Introduction
Several countries worldwide have been experiencing policy changes (or attempts of change) in the regulation of morality issues—that is, issues whose debates are primarily based on ethical, moral, and religious arguments—for the past few decades, mainly due to increasing levels of social and political secularization and individualization (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018; Engeli et al., Reference Engeli, Green-Pedersen and Larsen2012b; Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013; Knill, Reference Knill2013).
Portugal is no exception to this trend of increasing permissiveness—some examples are the decriminalization of drug use in 2001, the legalization of abortion in 2007, the legalization of marriage and adoption of children by same-sex couples in 2010 and 2016, and, more recently, the recognition of self-determination of gender identity in 2018 and the legalizationFootnote 1 of active euthanasia in 2023. This recent and fast permissiveness wave is nevertheless puzzling, as it contrasts with a society that still has a comparatively high level of religiosity (Moniz, Reference Moniz2018, 213) and may still be considered moderately conservative.Footnote 2
What accounts for such a situation? As mentioned in a recent strand of literature (e.g., Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 324; Knill, Reference Knill2013, 313–314; Schmitt et al. Reference Schmitt, Euchner and Preidel2013, 428–429), seven major factors may help to explain policy change (or stability) in morality issues: problem pressure, party cleavages, religion, societal values and public opinion, courts, international and transnational influences, and lobbying from interest groups.
Religion, alongside party politics, has been one of the most analyzed determinants of policy change or stability in the literature, which is not surprising considering morality issues often deal with elements that are central to several religious doctrines—for example, life, death, and sexual behavior (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 48; Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 375; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 843; Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 325). As explained in some studies, religion can exert influence in morality policy issues both at a macro-level, through a long-lasting influence over societal values, not only among believers but also among other citizens, as well as at a meso-level, through active attempts to influence policy decision-making processes exerted by religious organizational actors, either directly over policy decision-makers or indirectly on citizens/public opinion (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 48; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 847–848, 861, 863; Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 325–326).
According to some studies, countries with a high level of societal religiosity, which are predominantly Catholic or have a separation model in state–church relations—three characteristics that Portugal has—potentially have a higher intervention from religious actors in the discussion of morality issues (Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 376–377; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 847–848, 861–863). It could then be a surprise that the Portuguese Catholic Church (PCC), unlike other strong European Catholic Churches such as the Spanish, Italian, or Polish ones, decided not to have a strong formal intervention in political debates on morality issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s, namely, on the debates on abortion and marriage of same-sex couples (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015). According to Meyer-Resende and Hennig (Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 153–156), this lower level of intervention was primarily related to weaker party alliances and a more liberal ideological orientation of Patriarch Policarpo, who served from 1998 to 2013.
This situation of lower formal intervention from the PCC may have nevertheless changed after 2013, as the then-appointed Patriarch Manuel Clemente proclaimed that this institution should have a stronger opposition to morality issuesFootnote 3 (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 157).
Taking this scenario into consideration, this paper aims to analyze if the top echelon of the PCC developed a more substantial intervention in morality issues after 2013, namely, on the debates on self-determination of gender identity and euthanasia between 2016 and 2023, and, if so, which intervention strategies (direct or indirect) and type of arguments (predominantly moral or rational/instrumental) were used. To achieve these goals, this paper analyzes the content of articles published on the website of the Portuguese Episcopal Conference (CEP)Footnote 4 and articles published in Ecclesia (the PCC’s news channel) that reveal the PCC’s position on these issues (including CEP, regional dioceses, and local parishes).
Considering these goals, this paper is organized as follows. First, we have a section with a literature review on the role of religion in morality issues and on the history of state–church relations in Portugal. Second, there is a section on methods. Third, we present the main results, and finally, we discuss the results and provide some concluding notes.
Literature review
Religion as an explanatory factor of change and stability in morality policies
Morality issues are policy issues which address basic societal principles about what is “right or wrong” in life and, therefore, deal with value conflicts rather than with conflicts on material interests, as it happens, for instance, with distributive or redistributive policies (Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 318, 323; Knill, Reference Knill2013, 309). According to some authors (Knill, Reference Knill2013, 312; Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 320), four major types of issues may be considered morality issues: (a) “life-and-death issues”, such as abortion, euthanasia, or artificial insemination; (b) “issues of sexual behavior”, such as rights of LGBTIQ+ people, prostitution, or pornography; (c) “addictive behavior issues”, such as gambling and drug consumption; and (d) “individual freedom issues,” such as gun control or religious education.
Despite several policy changes in morality issues in distinct European countries, European political science has only recently begun to pay more attention to this research topic. One strand of this recent literature (e.g., Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018; Engeli et al., Reference Engeli, Green-Pedersen and Larsen2012b; Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 324; Knill, Reference Knill2013, 33–314; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Fernández-i-Marín, Budde and Heichel2020; Schmitt et al., Reference Schmitt, Euchner and Preidel2013, 428–429) has been focused on the systematization and empirical testing of different factors that explain policy change or stability, highlighting the following seven: problem pressure, religion, societal values and public opinion, party cleavages, judicial decisions, international and transnational influences, and lobbying from interest groups.
As mentioned before, religion and its relationship with politics have been one of the most analyzed factors on what concerns policy change or stability in morality issues (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018; Knill et al, Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, Reference Knill, Fernández-i-Marín, Budde and Heichel2020; Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015), thus contradicting the idea that increasingly secularized societies eliminated the influence of religion in public policies.
Although one may mention religion is losing some of its traditional importance, mainly because individuals increasingly advocate for the principle of “expressive individualism”—that is, the freedom to take their own decisions and life paths without societal pressure (Taylor, Reference Taylor2007, 299, 473)—one must also recognize there are multiple and diversified experiences of secularization depending on historical and cultural contexts of each society (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, Reference Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt2012). These multiple secularities help to understand distinct levels of permissiveness in different countries since what is considered acceptable and tolerable in one country may not be in another (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 2012). In this regard, Fernandes (Reference Fernandes2018, 181–182, 187–191) mentions the existence of four paths/levels of secularization—the first one, with a secularizing and Jacobin nature, entails anticlerical activism; the second one, with a liberal orientation, advocates that religious beliefs should be kept in the private sphere; the third one, which allows religious actors to participate in the public and political spheres and is common in predominantly Catholic and Lutheran countries; and a fourth path, which does not divide religion and political powers and is common in Islamic countries.
Another example of the importance of religion in politics is also the increasing emergence of religious populist leaders—such as Bolsonaro (Brazil), Trump (USA), Orbán (Hungary), Salvini (Italy), and Putin (Russia) and other party leaders with less electoral success—who appeal to their voters’ religious beliefs to oppose to modernism (modernophobia) and sometimes also to Islamic migrants (islamophobia) (Moniz and Brissos-Lino, Reference Moniz and Brissos-Lino2024, 4–11). Although these populist leaders have been opposed by parts of the Vatican, particularly by Pope Francis, they have had the support of some national religious actors (Moniz and Brissos-Lino, Reference Moniz and Brissos-Lino2024, 5). Moreover, one has also witnessed the increasing mobilization of Catholic-inspired organizations, which are often well-connected with religious and political organizations, as seen in Spain during the debate on euthanasia (Martín and Perugorría, Reference Martín and Perugorría2024, 332–333).
On what concerns morality issues, and as mentioned in the introduction, some studies consider that the influence of religion on morality issues may be understood from both a macro and a meso-perspective (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 48–50, 50–59; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 847–848, 861, 863). From a macro-perspective, one may consider the level of religiosity and the predominant religious denomination of the electorate as proxies of prevalent societal values, which may affect the chances of morality issues entering the political agenda and being issued in permissive bills, as well as the chances of such bills being approved (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 48; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 847; Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 326). In this regard, some studies indicate that morality issues tend to be less permissive (or become permissive later) in countries with high levels of religious people and with a larger share of Catholics, in opposition to European countries with a larger share of Protestants, considering this latter religion is less hierarchical and have no magisterium (Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 377; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 850). Moreover, other studies also indicate that the level of individual acceptance of practices concerning morality issues is negatively related to the individual’s level of religiosity (Storm, Reference Storm2016).
Regarding the meso-perspective (the one used in this paper), the literature mentions the importance of factors such as the structural organization of religious actors, the existence of strong confessional political parties, or state–church relations (Heichel et al., Reference Heichel, Knill and Schmitt2013, 325–326; Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 377). This means there is more chance of an active strategy from religious actors that are more organized and have more resources (such as the Catholic Church), when they have access to policy decision-makers (e.g., being the national official church), as well as in countries with a separation model regarding state–church relations, which means their influence is more dependent on their active mobilization (Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 377; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 861). Moreover, there are greater chances of an active strategy from religious actors when the national party system exhibits a religious-secular cleavage or is highly fragmented, as this leads to a higher politicization of the issue (Engeli et al., Reference Engeli, Green-Pedersen, Larsen, Engeli, Green-Pedersen and Larsen2012a; Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 383–388).
Regarding the influence of religious actors in the policy process of morality issues, Meyer-Resende and Hennig (Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 149) also make a distinction between direct intervention—when they explicitly address political actors, appeal for or campaign in referendums, or declare their support to political parties that advocate conservative positions regarding those issues—and indirect intervention, when they appeal to individual consciences, particularly from religious citizens, or support social protests against permissive regulations.
Concerning the arguments employed, the Catholic Church tends to utilize a combination of religious and non-religious arguments (Sousa and Silva, Reference Sousa and Silva2023, 304–314). In line with what Engeli et al. (Reference Engeli, Green-Pedersen, Larsen, Engeli, Green-Pedersen and Larsen2012a) mention may happen with conservative or even confessional political parties, Habermas (Reference Habermas2006) considers that religious actors often need to present their religious arguments regarding morality issues and other issues in secular terms so that they may be understood and accepted more easily by the public sphere. According to Cavanaugh (Reference Cavanaugh2009), religious actors, particularly in the West, have felt the need to use secular terms due to the exacerbation of the politics-religion and religious-secular dichotomies, which have somehow delegitimized religious actors’ ability to intervene in politics and society.
Finally, it is essential to note that the influence of religion may also vary over time. As concluded by some studies (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 50, 59; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 861–863), religion and religious actors did not impede the approval of more permissive laws in Western European countries but rather delayed their approval. Moreover, Knill et al. (Reference Knill, Fernández-i-Marín, Budde and Heichel2020, 259, 268) demonstrate that the influence of religion is stronger when the policy issue is new at the international level, but it decreases as soon as a significant number of other countries have permissive legislation.
After presenting this more general picture, we will outline the general features of the relationship between religion and the State in Portugal.
Religious actors in Portugal, their relations with the State and influence on morality policies
Despite increasing signs of secularization, Portugal remains a predominantly Catholic society and still exhibits comparatively high levels of religiosity (Moniz, Reference Moniz2018, 213). The predominance of Catholicism in Portugal dates to the establishment of the kingdom in the 12th century, although it was disturbed by liberal movements in the 19th century and again with the proclamation of a secularist and anticlerical State during the First Republic (1911–1926), which determined the separation between the State and the Church (Vilaça, Reference Vilaça2003, 171–185; Dix, Reference Dix2010, 9–14).
The strong influence of the Catholic Church returned, nevertheless, with the establishment of a conservative dictatorship regime in 1933, which lasted until 1974, and developed a close relationship with the Catholic Church, even if maintaining the separation law determined by the previous regime (Vilaça, Reference Vilaça2003, 186–193; Dix, Reference Dix2010, 16–19). Three examples of this close relationship are the Concordat signed between the Vatican and the Portuguese Government in 1940 (which lasted until 2004) that ascribed several privileges and benefits to the Catholic Church (Vilaça, Reference Vilaça2003, 186–193; Dix, Reference Dix2010, 16–17), the revision to the 1933 Constitution that was approved in 1935, which mentioned that public education should train individuals’ morale based on “Christian doctrinal principles and morale” (article 43)Footnote 5 and the revision of this same Constitution approved in 1951, which suggests that Catholicism is the religion of the “Portuguese Nation” (article 45).Footnote 6
After the revolution in 1974, the Constitution of 1976, still in effect nowadays, specified the principle of a secular state by proclaiming that “Churches and other religious communities are separate from the State (…)” (article 41, nr. 3) and that “the State may not programme education and culture in accordance with any philosophical, aesthetic, political, ideological or religious directives” (article 43, nr. 2).
Facing strong opposition and attacks from far-left movements—which had fought for power against centrist movements during the period of democratic transition—the PCC decided to become closer to the centrist movements and their leaders (Meyer-Resende, Reference Meyer-Resende2018, 13; Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 146). Although the centrist parties became more predominant in the following decades after this troubled period, the PCC decided not to establish formal relations with the center-left Socialist Party (PS) or with the center-right Social Democrat Party (PSD) and not even with right-wing CDS-PP (Social Democratic Center - People’s Party) (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 154).
Under this context, one may state there was no confessional political party per se in the Portuguese Parliament in the first years of democracy. However, in line with what Engeli et al. (Reference Engeli, Green-Pedersen, Larsen, Engeli, Green-Pedersen and Larsen2012a, 14) mention, several non-confessional political parties advocate confessional values under a “secular cover,” such as, for instance, “traditional family values” —which tends to be the case of CDS-PP and some parts of PSD,Footnote 7 which have historical roots in Christian democracy and conservativism (Belchior and Borghetto, Reference Belchior, Borghetto, Baumgartner, Breunig and Grossman2019, 146). Moreover, a radical-right conservative party named Chega! (meaning Enough!)—which joined the Parliament in 2019 and is now the second most powerful party in the Parliament with over 25% of the seats—often advocates for catholic and traditional values (Moniz and Brissos-Lino, Reference Moniz and Brissos-Lino2024). In a recent article, Moniz and Brissos-Lino (Reference Moniz and Brissos-Lino2024) named CDS-PP and Chega! as religious populist parties. This helps to explain why Portugal tends to exhibit a party cleavage between confessional/conservative parties and secular parties concerning morality issues (Almeida and Mota, Reference Almeida and Mota2023; Mota and Fernandes, Reference Mota and Fernandes2022).
In any case, the PCC remains an influential actor in Portuguese society. Even if there has been a decline in the number of Catholic believers since the 1970s and in the number of people attending religious acts at least once a week in Portugal, the country still reveals significant levels of religiosity when compared to other European countries (Moniz, Reference Moniz2018, 213; Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 148).
Despite its traditional power in Portuguese society, the top echelon of the PCC decided not to develop strong campaigns against morality issues in Portugal in the late 1990s and early 2000s, namely, in both referendums about abortion in 1998 and 2007, particularly in the latter, which led to the legalization of abortion, as well as in the debate about the legalization of marriage by same-sex couples (approved in 2010) (Vilaça and Oliveira, Reference Vilaça, Oliveira, Dobbelaere and Pérez-Agote2015, 150–151; Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 156). On what concerns abortion, Patriarch Ribeiro (in office between 1971 and 1998) still appealed to Catholics for actions against the liberalization of abortion. However, Patriarch Policarpo (in office between 1998 and 2013), appointed after the former’s death during the campaign for the referendum, decided that the hierarchy and the bases of the PCC should not have a direct intervention, while also declaring himself to be against the organization of a referendum (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 150). During the campaign for the second referendum on abortion, which took place in 2007, Policarpo restated he was against the organization of a referendum and that the PCC should not intervene in the political debate or support pro-life civic movements (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 151–152). Regarding same-sex marriage, the stance of non-intervention was even more visible since the hierarchy of the Catholic Church was against the organization of a referendum and explicitly mentioned that religious acts should not contain any sort of campaigning (Vilaça and Oliveira, Reference Vilaça, Oliveira, Dobbelaere and Pérez-Agote2015, 150–151; Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 152–153). It is worth noting that these decisions from Patriarch Policarpo were not well-received by all members of the clergy or by lay social movements (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 150–152) and that regional bishops and local priests addressed the topic in religious ceremonies, opposing the Patriarch’s suggestions.
Despite the decision not to develop public campaigns, a quantitative study about the participation of the PCC in several morality issues demonstrated that the CEP published several documents against the legalization of abortion and marriage by same-sex couples, often using doctrinal arguments (Sousa and Silva, Reference Sousa and Silva2023, 304–306, 309–313). Moreover, it preferred to use more indirect intervention strategies about abortion and more direct strategies (even if by a slow margin) about marriage by same-sex couples (Sousa and Silva, Reference Sousa and Silva2023, 304–306, 309–314).
This relatively lower intervention from the PCC is therefore not in line with what happened in other Catholic countries such as Spain, Italy, France, or Poland, where “the church hierarchies intervened directly over leading policymakers and political elites in the liberalization of abortion (Poland, Spain), attempting to restrict the law of in vitro fertilization (Italy) and legalizing same-sex partnerships (Poland, Italy, Spain, Ireland, France)” (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 145–146). In the same vein, Knill and Preidel (Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 383) and Schmitt et al. (Reference Schmitt, Euchner and Preidel2013, 439) mention that the Italian Catholic Church has been one of the leading actors responsible for the non-legalization of same-sex partnerships in Italy through active lobbying enabled by its contacts with political actors, which is facilitated by Italy’s weak and fragmented political system. Regarding the Spanish case, Fernández (Reference Fernández2012, 671) mentions that the Spanish Catholic Church “invested significant resources and helped mobilize the more Conservative quarters of the Catholic society” against the progressive moral agenda of Prime Minister Zapatero (in office between 2004 and 2011).
