Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T19:11:19.231Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Alexander V. Hirsch*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. e-mail: avhirsch@princeton.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

This paper analyzes the use of ideal point estimates for testing pivot theories of lawmaking such as Krehbiel's (1998, Pivotal politics: A theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago) pivotal politics and Cox and McCubbins's (2005, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representations. New York: Cambridge University Press) party cartel model. Among the prediction of pivot theories is that all pivotal legislators will vote identically on all successful legislation. Clinton (2007, Lawmaking and roll calls. Journal of Politics 69:455–67) argues that the estimated ideal points of the pivotal legislators are therefore predicted to be statistically indistinguishable and false when estimated from the set of successful final passage roll call votes, which implies that ideal point estimates cannot logically be used to test pivot theories. I show using Monte Carlo simulation that when pivot theories are augmented with probabilistic voting, Clinton's prediction only holds in small samples when voting is near perfect. I furthermore show that the predicted bias is unlikely to be consequential with U.S. Congressional voting data. My analysis suggests that the methodology of estimating ideal points to compute theoretically relevant quantities for empirical tests is not inherently flawed in the case of pivot theories.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology