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Learning about Learning: A Response to Wand

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Kenneth A. Schultz and
Jeffrey B. Lewis
Kenneth A. Schultz
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6044. e-mail: kschultz@stanford.edu
Jeffrey B. Lewis
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472. e-mail: jblewis@ucla.edu
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Extract

We welcome the opportunity to respond to Wand's careful and detailed analysis of our paper (Lewis and Schultz 2003). With the discipline's increasing inclination to move toward fully structural strategic choice models (e.g., Signorino 1999; Morton 1999), the issues that Wand raises are important to consider, as they bear on crucial questions of model construction and interpretation. Moreover, his work has allowed us to consider more carefully the properties of an estimator that we are in the process of applying to actual data.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , Winter 2006, pp. 121 - 129
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

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References

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