According to Meyer-Resende and Hennig (Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 153–156), the lower level of intervention from the PCC in the debate on morality issues is explained by its weaker alliances with political parties, as well as by the more liberal ideological orientation of Patriarch Policarpo.
As explained in the introduction, this situation may have changed in recent times, as Patriarch Clemente, in office from July 2013 to August 2023, proclaimed that the PCC should have a more direct intervention in discussing morality issues. An example of this was the pastoral noteFootnote 8 against “gender ideology” approved in November 2013 by the CEP, which stated that the law that legalized the marriage of same-sex couples was not irreversible, also appealing to citizens and legislators who defend the dignity of the family to do whatever possible to revoke such law.
This eventual change in posture will be analyzed in our paper, namely, using the debates on euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity held between 2016 and 2023 as case studies.
Methodology strategy
Goals and hypotheses
As explained in the introduction, this paper aims to analyze the way the hierarchy of the PCC, namely, the CEP, participated in the debates on euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity held between 2016 and 2023 when bills regarding both issues were under discussion in the Parliament. More specifically, this paper analyzes whether the PCC participated in the public/political debate and, if so, whether they employed direct or indirect strategies of influence in those debates, as well as the used arguments (predominantly moral or rational/instrumental).
Since Portugal has a religious-secular party cleavage regarding these two issues, a separation model on what concerns state–church relations and there are no officially confessional political parties with parliamentary representation during this period—despite the existence of conservative political parties that advocate pro-life and traditional family values (center-right PSD, right-wing CDS-PP, and radical-right Chega!) (Almeida and Mota, Reference Almeida and Mota2023; Mota and Fernandes, Reference Mota and Fernandes2022)—it is likely that the hierarchy of the PCC has actively participated in the discussion of these two morality issues (Knill and Preidel, Reference Knill and Preidel2015, 377; Knill et al., Reference Knill, Preidel and Nebel2014, 861–863). Moreover, it is essential to recall that the new Patriarch appointed in 2013 wished the PCC to adopt a more interventionist approach in debates on morality issues (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 145).
Considering the hierarchy of the PCC preferred indirect influence strategies in previous debates (Sousa and Silva, Reference Sousa and Silva2023, 314–316; Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 149–150), one could assume the same has happened in the debates on euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity. Our first hypothesis is therefore the following:
H1 The Portuguese Catholic Church opted for a predominant focus on indirect strategies of intervention in the debates on euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity in Portugal.
On what concerns the used arguments/frames by the Catholic Church, Sousa and Silva (Reference Sousa and Silva2023, 304, 310, 312) demonstrate that doctrinal arguments are not the most common type of arguments used in the documents produced by the CEP but rather pro-life arguments regarding the debate on abortion and social issues regarding the adoption by same-sex couples, the exception being the debate on marriage by same-sex couples, in which there was a predominance of doctrinal arguments. Our analysis, however, focuses on the distinction between moral arguments, whether doctrinal or non-doctrinal, and rational arguments. Based on these ideas, our second hypothesis is the following:
H2 The Portuguese Catholic Church used mainly religious and moral arguments in the debates on euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity rather than rational arguments.
Finally, in this paper, we also aim to assess whether there have been differences regarding the intensity of participation between the two issues. As mentioned by Budde et al. (Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 46, 48), the so-called “life-and-death issues”, as is the case with euthanasia, tend to be more related to religious precepts than other morality issues. Moreover, the influence of religion tends to be more prominent in “new issues,” for which not many countries have “permissive laws” (Knill et al., Reference Knill, Fernández-i-Marín, Budde and Heichel2020, 259, 268), which is the case of euthanasia and not so much the case of self-determination of gender identity. Based on these assumptions, our third hypothesis is the following:
H3. The participation of the Portuguese Catholic Church was more intense in the debate on euthanasia than in the debate on self-determination of gender identity.
The case studies: the debates on euthanasia and gender identity
Before moving forward with the description of the methodological strategy, it is important to brieflyFootnote 9 explain the evolution of the two debates.
Regarding euthanasia, the issue started to be addressed in Portugal in 2011 and 2012, when several bills about living wills (more or less similar to passive euthanasiaFootnote 10 ) were discussed and unanimously approved (Law No. 25/2012). However, it became a heated issue only a few years later, when the civic movement “Right to Die with Dignity” submitted a petition to the Parliament in April 2016, asking for the legalization of active euthanasia. After this event, an opponent petition was submitted to the Parliament by the Portuguese Federation for Life in January 2017, and four bills proposing the legalization of active euthanasia were presented by leftist and centrist political parties between February 2017 and April 2018. The four bills were voted on and rejected by a small margin in May 2018 (1st round). After the new legislative elections in 2019, five bills were submitted in late 2019 and early 2020 and approved in early 2021, but the Constitutional Court declared the conciliatory text unconstitutional due to a lack of conceptual clarity (2nd round). After being rejected by the Constitutional Court, a revised version was approved in late 2021 but vetoed by the President shortly after (3rd round). After the legislative elections of 2022, four bills were submitted in early 2022 and approved in December 2022, but the Constitutional Court declared the conciliatory text unconstitutional once again (4th round). In early 2023, a revised bill was approved, but the President vetoed it (5th round). Finally, in May 2023, the Parliament reconfirmed the text without changes, and a law was promulgated and published (6th round). However, following several requests for successive review, the Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional in April 2025, and the issue returned to the Parliament. However, the lack of a Parliamentary majority in favor of this legislation after the 2024 legislative elections left the issue in a stalemate.
On what concerns gender identity, the issue entered the legislative agenda in 2010 when two bills were discussed, which culminated in the approval of Law No. 7/2011 that recognized transgender people the right to change their legal gender in the civil registry upon the presentation of two medical reports, becoming one of the most progressive laws in the world by then (Hines and Santos, Reference Hines and Santos2018). The topic returned to the political agenda in 2016 and 2017, when three bills were presented by leftist and centrist political parties aiming the approval of the self-determination of gender identity, which ultimately led to the voting of a combined conciliatory text in April 2018 (1st round) and, after a presidential veto, reconfirmed in July 2018 (2nd round), leading to the approval of the Law No. 38/2018. Besides the general principles regarding the self-determination of gender identity, this law also stipulated that the Government would later produce specific legislation in the domains of education and health for trans people. The Government thus produced a regulating decree regarding education in August 2019 (Despacho 7247/2019), which caused a significant political and societal debate, as it would allow trans kids to use the bathrooms according to their gender identity. As a result, 86 members of Parliament (mostly from right-wing parties PSD and CDS-PP, but also from the Socialist Party) requested a constitutionality review, and the Constitutional Court declared that it should have been the Parliament, rather than the Government, that should have produced legislation on this education issue (3rd round). Several political parties then submitted bills during 2022, and the Parliament approved a law on education for trans children in December 2023, but the President vetoed it in early 2024 (4th round). Due to the dissolution of Parliament in early 2024, the legislative initiative was revoked, and the issue remains pending, as there is no longer a Parliamentary majority in favor of this legislation.
As can be observed, both issues were widely discussed in Parliament, particularly in the Committee of Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Liberties, and Guarantees. Moreover, it is worth noting that multiple hearings were held with civil society groups, professional associations, and academic experts, and the issues were also widely discussed in mainstream media and public debates/conferences - more details on both political processes are available in other publications (Almeida and Mota, Reference Almeida and Mota2023; Mota and Fernandes, Reference Mota and Fernandes2022).
Sources of information
To achieve the goals mentioned above, we analyzed two sources of information: (a) documents published on the website of the CEP,Footnote 11 such as pastoral notes and summaries of their regular meetings, and (b) news published on the website of the PCC’s news channel Ecclesia,Footnote 12 namely, those that specify the position of the CEP or the Patriarch to complement the information retrieved on the CEP’s website.
The analysis period spanned from January 1, 2016—when both issues were first discussed in Parliament—to December 31, 2023. The search items were “euthanasia,” “medically assisted death,” “gender identity” and, later, “gender ideology.”Footnote 13
All the documents were analyzed according to the type of strategy (direct or indirect) and the predominant arguments (moral or rational/instrumental) used by religious actors. Following Meyer-Resende and Hennig (Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 149), we considered direct strategies when religious actors explicitly addressed political actors, when they campaigned for/in a referendum or provided explicit support to certain political actors. Contrarily, indirect strategies “(…) include efforts to influence individual consciences through mobilization and/or support of societal protest against permissive laws, clarification sessions, and doctrinal pronouncements over the moral dilemma at stake” (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 149).
As concerns the types of arguments, moral arguments are based on ethical, religious, or cultural values which emphasize what is “right” or “wrong” according to absolute or traditional principles. Conversely, rational arguments are based on empirical data and logic. Based on other studies (Almeida and Mota, Reference Almeida and Mota2023, 26–27; Burlone and Richmond, Reference Burlone and Richmond2018, 322–327), one considered examples of moral arguments for euthanasia the inviolability/sanctity of life or medical ethics, while the fear of the slippery slope and the lack of palliative care were considered rational arguments. For the gender identity issue, based on other studies (Mota and Fernandes, Reference Mota and Fernandes2022, 58–62; Tadlock, Reference Tadlock, Taylor and Haider-Markel2014, 32–41), we considered the arguments of conformity to traditional gender roles and religious precepts about biology and the fear of “gender ideology” as moral arguments and the fear of trans people regretting their choice to transition or the necessary involvement from parents in the transition process as rational arguments.
Results
This section analyzes the content of the intervention from the leaders of the PCC in the debates on euthanasia and gender identity in Portugal, concerning the type of arguments and strategies of influence.
Analysis of positions and arguments used by leaders of the Portuguese Catholic Church published on the Portuguese Episcopal Conference’s website and Ecclesia’s website
Euthanasia
Regarding the debate on euthanasia, we identified 26 documents, of which 16 were from CEP’s website and 10 from Ecclesia (see Table 1). As can be observed, most publications were published during the first and second rounds of debate (5 and 9, respectively). Moreover, it is also possible to observe that most of these documents were published in immediate anticipation or response to the most important moments in the political debate - see section “The case studies: the debates on euthanasia and gender identity.”
Documents about the positions of the Portuguese Catholic Church’s leaders on euthanasia
Table 1. Long description
The table contains 26 documents related to the debate on euthanasia, categorized by date, title, origin, argument type, and stance. The table has 11 columns: Date, Title and link, Origin, Argument type, and Stance. The table includes documents from various dates ranging from March 8, 2018, to December 21, 2022. The documents are from sources like CEP and Ecclesia, with arguments categorized as mixed, indirect, or direct, and stances as mixed, indirect/vague, or direct. The table lists specific dates and titles of documents, along with their origins, argument types, and stances. Notable entries include documents from March 8, 2018, November 2, 2018, May 28, 2019, June 2, 2019, November 11, 2019, February 12, 2020, February 19, 2020, February 19, 2020, January 25, 2021, January 30, 2021, March 15, 2021, November 25, 2021, November 11, 2021, June 8, 2022, June 20, 2022, December 7, 2022, December 21, 2022, and December 11, 2022. The table provides a comprehensive overview of the documents related to the euthanasia debate, their origins, and the types of arguments presented.
Sources: own elaboration.
