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Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2016

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Abstract

The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent with our key predictions.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2016 
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Table 1The Electoral Game Induced by the Voter’s Behavior

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Table 2Description of Variables

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Table 3Summary Statistics

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Table 4Federal Outlays, Campaign Costs, and Partisan Imbalance

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Fig. 1Marginal effect of ad cost

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Fig. 2Predicted value of federal outlays, by percentile of partisan imbalance

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Fig. 3Marginal effect of cost for (a) trailing candidates and (b) leading candidates

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Table 5Separating Trailing and Leading Candidates

Supplementary material: PDF

Prato and Wolton supplementary material

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