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A Statistical Model of Bilateral Cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Adam Przeworski and
James Raymond Vreeland
Adam Przeworski
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003. e-mail: adam.przeworski@nyu.edu
James Raymond Vreeland
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8301. e-mail: james.vreeland@yale.edu
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Abstract

In most situations of bilateral cooperation we can observe only whether or not potential partners actually cooperate. Yet we often want to know what factors lead the actors to enter into and continue cooperation. The model we develop—a dynamic version of bivariate probit with partial observability—permits one to estimate the probabilities that either of two parties would want to cooperate and to identify the factors that affect these probabilities. As an illustration, we focus on agreements between national governments and the International Monetary Fund. The model should have a wide applicability.

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , Spring 2002, pp. 101 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association 2002 

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