Regarding the type of arguments, the results displayed in Table 1 reveal that most analyzed documents have a predominance of moral arguments (n = 13) or a mix of moral and rational arguments (n = 9).
This mix is visible, for instance, in document #2, which is a pastoral note and was often mentioned in other documents. In this pastoral note, CEP highlights the “ancestral ethical and legal awareness regarding respect and the sacredness of human life” and the commandment “Thou shalt not kill.” Moreover, without explicitly mentioning it, the text also counters some arguments present in the petition “Right to Die with Dignity” (which was already collecting signatures at that time), namely, by stating that all lives have dignity and are worthy of protection. However, later in the document, CEP mentions that, since Portugal is a secular country, they should appeal to our Judeo-Christian culture and the Portuguese Constitution, which specifies that “human life is inviolable” (article 24, nr. 1).
Despite the predominance of moral arguments, CEP also mentioned in document #2 some rational arguments by saying that the request for euthanasia is often related to depression or abandonment. The subscribers of this document go further by identifying the lack of palliative care in Portugal and the danger of the slippery slope.
This latter rational argument (the lack of palliative care and the corresponding danger of the slippery slope) is actually often mentioned in other documents (e.g., in documents # 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 18). For instance, this happened in the Joint Declaration of Religious Confessions about euthanasia from the Interreligious Working Group Religions-Health, which was co-produced with the leaders of other Portuguese religious organizations, such as the Evangelical Church, the Hindu community, the Islamic community, the Jewish community, the Buddhist community, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (document #4). Moreover, in document #7, the topic was again addressed in the Opening speech of the 197th Plenary Assembly of the CEP, published on November 11, 2019, as new bills were being submitted to Parliament. In this document, CEP dedicates six lengthy paragraphs to the topic, recalling ideas about the right to life, the difficulty in determining whether a patient’s will to die is truly free, that death does not eliminate suffering but rather a person’s life, and that palliative care should be reinforced. In document #18, in which CEP is reacting to the approval of a bill on June 9, 2022, it was mentioned the danger that euthanasia and assisted suicide pose to the most vulnerable, as they may “(…) feel socially pressured to require euthanasia because they feel they are ‘a burden’ on family and social terms.”
It is also worth noticing that moral arguments were not closely tied to religious doctrines, even though the sacredness of life was mentioned in some documents (e.g., documents #2, 18, 21). The non-religious moral arguments primarily focused on the idea that all lives have dignity and are worthy (e.g., documents #3, #4, #6, #13). CEP and the Interreligious Working Group go even further by considering the approval of bills in different moments to be an “unprecedented cultural setback, characterized by the absolutization of the person’s autonomy and self-determination” (document #13), or a “(…) a rupture in the dam of life and a civilizational setback due to the ideologies of desire (…)” and that the decision of the Parliament had been based on “moral nihilism, ethical relativism and individualistic indifference” (document #14). This idea is also expressed in Document #21.
Regarding the influence strategies, the analysis from Table 1 leads us to conclude that indirect strategies were more common. This is visible, for instance, in document #3, in which CEP appealed that the pastoral note should lead to “the internal and external reflection of our communities,” also praising initiatives from civil society, namely, a public statement from five former presidents of the Order of Physicians. Likewise, in document #5, CEP welcomed the rejection of euthanasia in Parliament without mentioning any politicians, praising the commitment through prayer and sensitization activities from several civil society institutions, particularly Catholic professional associations, and various religious confessions. Moreover, in document #9, CEP praised a protest against euthanasia held in several Portuguese cities on October 26, 2019, as well as the public statement of five former presidents of the Order of Physicians against euthanasia, which was in line with the statements the World Medical Association had made in October 2019 in their annual assembly. Furthermore, in document #20, CEP issued a note regarding the new approval of the bills, in which CEP appealed “to families and health professionals, who must always be guaranteed [the right to] conscientious objection (…)” (an idea also expressed in document #25). Finally, it is also worth noticing document #24, in which the Patriarch called for participation in the “Walk for Life 2023,” which would take place in 10 Portuguese cities.
Despite not being so common, the PCC also used direct strategies of influence during the debate on euthanasia. For instance, in document #8 (issued on February 11, 2020), CEP mentioned to “support ongoing initiatives against the decriminalization of euthanasia, namely, the holding of a referendumFootnote 14 .” Moreover, after pro-euthanasia bills from the second round had initial favorable voting, the Interreligious Working Group Religions-Health also made a statement reaffirming its opposition to the legalization of euthanasia, mentioning they would ask for a hearing with the then President of the Republic, the then President of the Parliament, and the Health Parliamentary Committee (document #9)—the hearings with the President and the Parliamentary Committee are then reported in documents #10 and #12. After the approval of a bill that had been readjusted after an unfavorable Constitutional review (3rd round), CEP made a statement on November 11, 2021, declaring to be against the law, which was clashing with the constitutional principle of protection of human life, and calling to “the highest authorities in the country to pronounce in accordance with the constitutional prerogatives at their disposal,” which one may assume to be a call to the then President of the Republic (document #17), who is a very religious man.
Gender identity
Regarding the debate about gender identity, we identified only eight documents published that addressed this topic. Most of these documents were produced in 2016, when bills were being submitted, and in 2018, when the bills were approved, as well as in 2019, when the issue of a specific regulation for trans children in schools was the subject of much debate. From Table 2, it is also evident that most of these documents were published on the Ecclesia website, while only two were published on the CEP website. It is interesting to note that the PCC never mentioned the expression “gender identity” but has always mentioned the expression “gender ideology.” It is also worth noticing that Ecclesia has published several other articles on the opinions and activities related to “gender ideology” from actors other than CEP, such as Catholic professional associations, and other lay conservative civil society organizations.
Documents about the positions of the Portuguese Catholic Church’s leaders on gender identity
Table 2. Long description
A table with eight rows and six columns detailing documents about the positions of the Portuguese Catholic Church’s leaders on gender identity. The columns are labeled as follows: Number, Date, Title and link, Dominant arguments, and Main strategy. Each row provides specific information about a document, including the date, title, link, dominant arguments, and main strategy. The table includes dates ranging from September 29, 2016, to May 14, 2023, and various titles related to gender ideology. Dominant arguments are categorized as Moral or vague, and main strategies are either Direct or Indirect.
Source: own elaboration.
Besides these documents, it is also important to highlight a document often mentioned in the analyzed documents but fell out of our analysis, as it was published in 2013, which was already mentioned—the Pastoral Note “On Gender Ideology” published on November 14, 2013.Footnote 15 In this pastoral note, CEP stated that the so-called “gender ideology” was increasingly spreading, considering it an anthropological revolution and not just a “simple intellectual fashion,” being a cultural movement with repercussions on the understanding of the family, teaching, and social communication. It added that “gender ideology” is radically opposed to our civilizational heritage and to “the biblical and Christian vision of the human person and sexuality.” It goes on to say that this theory “(…) is based on the distinction between sex and gender, forcing the opposition between nature and culture (…) [while it] considers that we are men or women not based on the biological dimension in which we are born, but we become such according to the process of socialization (the internalization of the behaviors, functions and roles that society and culture assign to us).”
This pastoral note is mentioned in document #G2 and in document #G3 in which CEP states that “[t]he sexual dimension, masculinity or femininity, is constitutive of the person [while also mentioning that] (…) sexual difference has a meaning in the plan of creation: it expresses a reciprocal openness to otherness and difference, which, in their complementarity, become enriching and fruitful.” Likewise, it is also mentioned in document #G6, in which it recalls the idea that “gender ideology aims to provoke an ‘anthropological revolution,’ relegating sexual identity as a ‘natural and biological condition’ to secondary importance.”
In line with this argument, all documents have a predominance of arguments with a moral nature, except two documents which only report two events will take place on the topic of “gender ideology”—in document #G1, it is reported that Diocesan Institute for Christian Training from the Patriarchate of Lisbon will organize a conference on that topic to open its pastoral year; and in document #G5, it is announced that the Parish of Estoril (near Lisbon) will organize a colloquium on gender ideology, aiming to answer three questions: “What is it? How to deal with it? What answers?”
Regarding moral arguments, document #G4 specifies that gender ideology has been trying to change the traditional conceptions of the man–woman binomial, ignoring “biological and scientific data.” On the other hand, in documents #G6 and #G7, and in response to the regulating decree regarding education issues in August 2019, CEP mentioned that “gender ideology” was trying to indoctrinate society by introducing its ideas in school curricula, which were “presented as consensual and indisputable scientific data.” In these same documents, the bishops from CEP go on to state that “gender ideology” is promoting a “civilizational rupture” and that this ideology is failing to take into consideration scientific data about biological differences between men and women.
On what concerns rational arguments, the documents only mention the idea that parents should have the right to decide on “(…) the education of their children (…).” (document #G6). Although scientific data were mentioned, the representatives from the PCC failed to specify the sources of such data.
Concerning the strategies of influence, there is a slight predominance of indirect influence. First, this strategy is evident in organizing two events on “gender ideology” open to the general public but primarily dedicated to Catholic citizens (documents #G1 and #G5). Moreover, in document #G7, there is a reference to the need to train catechists, teachers from the school subject of Catholic Moral and Religious Education, and teachers from Catholic schools so they know how to respond to the challenges posed by “gender ideology.”
However, there are also two references to direct intervention strategies. On the one hand, the National Secretariat for Christian Education organized a conference with the Secretary of State for Education to discuss the school subjects of “Catholic Moral and Religious Education” and “Education for Citizenship” (which included gender issues at that time), as reported in document #G4. On the other hand, the PCC helped to disseminate a petition that requested the revocation of the regulatory decree regarding education.
Discussion of results
As it was possible to observe, the top echelons of the PCC did indeed participate in the debates on euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity.
Regarding the used strategies of influence, data reveal that the leaders of the PCC mostly used indirect strategies of influence, which confirms our first hypothesis that was based on previous studies about the Portuguese reality on what concerns other morality issues (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015; Sousa and Silva, Reference Sousa and Silva2023). Regarding euthanasia, the analyzed actors mainly appealed vaguely or appealed to society, in general, or to believers, in particular, and even to physicians and patients’ relatives, so that they would become conscious objectors. Concerning gender identity, religious actors often appealed to believers and citizens by organizing events and to catechists and teachers when the debate became focused on the implementation of the law in the education sector.
Nevertheless, it is essential to emphasize that religious leaders also employed direct influence strategies. In the debate on euthanasia, the Interreligious Working Group Religions-Health appealed to the President to veto the bills and applauded when the President or the Constitutional Court vetoed them. The group also advocated for a referendum and held a meeting with the President of the Republic while also participating in a parliamentary hearing. Regarding gender identity, the PCC organized a conference with the Secretary of State for Education and supported and disseminated a petition aimed at revoking the regulatory decree regarding education. Even if not the majoritarian strategy of influence, this more direct intervention may be related to the new approach that the Patriarch in office between 2013 and 2023 had advocated (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 145).
Regarding the used arguments, the majority of these have a moral basis, which confirms our second hypothesis. Regarding euthanasia, the most common moral arguments were related to the idea that all lives have dignity and are worthy, that life is sacred, the fact that the legalization of euthanasia would destroy our society and be against our Judeo-Christian culture, or the fact that the Portuguese Constitution stipulates that “human life is inviolable.” In terms of gender identity, the moral arguments were related to the idea that our society and culture are based on the differences between men and women and their complementary roles and that gender ideology was trying to indoctrinate youth in schools.
Despite the predominance of moral arguments, one must also stress the relatively common use of more rational arguments in the debate on euthanasia, such as the lack of palliative care and the consequent danger of the slippery slope.
Finally, it is also worth noticing that the participation of the Catholic Church was much higher in the debate on euthanasia than in the debate on gender identity, which confirms our third hypothesis. This reality may be related to the fact that euthanasia is a “life-and-death” issue, which is more tightly related to religious doctrines than sexuality issues (Budde et al., Reference Budde, Knill, Fernández-i-Marín and Preidel2018, 46, 48). Likewise, it may also be related to the fact that religious actors and other conservative actors have more chances of success in “new issues” (i.e., issues that not so many countries had legalized—by the time Portugal started to discuss the topic, only four countries had legalized active euthanasia)—rather than in “older” issues—Portugal had already a somehow progressive law approved in 2011, and there were already five countries with legislation recognizing self-determination of gender identity (Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 2020). In any case, it is important to note that the PCC reported the opinions of several other religious actors (Catholic professional associations and conservative lay civil society organizations) on “gender ideology” in other articles that fell out of our analysis, as they are not part of the PCC per se.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the participation of the top echelon of the PCC in the recent debates on two morality issues in Portugal, particularly active euthanasia and self-determination of gender identity. The results led us to conclude that this actor was active in both debates, most noticeably in defining moments of the debate on euthanasia. We believe this preference for the debate on euthanasia followed a need to choose a “battle” since the two debates took place more or less simultaneously, and there was a higher chance of influence in the debate on euthanasia due to the existence of a higher political and social division (see Almeida and Mota, Reference Almeida and Mota2023). In any case, this situation thus suggests that Portugal may be included in the third path/level of secularization, which allows religious actors to participate in the public and political spheres (Fernandes, 2018, 181–182).
This stronger participation is, therefore, in contrast with previous debates on morality issues in Portugal, in which the PCC had a weaker direct intervention, and confirms our bigger expectation that the appointment of a new, more conservative and interventionist cardinal in 2013 would lead to a stronger and more visible opposition to morality issues (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 145). During this period, one witnessed a higher intervention from the PCC, not only through pastoral notes but also by promoting or divulgating events (protests, marches, and conferences), mainly using indirect strategies of influence, as well as a few direct strategies, namely, supporting referendums and petitions, participating in a parliamentary hearing and in a meeting with the President of the Republic.
This more interventive approach is, therefore, more in line with the approaches from other European Catholic Churches described in the literature review (Meyer-Resende and Hennig, Reference Meyer-Resende and Hennig2015, 145–146). It is important to highlight, nevertheless, that this position from the PCC was somehow initially ignored by most political parties (visible in the lack of references to the Catholic Church in the parliamentary debates), which may be related to the absence of strong confessional parties per se in Parliament during most of the debate. Moreover, the public image of the PCC was weakened in 2021 due to some scandals about pedophilia,Footnote 16 which may have led this institution to refocus its attention for some time.
Besides the examples which are directly related to the analyzed debates, two other examples may be mentioned regarding the involvement in politics of the top echelon of the PCC. One of these examples was a publication on Patriarch Clemente’s social media account about the 2019 European elections, which implied political support for parties that were pro-life and opposed to “gender ideology,” namely, the right-wing CDS-PP and a far-right coalition that included the then newly formed Chega! party.Footnote 17 This publication was nevertheless deleted shortly after it was published and was considered by the Patriarch himself as an imprudent message. The second example was the participation of the Patriarch Clemente, one bishop and three priests in the collective book titled Identity and Family: between the consistence of tradition and the demands of modernity,Footnote 18 which advocated ideas against gender equality, “gender ideology,” and “death culture” and was published in April 2024, shortly after the legislative elections of 2024, which had resulted into a right-wing parliamentary majority. This book was organized by the leaders of a conservative social movement named Ethical Action Movement, two of whom were former ministers from the CDS-PP, and included several other former politicians from the CDS-PP and the Catholic faction of the PSD and PS.
Likewise, it is worth mentioning that, like Moniz and Brissos-Lino (Reference Moniz and Brissos-Lino2024) concluded, some Portuguese political parties—namely, CDS-PP and Chega!—are using more religious morals in their political discourse, thus fitting in the category of “religious populist” parties.
Both trends, combined with the recent significant growth of a far-right conservative and populist party Chega!, as well as the emergence of several conservative civic movements (Mota et al., Reference Mota, Costa, Almeida, Silva, Gherghina, Kollman and Mișcoiuforthcoming), may lead us to question if the political involvement from the PCC will be a new trend or if the involvement described in this paper was largely dependent on the influence of Patriarch Clemente, who is no longer serving since 2023.
The positioning of the Portuguese and other European Catholic Churches in this new polarized context will then be a relevant topic for future research.
Acknowledgements
Inês Santos Almeida was financially supported by the Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies (UIDB/04058/2020) + (UIDP/04058/2020), funded by national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia and the PhD Fellowship awarded by FCT nr. 2021.06378.BD.
Competing interests
The authors confirm that they have no competing interests.
Inês Santos Almeida, Researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences from the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL). She holds a PhD and a Master’s in Political Science. By the time the first version of the article was written, she was a PhD student and junior researcher at the Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies from the University of Aveiro (GOVCOPP-UA). Her research interests are policy-making process, morality policies, political parties, public opinion, and political corruption. Inês Santos Almeida, Email: ines.almeida@ics.ulisboa.pt
Luís F. Mota, Assistant Professor at ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon and researcher at its Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology (CIES), as well as in the Research Centre in Political Science from the University of Minho (CICP-UMinho). He holds a Post-doctorate in Public Policies and a PhD in Public Administration. His research interests are the policy-making process, collaborative governance, public sector reform, local governance, and gender and queer issues. Luís F. Mota, Email: luismota.work@gmail.com.
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