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EQUILIBRIUM IN n-PERSON GAME OF SHOWCASE SHOWDOWN

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2010

Vladimir Mazalov
Affiliation:
Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, Russia E-mail: vmazalov@krc.karelia.ru, afalko@krc.karelia.ru
Anna Ivashko
Affiliation:
Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, Russia E-mail: vmazalov@krc.karelia.ru, afalko@krc.karelia.ru
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Abstract

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In this article we consider a noncooperative n-person optimal stopping game of Showcase Showdown, in which each player observes the sum of independent and identically distributed random variables uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Players can decide to stop the draw in each moment. The objective of a player is to get the maximal number of scores that does is not exceeded level 1. If the scores of all players exceed 1, then the winner is the player whose score is closest to 1. We derive the equilibrium in this game on the basis of the dynamic programming approach.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010