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A Method to Audit the Assignment of Registered Voters to Districts and Precincts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2020

Brian Amos*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Wichita State University, Wichita, KS67260, USA. Email: brian.amos@wichita.edu
Michael P. McDonald
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL32611, USA. Email: michael.mcdonald@ufl.edu
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Abstract

Electoral boundaries are an integral part of election administration. District boundaries delineate which legislative election voters are eligible to participate in, and precinct boundaries identify, in many localities, where voters cast in-person ballots on Election Day. Election officials are tasked with resolving a tremendously large number of intersections of registered voters with overlapping electoral boundaries. Any large-scale data project is susceptible to errors, and this task is no exception. In two recent close elections, these errors were consequential to the outcome. To address this problem, we describe a method to audit the assignment of registered voters to districts. We apply the methodology to Florida’s voter registration file to identify thousands of registered voters assigned to the wrong state House district, many of which local election officials have verified and rectified. We discuss how election officials can best use this technique to detect registered voters assigned to the wrong electoral boundary.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology.
Figure 0

Figure 1.Depiction of street segment district assignments. Notes: The dotted line represents the boundary between District 1 and District 2. Homes are color-coded by which district they are assigned to.

Figure 1

Table 1.Percentage of addresses matched by our sequential geocoding approach.

Figure 2

Table 2.Comparison of geocoding performance on the Colorado voter registration file.

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Figure 2.Example of street segment error.

Figure 4

Figure 3.Example of human operator error. Left: district assignment prior to a local redistricting. Right: district assignment after a local redistricting.

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Figure 4.Example of a setback gap error.

Figure 6

Figure 5.Example of a geocoding error.

Figure 7

Figure 6.Example of census geography changes resulting in assignment error.

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Table 3.Summary statistics for suspected registered voters assigned to wrong district.