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Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Control Bureaucratic Policy Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Sean Gailmard*
Affiliation:
Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720
*
e-mail: gailmard@berkeley.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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In this paper I investigate the trade-off a legislature faces in the choice of instruments to ensure accountability by bureaucrats with private information. The legislature can either design a state-contingent incentive scheme or “menu law” to elicit the bureau's information or it can simply limit the set of choices open to the bureaucrat and let it choose as it wishes (an action restriction). I show that the optimal action restriction is simply a connected interval of the policy space. However, this class of instruments is not optimal without some sort of limitation on the set of levers of control available to the legislature. I then analyze one such limitation salient in politics, the legislative principal's inability to commit to honor a schedule of (state contingent) policy choices and transfer payments for a menu law. In this case the optimal action restriction outperforms (in terms of the legislature's welfare) the best available menu law.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology