Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T05:26:21.351Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Depressive thinking: changes in schematic mental models of self and world

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2009

Leyland C. Sheppard
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge and the MRC Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge
John D. Teasdale*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge and the MRC Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge
*
1Address for correspondence: Dr John D. Teasdale MRC Applied Psychology Unit15 Chaucer RoadCambridge CB2 2EF.

Synopsis

Alternative explanations for the changes in thinking associated with depression were examined. Depressive thinking could reflect a generalized increase in accessibility of negative constructs and memories, previously associated with depression. Alternatively, depressive thinking could reflect changes at a more generic level of cognitive representation, related to schematic mental models. To investigate contrasting predictions from these two explanations, depressed patients and non-depressed controls completed sentence stems involving social approval or personal achievement e.g. ‘If I could always be right then others would____me’. Construct accessibility views predict that depression will be associated with more negative completions (e.g. ‘dislike’). By contrast, the schematic model view predicts patients may give more positive completions (e.g. ‘like’). This is because schematic models reflect inter-relationships between constructs, and, it is suggested, depression is associated with use of schematic mental models that imply closer dependence of personal worth/acceptance on success/approval than the models used in the non-depressed state. Predictions from the schematic model view were supported, confirming previous findings. Results suggest that depressive thinking reflects changes in the high level mental models used to interpret experience.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable