Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T13:42:47.935Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A MEAN FIELD GAME ANALYSIS OF SIR DYNAMICS WITH VACCINATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2020

Josu Doncel
Affiliation:
University of the Basque Country, Leioa 48940, Spain E-mail: josu.doncel@ehu.eus
Nicolas Gast
Affiliation:
INRIA and Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, LIG, F-38000 Grenoble, France E-mails: nicolas.gast@inria.fr; bruno.gaujal@inria.fr
Bruno Gaujal
Affiliation:
INRIA and Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, LIG, F-38000 Grenoble, France E-mails: nicolas.gast@inria.fr; bruno.gaujal@inria.fr
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

We analyze a mean field game model of SIR dynamics (Susceptible, Infected, and Recovered) where players choose when to vaccinate. We show that this game admits a unique mean field equilibrium (MFE) that consists in vaccinating at a maximal rate until a given time and then not vaccinating. The vaccination strategy that minimizes the total cost has the same structure as the MFE. We prove that the vaccination period of the MFE is always smaller than the one minimizing the total cost. This implies that, to encourage optimal vaccination behavior, vaccination should always be subsidized. Finally, we provide numerical experiments to study the convergence of the equilibrium when the system is composed by a finite number of agents ($N$) to the MFE. These experiments show that the convergence rate of the cost is $1/N$ and the convergence of the switching curve is monotone.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press