Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T03:08:05.931Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Polarization and Ideology: Partisan Sources of Low Dimensionality in Scaled Roll Call Analyses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

John H. Aldrich
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Duke University. e-mail: aldrich@duke.edu
Jacob M. Montgomery*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
David B. Sparks
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Duke University. e-mail: dsparks@gmail.com
*
e-mail: jacob.montgomery@wustl.edu (corresponding author)
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

In this article, we challenge the conclusion that the preferences of members of Congress are best represented as existing in a low-dimensional space. We conduct Monte Carlo simulations altering assumptions regarding the dimensionality and distribution of member preferences and scale the resulting roll call matrices. Our simulations show that party polarization generates misleading evidence in favor of low dimensionality. This suggests that the increasing levels of party polarization in recent Congresses may have produced false evidence in favor of a low-dimensional policy space. However, we show that focusing more narrowly on each party caucus in isolation can help researchers discern the true dimensionality of the policy space in the context of significant party polarization. We re-examine the historical roll call record and find evidence suggesting that the low dimensionality of the contemporary Congress may reflect party polarization rather than changes in the dimensionality of policy conflict.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 
Supplementary material: PDF

Aldrich et al. supplementary material

Supplementary Material

Download Aldrich et al. supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 607.5 KB