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Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2014

Kerim Keskin
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 06800 Ankara, Turkey. kerim@bilkent.edu.tr
H. Çağrı Sağlam
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 06800 Ankara, Turkey. kerim@bilkent.edu.tr

Abstract

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This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities à la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI, 2014