 117–121, 149, 152–167, 254, 298–300; Edgar Lee Masters, Whitman (New York: Chas. Scirbner's Sons, 1937), pp. 85–86, 148–150, 277–280; Perry, op. cit., pp. 276, 277, 280; Emory Holloway, Whitman, An Interpretation in Narrative (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 101–112; Ed. Floyd Stovall, Walt Whitman (“Amer. Writers Series”; New York: Amer. Bk. Co., 1934), p. xxxi; Dr. R. M. Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness (Philadelphia: Innes and Sons, 1905), pp. 178–196; Falk, op. cit., pp. 320, 324; Matthiessen, op. cit., pp. 535–543, 549.

For an enlightening distinction between Whitman's mysticism and New England transcendentalism (especially that of Emerson), see Leon Howard, “For a Critique of Whitman's'Transcendentalism,” MLN, xlvii, no. 2 (1932), pp. 79–85.

Whitman himself describes the mystical experience in Song of Myself, i, 38, Sec. 5; Salut au Monde, i, 175, 13:1–8; Hast Never Come to Thee an Hour, ii, 38; Prayer of Columbus, ii, 198–200, ll. 16–46, 51–55; New Precedent Songs, Farewell, ii, 321, ll. 13–14; To The Sunset Breeze, iii, 14–15, ll. 6–9, 13–15; Democratic Vistas, v, 72, ll. 1–3; 94, ll. 7–12; 97, l. 27 to 98, l. 13; 105, l. 14 to 106, l. 3; 134, ll. 9–20; 140,l. 16 to 141, l. 6; As In a Swoon, vii, 29. Most of these references appear also in Bucke, loc. cit.

^{page 1077 note 16} Song of Myself, i, 101, 46:5; Myself and Mine, i, 290, l.28; Arvin, op. cit., p. 219 (Whitman's conversation with Daniel G. Brinton, the archaeologist).

^{page 1077 note 17} Stace, op. cit., p. 364.

A brief lucid distinction between the philosophic thought of Hegel and intuition, with a commentary on Hegel's sharp criticism of mysticism appears in Croce, op. cit., pp. 5–7. Although the mysticism of Whitman is more subdued than that described here, it would nevertheless constitute a strong distinction between Hegel and Whitman.

Croce accuses Hegel of confusing real intuition with the “first reflexion upon sensible knowledge,” pp. 122–124, and of failing to grasp adequately art, intuition, and language, pp. 124–128, 130–133. He gives a sympathetic treatment of ingenuous thought in distinction from the philosophic and of the poet both in comparison and contrast with the philosopher, pp. 16–20. He classes mystics with sentimentalists and apparently denies them both the philosophic robe and the poetic laurels. Suffice it to say that not all critics deny the true mystic either philosophic or poetic insight.

Wallace discusses Hegel's struggle between a sympathy with mystical, intuitional minds and a strong bent for non-visionary reason, leading to the eventual rejection of the former. Op. cit., pp. 38–39, 52–54.

See also Edward Caird, Hegel (London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, reprint 1896), pp. 130–131.

Falk also points out the distinction between Hegel's system of logic and Whitman's mystical, immediate, intuitional perception. Op. cit., pp. 320–323, 324.

^{page 1078 note 18} Carlyle from American Points of View, iv, 323, ll. 3–12.

^{page 1078 note 19} Preparatory Reading and Thought, ix, 169, ll. 11–20.

^{page 1078 note 20} Ibid., ix, 182, ll. 16–17.

^{page 1078 note 21} Song of Myself, i, 64, 24: 53.

^{page 1078 note 22} Ibid., i, 70, 30: 6–7.

^{page 1079 note 23} Quoted by Arvin from Whitman's notes on bird life to show how “this anti-intellectualist” belittled “not merely rational argument but even exact knowledge.” Op. cit., p. 221.

^{page 1079 note 24} Song of the Open Road, i, 181–182, 6:15–16.

^{page 1079 note 25} Op. cit., p. 134. See also Arvin, op. cit., pp. 219–221; Beach, op. cit., p. 378; Salter, op. cit., p. 6; Binns, op. cit., p. 298; Perry, op. cit., p. 264; Falk, op. cit., pp. 319–320; Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 526.

^{page 1079 note 26} Op. cit., p. 143.

^{page 1079 note 27} Boatright, op. cit., p. 134.

Falk points out that “Boatright does not take sufficiently into account other shaping influences on Whitman's thought. The fluid-like, processional state of the universe ... had a basis in contemporary evolutionary science of Lamarck and Darwin whom we know Whitman read.” Op. cit., p. 321. He cites an article by Mrs. Alice Lovelace Cooke (see footnote 47, infra).

Falk expresses doubts similar to those herein expressed, but it should be stated that this discussion was completed before the writer had access to his article.

^{page 1079 note 28} Stace, op. cit., pp. 85, 107–111; Pringle-Pattison, op. cit., pp. 81–82; Thilly, op. cit., p. 465.

^{page 1079 note 29} Stace, op. cit., p. 138; Wallace, op. cit., p. 155.

^{page 1079 note 30} Wallace, op. cit., p. 423; see also Stace, op. cit., p. 221.

^{page 1080 note 31} Song of Myself, i, 36, 3: 16.

^{page 1080 note 32} See Starting from Paumanok, i, 25, 12: 16; Song of Myself, i, 36, 3: 14; 54, 17: 3; 56, 20:1–3; 61, 23: 6; 63, 24: 27; 68, 26: 28; 71, 31: 7; 91, 41: 19; 105, 48: 11, 14; I Sing the Body Electric, i, 113, the entire poem dealing with the miraculousness of the human body; When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd, ii, 95, 3: 4; As Consequent, ii, 127, l. 15; The Return of the Heroes, ii, 133, 7: 19; Miracles, ii, 163; Who Learns My Lesson Complete, ii, 168; Passage to India, ii, 194–195, 8: 12, 33; A Riddle Song, ii, 258; Song at Sunset, ii, 278, l. 11; Life, ii, 311, l. 5; Shakespere-Bacon's Cipher, iii, 12, l. 6; Seeing Niagara to Advantage, iv, 291, ll. 5–6; Democratic Vistas, v, 98, l. 2.

This list includes only some of the most pronounced examples. It is by no means exhaustive.

^{page 1080 note 33} Song of the Redwood Tree, i, 252, 1:28–30; To Think of Time, ii, 220, 9:1; Song at Sunset, ii, 279, ll. 35–37.

For Hegel's rejection of panpsychism, see Croce, op. cit., p. 198.

^{page 1080 note 34} Op. cit., p. 135.

^{page 1080 note 35} Ibid., pp. 135–136, quoting from Song of Myself, i, 107, 50: 10.

^{page 1080 note 36} Ibid., p. 136, quoting from Salut au Monde, i, 175, 13: 4 and Assurances, ii, 227, l. 5.

^{page 1081 note 37} Op. cit., p. 136.

^{page 1081 note 38} Thilly, op. cit., p. 467.

^{page 1081 note 39} Arvin, however, states, “... Whitman is far from being a kind of inverted mystic, intoxicated not with the vision of the One but with the phantasmagoria of the Many.” Op. cit., p. 257.

^{page 1081 note 40} Op. cit., p. 137.

^{page 1082 note 41} Song of Myself, i, 62, 24: 1.

^{page 1082 note 42} Op. cit., p. 136, quoting from Song of Myself, i, 98, 44:15 and I Sing the Body Electric, i, 120, 7: 6–7.

^{page 1082 note 43} Thilly, op. cit., p. 476.

^{page 1082 note 44} Ibid., p. 471.

^{page 1082 note 45} Beach expresses a similar view, op. cit., p. 377.

^{page 1083 note 46} Stace, op. cit., p. 313; Croce, op. cit., pp. 164–166; Wallace, op. cit., pp. 154–156; Ed. Lasson, op. cit., v, 209–210, Sec. 249.

^{page 1083 note 47} Democratic Vistas, v, 149, ll. 12–18; see also Arvin, op. cit., pp. 171, 197, 211 (especially) 216–218; Beach, op. cit., p. 394; Falk, op. cit., p. 329 (see footnote 88, infra).

A discussion, wholly from the scientific viewpoint, of the influence of current evolutionary doctrines upon Whitman is given by Mrs. Alice Lovelace Cooke, “Whitman's Indebtedness to the Scientific Thought of His Day,” Univ. of Tex. Studies in English, no. 14 (1934), pp. 100–107.

^{page 1083 note 48} Song of Myself, i, 58, 21: 1.

^{page 1083 note 49} I Sing the Body Electric, i, 114, 1: 7–8.

^{page 1083 note 50} Pioneers, O Pioneers, i, 282, ll. 69–70.

^{page 1083 note 51} i, 107, 50: 4–6.

^{page 1083 note 52} Op. cit., pp. 137–138. In this regard Mrs. Cooke comments: Clearly the poet's interest in phrenology affords another illustration of his determination to adopt a scientific rather than a theological or philosophical point of view. As a bard of personality he was seeking a scientific explanation for the complexities, diversities, and perversities resulting from that inexplicable union of body and soul known as human nature, and he thought he had found it in phrenology. Op. cit., p. 109.

She adds significantly: “He was, however, the poet rather than the scientist. As a poet he never ended, as does the scientist, with the concrete fact, but he attempted to reach beyond it.” Ibid., p. 111.

^{page 1083 note 53} See Thilly, op. cit., pp. 464 and 471.

^{page 1084 note 54} A Song of Joys, i, 219, ll. 100–103.

^{page 1084 note 55} I Corinthians xv. 44.

Eidolons, i, 8, ll. 77–80; Starting from Paumanok, i, 26–27, 13: 4–12; A Song of Joys, i, 221, l. 142.

^{page 1084 note 56} I Sing the Body Electric, i, 114, 2: 1.

^{page 1084 note 57} Thilly, op. cit., p. 473.

^{page 1084 note 58} i, 54, 16: 20.

^{page 1084 note 59} Ibid., i, 108, 51: 6–8.

^{page 1085 note 60} Song of the Open Road, i, 180–181, Sec. 5.

^{page 1085 note 61} Song of Myself, i, 102, 46: 21.

^{page 1085 note 62} Ibid., i, 101, 46: 1.

^{page 1085 note 63} A Song of Joys, i, 218, ll. 98–102.

^{page 1085 note 64} Op. cit., p. 139.

^{page 1085 note 65} Stace, op. cit., p. 238, quoting from Wm. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), Sec. 173, p. 307.

^{page 1085 note 66} For a scientific explanation of this identification, see footnote 96, infra.

^{page 1085 note 67} There was a Child Went Forth, ii, 135.

^{page 1085 note 68} A Song for Occupations, i, 263, 5:5.

^{page 1085 note 69} Song of Myself, i, 68, 27: 4–6.

^{page 1086 note 70} Song of the Rolling Earth, i, 268, 1: 10–11.

^{page 1086 note 71} iii, 26.

^{page 1086 note 72} There was a Child Went Forth, ii, 135, 1. 5.

^{page 1086 note 73} Op. cit., pp. 140–141.

^{page 1086 note 74} A Song for Occupations, i, 263, 5: 3; Grand is the Seen, iii, 26, l. 7.

^{page 1086 note 75} Op. cit., p. 141.

^{page 1086 note 76} Stace, op. cit., p. 87.

^{page 1086 note 77} Thilly, op. cit., p. 468.

^{page 1086 note 78} Ibid., p. 470.

^{page 1086 note 79} To You, i, 285, l. 17.

^{page 1087 note 80} Democratic Vistas, v, 77, ll. 21–25.

^{page 1087 note 81} Op. cit., p. 142.

Falk suggests that “the doctrine of equality of men and the participation of the individual in the divine Soul may have had a stimulus, at least, in the Quaker doctrine of the ‘inner light’ and the universal priesthood of believers. Whitman's ancestry and lifelong interest in the doctrines of Elias Hicks made Quakerism an important factor in his later thought.” Op. cit., pp. 321–322.

The Quaker influence upon Whitman in regard to his democratic ideas and his mysticism is stressed by Matthiessen, op. cit., pp. 536–543.

^{page 1087 note 82} Op. cit., p. 142, summarizing J. McT. E. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1901), Ch. i, and quoting Stace, op. cit., p. 514.

^{page 1087 note 83} Song of Myself, i, 106, 49: 10.

^{page 1087 note 84} Crossing Brooklyn Ferry, i, 195, 5:10; Think of the Soul, iii, 310, 2–3.

^{page 1088 note 85} Death of Carlyle, iv, 310, ll. 7–21; see also To Think of Time, ii, 217, 6: 7–8; John Burroughs, Whitman, a Study (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1896), p. 77; Shephard, Walt Whitman's Pose (N. Y.: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1936), pp. 356–357; Ed. Stovall, op. cit., pp. xli–xlii.

^{page 1088 note 86} Hegel nowhere deals exhaustively or clearly with it [the doctrine of immortality of the soul]. The clearest and fullest passage will be found in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, trans., London, 1895, Vol. iii, p. 57. Stace, op. cit., p. 514, footnote.

^{page 1088 note 87} Robt. Mackintosh, Hegel and Hegelianism (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1903), pp. 121–122.

^{page 1088 note 88} Although Falk states: “In the case of Hegel, Whitman certainly buttressed and possibly largely derived his evolutionary conception of a universe, exhibiting conflict and struggle, yet tending toward a vague divine culmination in the return of the individual souls to the Absolute,” he refers, as previously indicated, to Whitman's doctrine, possibly stimulated by Quakerism, of “participation of the individual in the divine soul.” Op. cit., pp. 329 and 321–322, respectively.

One may assume then that Falk would agree with the view that Whitman believed firmly in personal immortality.

^{page 1088 note 89} ii, 222.

^{page 1089 note 90} Op. cit., p. 143.

^{page 1089 note 91} For a criticism of Hegel's triads, see R. F. A. Hoernlé, Idealism as a Philosophy (New York: Geo. H. Doran Co., 1927), p. 226.

^{page 1089 note 92} Horace Traubel, With Walt Whitman in Camden (Boston: Small Maynard and Co., 1915), i, 156.

^{page 1089 note 93} Note that in the poem, line 3, Whitman states “four-sided, (all the sides needed,)....”

^{page 1090 note 94} Op. cit., p. 143.

Falk suggests “the concept of evil as but another aspect of good in the Absolute Idea could well have been an extension of Emerson's tendency to see good and evil merged in the Over-soul, and may have derived ultimately from Rousseau's glorification of natural goodness.” Op. cit., p. 321.

Claiming that, while not explaining this poem as a whole, the teachings of science come nearer than those of orthodox religion to an explanation, Mrs. Cooke interprets the square as a symbol of the Deity and the four sides as (1) “inexorable natural law”; (2) love, symbolized by a Christ no more divine than other men; (3) evil, symbolized by Satan, “but evil is the law of nature—‘no law stronger [Song of the Broad-Axe, i, 237, 11: 10]‘”; (4) immortality, Santa Spirita being “Whitman's word for the general soul present in all life, evidences of which he had found in science, particularly in his conception of the theory of evolution and in chemistry.” Op. cit., pp. 113–114.

But Whitman did not limit the first side of the square to natural law. It dispenses inexorable judgments and shows no more mercy than the seasons, gravitation, and the appointed days. Besides, in the conversation with Brinton, Whitman has all four sides sustain the “supernatural something.” By this interpretation, then, one would have “inexorable natural law” sustaining the “supernatural something,” the natural sustaining the supernatural—a contradiction in terms, to say the least.

Concerning evil as the law of nature, “no law stronger,” one should note that in the poam quoted, Song of the Broad-Axe, it is Democracy that is the law than which there is “no law stronger”:

She too is a law of Nature—there is no law stronger than she is.

^{page 1091 note 95} Lastly, further to dispel the notion that Whitman began with a triad or the Trinity, it should be noted that from the beginning he had the four sides of his square (“all the sides needed”) incorporated in his scheme of the universe in that he always insisted upon including the idea of Satan who represents the spirit not only of evil, but also of revolt (Ch. the Square Deific, ii, 224, 3: 1)—revolt that is sometimes necessary to oppose tyranny and to insure progress. Whitman stated the idea as early as 1855 in Song of Myself (ii, 58, 21: 2–3; 60, 22: 16–20; 61, 23: 20); and he reaffirmed it clearly in 1891, the year before his death, in the poem The Rounded Catalogue Divine Complete (iii, 23) wherein he obviously declined to have the catalogue complete without the inclusion of evil. (See also the following, which have been listed chronologically, from 1855-1891: To Think of Time, ii, 218, 7: 15; 218–219, 8: 7 and 13–14; Song of the Open Road, i, 189, Sec. 14; By Blue Ontario's Shore, ii, 109, 4, 1–4; 115, 10: 8–9; 126, 20: 9–13; To a Foil'd European Revolutionaire, ii, 143, 11; 144, 28–29; Not the Pilot, ii, 72, 5; Starting from Paumanok, i, 21, 7:4–7; Myself and Mine, i, 289, 10–13; Song of the Banner at Daybreak, ii, 46, 15–17; 50, 77–80; 51, 105–106; 53, 138–144; Spirit Whose Work Is Done, ii, 91, 16–18; To a Certain Civilian, ii, 89; Long, too Long America, ii, 77, 3; Weave in, My Hardy Life, ii, 263; City of Ships, ii, 58, 14–17; World Take Good Notice, ii, 86; Race of Veterans, ii, 85; As I Lay with My Head in Your Lap Camerado, ii, 88; The Return of the Heroes, ii, 132, 6: 18–21; As I Pondered in Silence, i, 1–2; Still Though the One I Sing, i, 14; Lessons, iii, 316; Democratic Vistas, v, 82, 22–24; 86, 1–2 and 10–16; 88, 14–26; Preface to “As a Strong Bird on Pinions Free,” v, 187, 22–24; Mother with Thy Equal Brood, ii, 239, 5: 15; 241, 6: 11–13; The Mystic Trumpeter, ii, 252, 7: 7–10; Song of the Universal, i, 277, 2:11–12; A Persian Lesson, iii, 22, 14.

^{page 1092 note 96} Op. cit., p. 135.

Mrs. Cooke states that Whitman “traces his own origin back to the First Nothing, identifying himself thereby with all creation, not by the old philosophical doctrine of identity, but by the scientific doctrine of the unity of nature.” Op. cit., p. 104.

^{page 1092 note 97} Op. cit., p. 137.

^{page 1092 note 98} Thilly, op. cit., p. 470.

^{page 1092 note 99} As pointed out, it has logical priority, not temporal.

^{page 1092 note 100} Song of Myself, i, 100, 45: 22; I Sing the Body Electric, i, 120, 6: 19; Crossing Brooklyn Ferry, i, 195, 5: 9.

^{page 1092 note 101} Op. cit., p. 145.

^{page 1093 note 102} For additional comment to that made in the course of this discussion on what Whitman admired in Hegel's philosophy, see Beach, op. cit., pp. 376–377, 379, 393; Kennedy, op. cit., p. 130; Binns, op. cit., p. 298; Masters, op. cit., p. 69; Perry, op. cit., p. 264; Falk, op. cit., pp. 319–320, 322–323, 329.