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Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games∗

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2013

Sylvain Sorin
Affiliation:
Combinatoire et Optimisation, IMJ, CNRS UMR 7586, Faculté de Mathématiques, Université P. et M. Curie – Paris 6, Tour 15-16, 1er étage, 4 Place Jussieu, 75005 Paris. sorin@math.jussieu.fr; cheng.wan.2005@polytechnique.orgLaboratoire d’Econométrie, École Polytechnique, France
Cheng Wan
Affiliation:
Combinatoire et Optimisation, IMJ, CNRS UMR 7586, Faculté de Mathématiques, Université P. et M. Curie – Paris 6, Tour 15-16, 1er étage, 4 Place Jussieu, 75005 Paris. sorin@math.jussieu.fr; cheng.wan.2005@polytechnique.org

Abstract

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This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game isassociated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finiteinteger weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts andassigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associateddelegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each partto an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game playedby these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibriumpayoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined.Several examples are provided.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI, 2013