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Exit Options and the Effectiveness of Regional Economic Organizations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2013

Julia Gray
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
Jonathan B. Slapin
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Abstract

Regional economic organizations (REOs) proliferate in the developed and developing world. However, there is wide variation in both their institutional structure and the degree to which they achieve their goals. This article presents a theoretical framework and empirical evidence to explain the variance in the institutional design and effectiveness of these agreements. It argues that the conditions that produce effective and broad agreements are not a function of design, but rather of exogenous factors. If countries within the REO have fewer options for world trade beyond the REO, they will develop strong institutions and make substantial use of them. This study presents a new cross-regional dataset, compiled from expert surveys, to test these arguments. It shows that expert evaluations of how well a REO functions - including its ability to meet its own goals and the ambition of those goals—hinge less on that agreement's legalization and more on the trade opportunities that REO members faced when the institution was formed.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2013 
Figure 0

Table 1Correlation Matrix of Dimensions of REOs, with Exit Options and Legalization

Figure 1

Table 2Agreement Design as a Determinant of Effectiveness

Figure 2

Table 3Design Determinants of Effectiveness, with Exit Options

Figure 3

Table 4Exogenous Determinants of Effectiveness

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Fig. 1Partial regression plots: effect of legalization and exit options (controlling for GDP per capita)

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Table 5Design and Exogenous Determinants of Effectiveness, with Exit Options

Figure 6

Table A1List of REOs

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Table A2Effectiveness with Kucik & Reinhardt Flexibility Variable

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Table A3Unscaled Dependent Variables

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Table A4Legalization, Flexibility and Exit Options

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Table A5Dispute Settlement and Exit Options

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Table A6Exclusion of Outliers (ECCAS)

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Table A7Exclusion of Outliers (EU)

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Table A8Robustness Checks: Control for Proposed Level of Integration, Full Model with Raw Scores

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Table A9Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables