Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-kwt9d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-14T08:49:52.181Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES REVISITED IN SOFTWARE RELEASE GAMES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2020

Yasuhiro Saito
Affiliation:
Department of Maritime Safety Technology, Japan Coast Guard Academy, 5-1 Wakabacho, Kure Hiroshima 737-0832, Japan E-mail: yasu-saito@jcga.ac.jp
Tadashi Dohi
Affiliation:
Department of Information Engineering, Hiroshima University, 1-4-1 Kagamiyama, Higashihiroshima 739-8527, Japan E-mail: dohi@hiroshima-u.ac.jp
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

A software release game was formulated by Zeephongsekul and Chiera [Zeephongsekul, P. & Chiera, C. (1995). Optimal software release policy based on a two-person game of timing. Journal of Applied Probability 32: 470–481] and was reconsidered by Dohi et al. [Dohi, T., Teraoka, Y., & Osaki, S. (2000). Software release games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 105(2): 325–346] in a framework of two-person nonzero-sum games. In this paper, we further point out the faults in the above literature and revisit the Nash equilibrium strategies in the software release games from the viewpoints of both silent and noisy type of games. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium strategies in the silent and noisy of software release games exist under some parametric conditions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press