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Some Simple Tests of Rational Voting and AgendaSetting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2014

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Abstract

This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rationalvoting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate electionresults. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences,there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that arevoted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not allvoters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among thevoters can be solved simply by iterative application of weak dominance. Theagenda-setting prediction tested is that agenda setters should make oneproposal rather than two when given the option. The data come from Oregonschool district financial elections from 1980–83, years in which the rulesfor these elections were abruptly changed.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2014 
Figure 0

Fig. 1Best responses of the voter types (single-peaked preferences)

Figure 1

Fig. 2Best responses of a voter with non-single-peaked preference

Figure 2

Table 1Count of Districts by Election Type, Oregon School Referenda 1980–83

Figure 3

Table 2Oregon School Budget Elections by Type, 1980–83

Figure 4

Table 3Oregon School Budget Elections by Type in 1981 and 1982

Figure 5

Table 4Choice of Combination or Split Ballot by District Size, 1982 and 1983

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Table 5Differences in Voter Turnout between A and B Ballots

Supplementary material: Link

Corcoran et al Dataset

Link