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Introduction to Symposium on Time Series Error Correction Methods in Political Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Janet Box-Steffensmeier and
Agnar Freyr Helgason
Janet Box-Steffensmeier*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1373
Agnar Freyr Helgason
Affiliation:
Social Research Centre, University of Iceland, Gimli G-201, Sæmundargötu 2, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland, e-mail: afh@hi.is
*
e-mail: box-steffensmeier.2@osu.edu (corresponding author)
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In recent years, political science has seen a boom in the use of sophisticated methodological tools for time series analysis. One such tool is the general error correction model (GECM), originally introduced to political scientists in the pages of this journal over 20 years ago (Durr 1992; Ostrom and Smith 1992) and re-introduced by De Boef and Keele (2008), who advocate its use for a wider set of time series data than previously considered appropriate. Their article has proven quite influential, with numerous papers justifying their methodological choices with reference to De Boef and Keele's contribution.

Grant and Lebo (2016) take issue with the increasing use of the GECM in political science and argue that the methodology is widely misused and abused by practitioners. Given the recent surge of research conducted using error correction methods, there is every reason to take their suggestions seriously and provide a fuller discussion of the points they raise in their paper. The present symposium serves such a role. It consists of Grant and Lebo's critique, a detailed response by Keele, Linn, and Webb (2016b), and shorter comments by Esarey (2016), Freeman (2016), and Helgason (2016). Finally, Lebo and Grant (2016) and Keele, Linn, and Webb (2016a) reflect on the contributions made in the symposium, as well as discuss outstanding issues.

Information

Type
Time Series Symposium
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , Winter 2016, pp. 1 - 2
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

References

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Freeman, John, Hitt, Matthew, and Pevehouse, Jon. 2014. Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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