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Cognitive requirements for hawk-dove games: A functional analysis for evolutionary design

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Tomonori Morikawa
Affiliation:
Center for International Education, Waseda University, 1-7-14-404, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku Tokyo, Japan goducks1221@hotmail.com
James E. Hanley
Affiliation:
Visiting Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47408 james@jhanley.net
John Orbell
Affiliation:
Political Science Department & Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 jorbell@oregon.uoregon.edu
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Abstract

Like other social animals, humans play adaptively important games, and current evolutionary theory predicts special-purpose, domain-specific cognitive mechanisms for playing such games. We offer a functional analysis of the information requirements for successfully playing one important social game, the “hawk-dove” conflict-of-interest game, developing new graphic conventions for doing so. In particular, we address the orders of recognition necessary for successfully playing such games, showing that there are adaptive advantages of capacities for first, second, third, and fourth such orders, but no more. We suggest that first-order recognition is not only the most basic in analytic terms but is likely to have been the first to evolve, with subsequent orders added later in evolution.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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