Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T06:47:09.337Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Performance of an Institutionalized Legislature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Thomas W. Gilligan
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Within the context of a game-theoretic model with incomplete information, three dimensions of performance are defined and used to evaluate and analyze an institutionalized legislature. The performance of an institutionalized legislature is also compared to that of a noninstitutionalized legislature, one without any internal differentiation and in which members are equally uninformed about key parameters of the choice environment. Among the results are that increasing institutionalization (lower member turnover and the application of universal decision criteria) can diminish legislative performance. Additionally, a noninstitutionalized legislature always dominates the institutionalized legislature on at least one performance dimension. Institutionalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for superior legislative performance.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 3 , 1991, pp. 1 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1992 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Austen-Smith, David, and Riker, William. 1987. “Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation.” American Political Science Review 81: 897–918.Google Scholar
Bach, Stanley. 1983. “The Amending Process in the Senate.” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. Manuscript.Google Scholar
Bach, Stanley. 1986. “Suspension of the Rules in the House of Representatives.” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. Manuscript.Google Scholar
Bach, Stanley. 1987. “The Nature of Congressional Rules.” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. Manuscript.Google Scholar
Bach, Stanley. 1988. “Patterns of Floor Consideration in the House of Representatives.” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. Manuscript.Google Scholar
Bach, Stanley, and Smith, Steven S. 1989. Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
Baron, David P. 1989. “Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control.” Research Paper no. 1044. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
Baron, David P., and Ferejohn, John A. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83: 1181–1206.Google Scholar
Cooper, Joseph. 1970. The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. Houston: Rice University Studies.Google Scholar
Cooper, Joseph. 1977. “Congress in Organizational Perspective.” In Congress Reconsidered, ed. Dodd, Lawrence C. and Oppenheimer, Bruce I., 140–63. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.Google Scholar
Cooper, Joseph, and Brady, David W. 1981. “Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress.” American Political Science Review 75: 988–1006.Google Scholar
Francis, Wayne L. 1989. The Legislative Committee Game. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Krehbiel, Keith. 1987. “Collective Decision Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 287–335.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Krehbiel, Keith. 1989a. “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee.” American Journal of Political Science 33: 459–90.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Krehbiel, Keith. 1989b. “Collective Choice Without Procedural Commitments.” In Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, ed. Ordeshook, Peter, 295–314. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 531–64.Google Scholar
Hedlund, Ronald D., and Freeman, Patricia K. 1981. “A Strategy for Measuring the Performance of Legislatures in Processing Decisions.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6: 87–113.Google Scholar
Hibbing, John R. 1988. “Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 681–712.Google Scholar
Jewell, Malcolm. 1970. “Attitudinal Determinants of Legislative Behavior: The Utility of Role Analysis.” In Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, ed. Komberg, Allan and Musolf, Lloyd D., 460–501. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 67: 45–56.Google Scholar
Muir, William K. Jr. 1982. Legislature: California's School for Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review 62: 148–68.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Squire, Peverill. 1988. “Reform and Institutionalization of the California Assembly.” University of Iowa, Iowa City. Manuscript.Google Scholar
Stone, Walter K. 1979. “Measuring Constituency-Representative Linkages.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4: 623–39.Google Scholar
Weingast, Barry R., and Marshall, William J. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 96: 132–62.Google Scholar