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The Need for a Defensive Biological Research Program1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Thomas R. Dashiell*
Affiliation:
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Foreign Affairs, 320 21st. Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20451
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Abstract

The biological defense research program maintained by the Department of Defense as a deterrent to the potential use of biological warfare against United States forces or national interests has been subjected to intense criticism. Concerns center on developments in the protective programs and the potential for new offensive developments through the application of biotechnology. The arms control activities intended to preclude any offensive developments are reviewed which point out the relative ineffectiveness of these control mechanisms. The nature, scope and direction of the biological defense research program and the openness of the program are noted. The proliferation of biological warfare capabilities adds to the urgency of an adequate defense program. The political nature of the problem and its relationship to control of biological warfare is examined and the interplay between the technical and the political roles leads to a potential solution. Key attributes of a control program should be enhanced efforts to develop the political framework to achieve effective control mechanisms while maintaining a complementary biological defense research program as the only effective deterrent at this time.

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Type
Articles and Commentaries
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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