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The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule: Experiments on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 September 2007

William T. Bianco
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, e-mail: wbianco@indiana.edu
Michael S. Lynch
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, 504 Blake Hall, Lawrence, KS 66044, e-mail: mlynch@ku.edu
Gary J. Miller
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1063, One Brooking Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, e-mail: gjmiller@wustl.edu
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Abstract

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The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. This paper tests this proposition using a new technique for estimating uncovered sets and a series of experiments, including five-player computer-mediated experiments and 35-player paper-format experiments. The results support the theoretic appeal of the uncovered set. Outcomes overwhelmingly lie in or near the uncovered set. Furthermore, when preferences shift, outcomes track the uncovered set. Although outcomes tend to occur within the uncovered set, they are not necessarily stable; majority dominance relationships still produce instability, albeit constrained by the uncovered set.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology