This year marks the centenary of the birth of Iris Murdoch (1919–99).Footnote 1 She has been celebrated as one of Britain's most important postwar writers with twenty-six prose fiction novels to her name.Footnote 2 Murdoch was also an ancient philosopher who was primarily interested in issues of moral philosophy. Pinning down her place in the Anglo-American analytic tradition of philosophy, however, is not a straightforward task.Footnote 3 On the one hand she cut a conventional figure, holding a tutorial fellowship at St Anne's College, Oxford, from 1948 to 1963.Footnote 4 On the other hand, her philosophical writing increasingly departed from the coordinates of analytical philosophy.Footnote 5 As Martha Nussbaum notes in her deeply ambivalent review of Murdoch's The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists, Murdoch is ‘a novelist whose best work is deeply philosophical, a philosopher who has stressed…the special role that beauty can play in motivating us to know the good, …a Platonist believer in human perfectability, and an artist.’Footnote 6 Nussbaum points us towards understanding two key elements in Murdoch's thought: her commitment to Plato and the manner in which Murdoch's activity as philosopher and novelist should be considered as interdependent.Footnote 7
If the overlapping lives of popular novelist and academic philosopher add up to an image of Murdoch as an unconventional intellectual creature, it is less commonly known that her oeuvre also included poetry.Footnote 8 In part, Murdoch's poetry has been less in the analytical and cultural spotlight because it constitutes a slim corpus relative to the number and popularity of her novels. Moreover, the limited publication of this poetry till now has led only the most completist of readers to seek it out.Footnote 9 At the very least, then, this article aims to shine new light on one of her poems. It is a pleasure therefore to present a reprinting of ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ alongside this essay so that Murdoch the poet can enjoy as wide an audience as she deserves.Footnote 10
‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ attests to a writer at the height of her creative powers. It was originally published in 1977, that is, in the same year as The Fire and the Sun and a year before The Sea, the Sea, the Man Booker Prize-winning novel. Observing that Murdoch worked on poems and novels concurrently, it would make sense to draw thematic connections between them. My aim, however, is to put ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ into conversation with Murdoch's tour-de-force defence of art against Platonic critique in The Fire and the Sun. In the first instance, in reading the poem for its own sake, we derive a complex picture about the nature of Murdoch's engagement with antiquity. I argue that ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ presents a close engagement with Aeschylus’ Agamemnon. Murdoch's method is to pay close attention to the language, imagery, and temporal organization of the tragedy. This attention enables her to insist, through a reading of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, that war warps the sense of self-in-time. Specifically, I am interested in Murdoch's complex thinking through of time and loss, presented here through a memory of an undergraduate encounter with the Agamemnon under the eye of Eduard Fraenkel (1888–1970).Footnote 11 Across three stanzas, ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ weaves together reflections on studying the Aeschylean tragedy about the end of the Trojan War with a German-Jewish refugee scholar at the outbreak of the Second World War. Starting from the kind of seemingly casual question one might put to an old friend at a college reunion, the poem variously connects loss of innocence on the personal level with the changes in a culture affected by unprecedented violence. The poem then can be read as an astute response to the Aeschylean notion that suffering is a key condition through which knowledge is arrived at. Then, I shall show that Murdoch's poetic engagement with Aeschylus is a mode of classical reception that is as explicit about its personal investments and temporal mediations as it is astute in the philological attention it brings to the ancient intertext.Footnote 12
The further aim of this essay is, as mentioned, to demonstrate the value in reading this poem in conjunction with Murdoch's philosophical rejoinder to Platonic aesthetics.Footnote 13 I will show that her reading of and response to Aeschylus in ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ is a powerful enactment of the capacities and limits of poetry. The poem thus shows her philosophical argument working in the very form about which Plato harbours such damning reservations.
Defending Art: With and Against Plato
Based on the Romanes Lecture at Oxford University that Murdoch gave in 1976, The Fire and the Sun opens with its tongue firmly in cheek: ‘To begin with, of course, Plato did not banish all the artists or always suggest banishing any.’ She continues:
In a memorable passage in the Republic (398a) he says that should a dramatic poet attempt to visit the ideal state he would be politely escorted to the border. Elsewhere Plato is less polite, and in the Laws proposes a meticulous system of censorship.Footnote 14
The Fire and the Sun does not elaborate on why dramatic poetry in particular should draw Plato's ire. Murdoch does, however, observe that Plato cites an old quarrel between poetry and philosophy (Rep. 607b).Footnote 15 Her elision of poetry with the broader category of art is important to notice, not least because Plato's critical mimetic distinctions between visual and literary art have provided the grounds for robust philosophical counterarguments in the Western aesthetic tradition as thinkers have tried to press the gaps in the arguments against art in the Republic, from Horace's ut pictura poesis (Ars Poetica 361) to the paragone that addressed the relative merits of sculpture and painting in the Italian Renaissance to Gottfried Ephraim Lessing's Laokoon, oder: Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie (1766). Murdoch's counterargument to Plato's attack, however, wavers between the broad category ‘art’ (whose proponents are a transhistorical community including Tolstoy and Shakespeare), and the specific examples of dramatic poetry as the great artworks that support her point.
As an introduction to Platonic aesthetics for an educated lay audience, The Fire and the Sun is remarkably clear. Murdoch provides a sympathetic account of the split between art and beauty in Plato's thought. The first half of the short book lays out Plato's consistently hostile view of art, drawing from Republic Books Three and Ten; the second half is concerned with explaining why beauty is considerably more valuable than art in Plato's aesthetics.Footnote 16 Murdoch's account is not merely descriptive of Plato's arguments: for example, in laying out the two types of eros outlined in Phaedrus and Symposium, she adduces parallels and divergences between Platonic and Freudian accounts of eros.Footnote 17 A preview of the polemical position that Murdoch takes in the conclusion emerges in her discussion of the Demiurge in the Timaeus, drawing attention to the contrast between Plato's approval of divine creativity and his disapproval of human artistry.
There is a distinct shift in stance from lecturer providing an overview to Murdoch's own intervention as The Fire and the Sun rounds to a close. In the last ten pages, Murdoch elaborates on what art can do: instead of cultivating the lower parts and leading even the more noble parts of the soul towards base action, Murdoch insists that art ‘can point in the direction of the good and is at least more valuable to the moralist as an auxiliary than dangerous as an enemy’ (77). Her ultimate rejoinder to Plato is that (good) art is not frivolous, it is not a distraction from the ethical demands to see reality and crucially it is not a barrier to accessing that reality. Art at its best can be a valuable ally for the moralist (or the spiritual therapist, to put it in Murdoch's Platonic terms) who seeks to move from ‘appearance to reality’ (The Fire and the Sun, 80). She continues (ibid.):
The good artist helps us to see the place of necessity in human life, what must be endured, what makes and breaks, and to purify our imagination so as to contemplate the real world (usually veiled by anxiety and fantasy) including what is terrible and absurd.
Her insistence here is that art has capacities that are unique to it and not shared by philosophy. To make her defence of art, Murdoch exploits the gap between two extreme positions about the relationship between art, illusion, and reality. One extreme is that art can make use of ambiguity about reality but to ends that are not instructive. The other extreme is that art that fosters deceptive structures (such as irony, parody, and comedy) is totally complicit with illusion and therefore not morally instructive. According to Murdoch, Plato is an ‘authoritarian moralist’ because he refuses to admit that art can navigate a middle ground between these extremes.Footnote 18 Murdoch therefore insists that though ambiguity, art has the capacity to convey truth as well as illusion creatively.
This is not the venue to discuss whether Murdoch is right to stake her objections to Plato on ‘good art’ or individual great artworks (to concede even so much ground opens the way to authoritarian thinking about art, and we might note that Murdoch still uses the rhetoric of ‘purity’). She also insists, within what we might call her qualified Platonic position, that there are limits to the capacities of even great art works. Even at its best, art can only ‘explain partly, only reveal almost… Even the Demiurge will never understand entirely.’Footnote 19 The suggestion that lies within reach of Murdoch's argument in The Fire and the Sun, but is not explicitly aired, is how art might work together with philosophy to provide (an always composite and incomplete) access to reality.
It is helpful to look at the specific examples of great artists and artworks that Murdoch recruits to her defence of art:
Shakespeare makes not only splendour but beauty out of the malevolence of Iago and the intolerable death of Cordelia, as Homer does out of the miseries of a pointless war and the stylish ruthlessness of Achilles. Art can, rarely, but with authority, show how we can learn from pain, swept by the violence of divine grace toward an unwilling wisdom, as described in the first chorus of the Agamemnon in words which somehow remind us of Plato, who remained (it appears) so scandalously indifferent to the merits of Aeschylus. (A case of envy?)Footnote 20
The qualification ‘rarely’ indicates how much Murdoch is conceding to Plato—only the best (read: the most canonical?) dramatic stylists operating might be able to facilitate insights into reality. Murdoch draws our attention to the ancient targets of Plato's attack: the tragic poets, of whom Plato considers Homer the foremost (Rep. 606a–e). Echoing the transhistorical sweep of Plato's attack, Murdoch joins Shakespeare together with Homer as examples of how art can communicate truth, particularly moral truth. Murdoch insists that the Iliad does not shy away from showing us Achilles spiritual faults (‘ruthlessness’), however glamorously presented. Moreover, Murdoch playfully raises the spectre of a rivalry between philosophy and poetry by suggesting that Plato did not take the wisdom formulated in contemporary tragedies seriously—only out of jealousy of their metaphysical and moral reach. The allusion here to the specific piece of ‘unwilling’ wisdom formulated by the chorus of the Agamemnon is brief but specific. The original auditors of Murdoch's lectures might have had to take her word for it that there is something powerful enough in the Agamemnon that could induce cold envy in Plato, that is, they might or might not have been able to independently supply a specific allusion to the Agamemnon. We, however, are able to observe her defence of art—that is, both the capacities and limits of poetry—in action precisely through her poetic thematization of ‘learning from pain’ (understood as a gloss on the Agamemnon’s chorus slogan πάθει μάθος) as well as to the Agamemnon more broadly.Footnote 21
Contextualizing ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’
Far from Plato's ‘scandalously indifferent’ stance then, I argue that Murdoch is passionately attentive to Aeschylus’ Agamemnon in formulating a poetic meditation on time and loss. She experienced the Second World War as an undergraduate and then as a civil servant for the government and the United Nations—while these experiences were obviously not those of the front line, Murdoch articulates a particular set of personal and generational losses.Footnote 22 The dedicatee of the poem is Frank Thompson, Murdoch's friend, lover, and classmate at Oxford who died aged twenty-four fighting in Bulgaria.Footnote 23 Understood as an epitaph of sorts, the poem is therefore involved in the painful shuttling to and from the past that is required to give presence to a person who is gone.Footnote 24
The immediate context of the poem is the undergraduate seminar that Fraenkel ran on the Agamemnon out of which discussions he produced his landmark commentary.Footnote 25 The multiple time frames of this poem collide: the mythological moment of Agamemnon's return to Argos, the original performance context of Aeschylus’ trilogy in 458 BC, Oxford at the start of the Second World War in 1939, Murdoch's moment of composition and now us, reading Murdoch from the vantage point of the present. ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ eloquently makes the case that our responses to the ancient world and its texts are shaped by the flesh and blood bodies that sit next to us and teach us and desire us, as much as they are conditioned by the political horrors outside the classroom.Footnote 26 Murdoch is attentive to the dread-inducing strangeness of Aeschylus’ organization of time and uses ‘untimeliness’ to think through personal and cultural loss.Footnote 27 A close reading of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon informs this meditation, illuminating Murdoch's interpretative skill in reading the ancient texts that stands apart from the context of her encounter with the tragedy through the lens of Fraenkel and the making of his commentary. Murdoch's canniness in reading and responding poetically to Aeschylus ought to be acknowledged in its own right. The overlooking of Murdoch's expertise as a Hellenist and the downgrading of her poetic responses to the classical tradition shares in a long history of the underrecognition of women's scholarly and creative interventions.Footnote 28 This is all the more the case if the woman in question has had a personal relationship with a major male scholar. For example, in recent reappraisals of Fraenkel's commentary in the history of classical scholarship, citations of ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ (often from the opening stanza only) are used to illustrate the duration of the seminar. The effect of citing the poem in this un- or under-contextualized manner is to subordinate the creative (female) labour of the poem to the serious intellectual (male) endeavour of the construction of a philological commentary.Footnote 29 The reparative reading offered here appreciates the complexity of the poem per se and thus how it formally embodies Murdoch's philosophical defence of art.
Normative Time and Untimeliness in the Agamemnon
The Oresteia’s construction of time is conspicuous in its concern for καιρός (timeliness), forming a counterpoint to its thematic exploration of untimeliness. As Wilson notes, καιρός in archaic and classical literature holds rich meaning beyond the temporal.Footnote 30 Thus, καιρός and its cognates are significant in the Oresteia in describing the manner of action, specifically in how well aimed a blow is: καιρός contains shades of κρίσις, implying ‘judgment’ and ‘opportunity’. At Agamemnon 1292, for example, Cassandra prays for a quick death with a blow that is both timely and accurate.Footnote 31 Clytemnestra advertizes her rhetorical mastery (1372f.), insisting that she has no regrets using words appropriate to the occasion. She thereby brings into play both temporal and critical senses of καιρός.Footnote 32 There is an acute contrast, however, between Cassandra and Clytemnestra with respect to the agency they have over normative time, even as they both invoke καιρός in its double meaning. A revealing instance of the multivalence of καιρός is Agamemnon's desperate shout at the beginning of Clytemnestra's attack:
ὤμοι, πέπληγμαι καιρίαν πληγὴν ἔσω.
(Aesch. Ag. 1343)Ah me, I am struck down, a καιρίαν blow!
(tr. Sommerstein, adapted)Again we can contrast Agamemnon's use of the term καιρίος with Clytemnestra's. Against Clytemnestra skillful manipulation of public speech to achieve her private aims, Agamemnon announces that he has been caught unawares, passive to the blow. It would be reasonable for a homecoming hero to be confident that he had avoided a well-timed and well-aimed blow, having left Troy alive. καιρίος thus reminds us of why the violence of which we, the audience of the Agamemnon, are spectators is particularly disturbing. The temporal sense of καιρός has been overtaken by the critical sense and refers us to the violence of the battlefield—the spear that comes out of nowhere and finds it mark. In privileging the critical sense of ‘on-target’ above the temporal sense, we are reminded both when and where the appropriately heroic death should have occurred and that the impetus behind Clytemnestra's critical blow was motivated long ago. Even as the Agamemnon constructs how time should work, the play invites us to consider how human temporal experiences and our agency with respect to time vary enormously. Thus the Agamemnon's normative organisation of time points us towards considering untimeliness.Footnote 33
Already by the first staging of the trilogy, the myth of Agamemnon had been fixed in a framework of homecomings that emphatically rejected a happy ending, primarily through the Nostoi and Homer's Odyssey. It is possible to read the Agamemnon as a forward-looking play whose generational violence is redeemed by the conclusion of the trilogy.Footnote 34 The consensus in the wake of Froma Zeitlin's critical interventions, however, has been to reject progressive readings of the Oresteia and to draw attention to the complexity of the shaping of the myth of Agamemnon's homecoming, and to the ways in which the Oresteia undercuts triumphalist vindications of patriarchal justice in the acquittal of Orestes.Footnote 35 The turn away from progressive readings of tragedy also contests how the historiography of tragedy as a genre is written, that is, no longer in terms of cultural development from Aeschylus to Euripides. Following Zeitlin in understanding the Oresteia as more than a straightforward document of development towards patriarchy, readers have been alert to how time is organized in non-linear fashion within the trilogy.Footnote 36
There are two moments in the Agamemnon through which we can observe an explicit concern with the complexity of temporality: the extraordinary choral parodos (40–247) and the introduction of Cassandra as a major innovation in the plot (1071–331).Footnote 37 Both demonstrate formal features of temporal complexity. The choral parodos, for instance, is split metrically into two: in the anapestic first part, the Argive elders describe the genesis of the Trojan War and explain why they did not go off and fight (40–104). In the longer lyric second half, the chorus describes Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia in painfully vivid detail (105–247). The chorus recognize that they were too old to fight even at the expedition's departure—at the moment of Agamemnon's return, they inhabit an extreme old age (τό θ᾽ ὑπέργηρων φυλλάδος ἤδη κατακαρφομένης, ‘while extreme old age, its leaves already withering’, 79f.). In continuing to live—perhaps overliving—the chorus sense that they have outlasted their usefulness except to bear witness and to recollect the story of the departure of the fleet (σύμφυτος αἰών, ‘the age that was born with me’, 107). By contrast, they draw attention to the youth of the men of the chorus who fell at Troy (Ἑλλάδος ἥβας, ‘the youth of Greece’, 109). Moreover, the time of a human lifespan folds back on itself in the chorus’ metaphors for the frailty of old age as ‘childlike’ (ἰσόπαιδα, 75) and ‘no better than a child’ (παιδὸς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀρείων, 81).
In both parts of the parodos the chorus implicates untimeliness in the basic sense of young life cut (violently) short. In this sense, the choral focus is not so much the Greeks who fell in battle, but rather the very young. In the first anapestic part, the chorus describes an omen sent from Zeus in which two eagles attack a pregnant hare (113–20). The attack instantiates a disruption of the logic of generation and implies that the motivation of violence against the vulnerable might have no other cause than divine will, pointing forward to the description of the sacrifice. The metrical shift underscores the intensity of experience that Iphigenia's sacrifice created for the chorus as a group of spectators at the original event and in their recollection of this painful memory on the occasion of Agamemnon's homecoming. Untimeliness is also a way of understanding how the sacrifice at Aulis has an effect on the present of the Agamemnon—the logic of cause and effect is stretched to encompass the full decade of Agamemnon's absence, and yet the chorus’ memory of the sacrifice is precise (238–47) and urgent as though it were a recent event. Time buckles and folds under the intensity of this recollection—its consequences and thus the future (252) are unknowable for the chorus and thus so are the appropriate responses. One of the final images in this, the longest extant parodos in Greek tragedy, is of a person weeping out of sync, anticipating misfortune (ἴσον δὲ τῷ προστένειν, ‘but that's as much to say, “lament it in advance”’, 253). It is fitting that the chorus are concerned to avoid the untimely or unseasonal response, since they have expressed throughout the parodos a sense of having overlived in contrast to those who have lived too little.
Placed at the halfway point of the narrative of the events at Aulis, the ‘hymn to Zeus’ (160–83) meditates on the nature of divinity and divine justice, and on the human experience of divine justice. The hymn draws to the surface some of the troubling implications of Agamemnon's adherence to the will of Zeus (if indeed this is how we construe his decision to sacrifice his daughter). These meditations are concentrated in πάθει μάθος (‘learning through experience/suffering’, 177f.), an idea that is recapitulated at the end of the parodos (250f.). As we have seen in the manner in which Murdoch herself already deploys this phrase in The Fire and the Sun, πάθει μάθος has come to be used as a shorthand for the logic of the Oresteia as a whole. Of the many fascinating critical perspectives that πάθει μάθος has launched, most pertinently for my purposes here is the idea that it implicates a time of knowing. Whether we translate πάθει as ‘suffering’ or ‘experience’, it opens up the idea that knowledge (of how the world works and the human place in it) is not available immediately to humans. ‘Learning through experience/suffering’ is not merely hindsight but an epistemic mode in which human and divine relationships to time are construed as profoundly different. Unlike dreams or prophecies (which are also strategies of knowing), learning through experience/suffering gives an account of human knowledge that is constantly in development, re-evaluating the past through new (technical, sensory etc.) information. πάθει μάθος insists that human knowing-in-time is characterized by temporal lag: constant historical revision, together with uncertainty about causation, creates painful conditions in which we think about ourselves and how to act ethically. Untimeliness, as thematized in the Agamemnon, is more than being out of sync with a given present. If καιρός holds more than a temporal meaning, so too untimeliness describes a set of relations between human time, knowledge, and action in which the temporal is not always paramount. Thus I understand untimeliness here as the framework in the Agamemnon that indicates that human knowing-in-time is always partial and in need of revision, and thus ethically fraught. The Agamemnon shows that to be embroiled in untimeliness, understood as this kind of ethical and epistemological situation, is painful.Footnote 38
The key strategy through which the Agamemnon renders untimeliness is in the figure of Cassandra and her position as prophet between multiple and conflicting temporal modes.Footnote 39 Cassandra, the Trojan priestess of Apollo, is cursed with the incredible gift of prophecy and does not inhabit the same cultural or temporal coordinates as other characters. Cassandra lives an awful epistemic paradox: having full knowledge of both past and future, she cannot intervene in, mitigate, or avoid the historical perspectives to which she has access. While her knowledge is not partial, her capacity for action is emphatically truncated and thus underscores the vexed temporal situation of her knowledge. Even as Agamemnon (and indeed the entire house of Atreus) are caught up in contradictions between historical causation and free will, Cassandra's double temporal orientations bleakly concentrate the epistemological contradictions operating at the heart of the play. Her impossibilities sometimes break language wide open. Thus Yopie Prins observes: ‘the stuttering of her first words—the letters otototoi, the graphic representation of a barbaric utterance…hovers between languages, turning Cassandra in the strange literality of language itself, which remains untranslatable’.Footnote 40 Cassandra's interstitial relationship to Greek, and to language as a means of human communication, is part of her vexed relationship to time. As a prophet, Cassandra has a double temporal orientation to knowledge that she can only partially distil into a form that is intelligible to other characters, most clearly seen in the specific prophecies that she makes: her own death (1160f.), Agamemnon's murder (1246), and Orestes’ revenge (1279–84). Cassandra's strange and skewed insight into the flow of time allows her to give an accurate account of the violent history of the house of Atreus and to link it to the present bloodshed (1156–97).Footnote 41 The threads of causation tie together the sacrifice of Iphigenia and Cassandra's lament—if the act of violence against Iphigenia is the local cause of Clytemnestra's revenge, Cassandra provides a deeper mythological context for the violence in which the Atreidae are enmeshed, alluding to the feasting of Thyestes on his children, and the dismembered Pelops. Cassandra's ability to see violence deep into mythological time, to accurately forecast the violence to come but only partially communicate these visions is itself a symptom of trauma suffered through divine sexual violence. Before entering the royal house and meeting the death that she can already foresee, Cassandra's final image speaks to the insubstantiality of human life, regardless of its degree of suffering or success (1326–30)—both metaphors of the sketch easily erased with a sponge and the shadow imply that the time of human existence is unstable. Thus, Cassandra inhabits πάθει μάθος as untimeliness in an acute form: one way of understanding her unbelievable prophetic skill is as a subject who has experienced time itself as an inescapable and violent structure, and a consequence of the bodily harm she has suffered.
Encountering Untimeliness in the Agamemnon
At first sight, ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ does not engage explicitly with its ancient intertext head-on. In the following reading, however, I shall show how Murdoch is strategically selective in her engagement with the Agamemnon.
After the opening question, the first stanza continues:
Towards the end of the first stanza, the following lines appear:
In fact the poem gives precise textual coordinates to situate us in the tragedy—‘Between line eighty three and one thousand’—and presses pause. Murdoch frames a specific moment and concentrates our attention there. This pausing allows us to recognize Murdoch's mobilization of the Agamemnon’s untimeliness. Between Clytemnestra's triumphant persuasive speech that ends at line 974 and when we hear Agamemnon's death cries at line 1343, Aeschylus interposes a choral song and Cassandra's stunning part sung, part spoken intervention. The third stasimon and this kommos together put more than twenty minutes of performance time between Agamemnon's departure from the stage and his murder. As Oliver Taplin notes: ‘the dramatic time is, so to speak, suspended for more than two hundred lines’.Footnote 43 The prolonged suspense created by this gap cranks up the tension on the chorus resulting in the total formal breakdown of their social identity at a crucial moment: in deciding how to react to the sound of Agamemnon being killed, the chorus splits up into individual voices. This split into individual voices is a unique, and uniquely disturbing, moment in extant tragic choral song.Footnote 44 Performance time and dramatic time have peeled apart from one another in an unsettling way.
By framing the time of the undergraduate class as stopping at line 1000, Murdoch is leveraging a dramatic and temporal uncertainty. Clytemnestra has welcomed Agamemnon into the house, but yes, the hero is not quite yet ended. More exactly, line 1000 pitches us into the third stasimon of choral song (976–1034). The chorus, almost against their own volition, have started to sing an ode full of foreboding, declaring that they have learned of the return of the Greek army from Troy. As they sing, time (χρόνος) itself is the subject:
The chorus recall the Greek fleet's sailing for Troy as they proclaim their self-taught ability to sing and to bear witness. By the end of the song they have worked themselves into a deep despondency, doubting their capacity for any action whatsoever:
Here the chorus is resigned to the idea that they can never act καίριον (‘timely’), anticipating their subsequent inaction in response to Agamemnon's murder. Murdoch's strategic choice to frame the Fraenkel seminar as running ‘Between line eighty three and one thousand’ picks up the escalating tension of the chorus and their relationship to normative time. By choosing to focus on the choral song in which foreboding is explicitly thematized, Murdoch suspends her reader in Aeschylus’ horrifically dilated moment of waiting for Agamemnon to die. As we shall see, this poem will never get to the moment of his offstage death. Murdoch arrests her reader in the chorus’ third stasimon and with the figure of Cassandra in order to structure the memory of her experience of the outbreak of the Second World War. Murdoch's poetic structuring of this memory therefore formulates an untimeliness consistent with Cassandra's knowledge of what is coming beforehand: or, as Murdoch puts it at line 8 of her poem: ‘aftermath experienced before’.
The qualitative memory of the seminar is the first cue to reading Murdoch's strategic stretching of time. The seminar is described in line 2 as ‘endless’. And, as Christopher Stray observes, endless it must have seemed too: ‘the seminar ran from Michaelmas (autumn) term 1936 to Hilary (spring) term 1942, longer than an undergraduate career’.Footnote 46 Murdoch's ‘endless’ invites us to observe the strange dynamics of time as refracted through the memory of Fraenkel's seminar, in painful counterpoint to the specific temporal coordinates of the dedication (the notice of Thompson's conspicuously short life) and in the title (advertising the start of the Second World War as much as announcing the seminar itself). Amongst the temporal resonances of ‘endless’, furthermore, Murdoch might also issue here an implicit invitation to measure the result of the interminable work of the philological seminar against the poem to follow, underscoring its relative brevity.Footnote 47
Neither of the two orienting figures of the poem, Eduard Fraenkel and Frank Thompson, were alive by the time ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ was published. In their respective ways, they mark strangely dilated relationships with time. In a direct address, Murdoch figures Thompson's death as removing him from history and freezing him in the Underworld:
The poem is a requiem not only for her friend but also for the kinds of innocence that Thompson represented to Murdoch.Footnote 49 We can name a few of these as: a political innocence (in a willingness to die for a principle), a personal or historical innocence (the confidence youth has in its own immortality), a sexual innocence (the intensity of first love). Murdoch compounds these losses in the opening lines. In evoking the heady fearlessness and mortifying self-consciousness in answer to the question ‘what did we fear?’ she pitches perfectly at the lack of perspective youth has, where the prospect of war is just as bad as failing spectacularly to answer a Greek grammar question.Footnote 50
Murdoch situates Fraenkel too as a temporally displaced figure. He appeared in wartime Oxford as a throwback to another place and time. As Stray remarks:
If by the 1930s it would have seemed, at least in Britain, anomalous for a professor of Latin to edit a Greek text, Fraenkel's position itself was anomalous not least as a result of the special circumstances that had brought it about. A German Jew steeped in the traditions of Wissenschaft, in 1935 he found himself transplanted to the heart of English Classics, in a collegiate university…where the PhD had hardly taken hold…Footnote 51
Under the sign of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, between Frank and Fraenkel, the memory of the class distils for Murdoch a moment in which life, rather than death, felt infinite; a moment in which Fraenkel (the ‘unforgiving’ in line 7) gives Murdoch a taste for rigorous academic inquiry. Moreover, in her conclusion of the description of the atmosphere of the seminar, Murdoch insists that the gaining of scholarly knowledge comes at the cost of innocence of the various kinds discussed above. Running over most of the second half of the first stanza, the sentence that starts ‘The spirit's failure we knew nothing of’ (line 16) ends with:
Murdoch does not spell out precisely what constitutes ‘guilt’ in this context. While ‘guilt’ is similar enough to ‘anxiety’ for the two to be mixed up, Murdoch gestures towards the kind of knowledge that might be implied by guilt, in the ‘chaste soul’. Together with the riding metaphor condensed in ‘With exquisite dressage’ (with its implications of the charioteer image of the tripartite division of the soul from the Phaedrus), we observe Murdoch's erotic attachments moving beneath the surface of these lines.
As I have been arguing, Murdoch's engagement with Agamemnon is strategic, that is, attentive and selective. In light of that, there is a startling gap between the kinds of sexual relationships at stake in the poem: the mythological erotic violence that shapes Cassandra's prophetic knowledge and Fraenkel's sexual harassment of female undergraduates including Murdoch. It is clear that ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ is not Murdoch's venue to reassess her relationship with Fraenkel through the lens of Cassandra. The proximity of Cassandra's sexual trauma and Apollo's abuse of power with Murdoch's and Fraenkel's relationship is uncomfortable—but it is our discomfort (or mine, at least), and not hers.
In the age of #MeToo, various hermeneutic strategies are available in the light of Fraenkel's breach of pedagogical trust.Footnote 53 At such an impasse, it is worth attending to how Murdoch and other women shaped their memories of these experiences. Mary Warnock (who was also subject to sexual harassment during one-on-one after-dinner reading classes of Agamemnon) records a range of reactions to Fraenkel's ‘pawing about’ amongst her contemporaries.Footnote 54 Philippa Foot, in her obituary for Murdoch, insists that: ‘Even as an undergraduate at Somerville she had sat at the feet of the renowned classical scholar Eduard Fraenkel and he had been one the first of many very distinguished men to come under her spell.’Footnote 55 Foot goes on in the next sentence to name Donald MacKinnon, Murdoch's philosophy tutor, as a formative influence, implying that both men should be considered of equal importance in Murdoch's intellectual development, though there is no evidence that MacKinnon harassed Murdoch or other female undergraduate. Foot's description of Murdoch's relationship with Fraenkel suggests that teacher and student were at least equals, if not that Murdoch's charisma as an undergraduate gave her a kind of power over her tutor. If Foot does not acknowledge at the very least Fraenkel's foul play, Warnock suggests that she saw no abuse of power on his part:
In one way the impropriety of his sexual behaviours seemed utterly trivial compared with the riches he offered us, and the vast horizons he opened up. In another way, the conjunction of the physical with the intellectual seemed the most natural thing in the world, a conjunction of mind and body which it would have been silly and ungrateful to attempt to disjoin…
From the correspondence between Murdoch and Fraenkel we can glean the tenor of their relationship. In a letter dated February 7, 1966, she writes:
Dearest Eduard, my dear, just to say I was so happy to see you again. It's hard to put this into words: you are something very precious and permanent in my life, and I felt this all the time… You have always given me, ever since the days of the Agamemnon class, a vision of excellence. More simply, I love you.Footnote 56
Startling emotional articulacy and openness generally characterizes Murdoch's correspondence with her friends. Here, to Fraenkel, she does not hold back in expressing her affection and admiration for her former tutor. Murdoch's claim to the constancy of these feelings (‘you are something precious and permanent…and I felt this all the time’) is striking, as is her dating of these feelings to ‘the days of the Agamemnon class’. The generosity of ‘you have always given me…a vision of excellence’ implies that Murdoch praises an ethical, as well an intellectual, quality. However we choose to interpret ‘excellence’, we might safely say that Murdoch as an adult does not regret (or choose to remember negatively) the experiences of Fraenkel as her teacher.
Our responses to the erotic attachments at stake in the poem directly inform how we read lines 26 to 35:
Directing us to Agamemnon 1072f., Murdoch mobilizes the shock of Cassandra's bursting into language: the enjambment here over lines 30 and 31 implies that Cassandra herself might be the ‘undulating siren’. It is a sleight of mythological hand, because of course Cassandra is not a siren. The sexual charisma of the undulating siren that might indeed create ‘new structures of sensation’ contrasts starkly with Murdoch's other meaning here. Of course, it is the siren of the air raid, installing an existential terror in those who hear it. Murdoch keeps running twin lines of interpretation, the erotic and the catastrophic, with the compressed syntax of line 32 ‘And in the heart new structures’ until the enjambment over lines 33 to 34. The cumulative effect is to jolt the reader into the war. Murdoch connects the discovery of sex with the start of war: with the result that the loss of innocence is figured as a violent loss.
Raped by Apollo, kidnapped by Agamemnon, murdered out of jealousy by Clytemnestra, Cassandra embodies the erotic and catastrophic experiences of war.Footnote 58 Murdoch's jamming together of Cassandra's wailing with the start of the Second World War is unsettling. In the Agamemnon, Cassandra is not lamenting the start of the Trojan War but its consequences including her own death. By repositioning Cassandra's unique ability to see the horror about to unfold in the Oresteia as the ‘herald’ of war, Murdoch names an experience of profound temporal disjunction in reading Agamemnon at the start of the Second World War. It is specifically Cassandra who animates ‘the aftermath experienced before’, the only figure capable of holding together the various impossibly colliding experiences of time, sex, and violence that Murdoch names. To underscore how unmoored the coordinates of time become when the Cassandra/siren starts to wail, Murdoch observes that ‘the hours distend with bombs’ (line 35). The switch to the present tense is consistent with the rest of the poem. The cumulative effect, then, is an observation, beautifully and painfully realized in hindsight: war distorts one's perception of time. This warping effect cannot be adduced or realized ‘head-on’, but only in the oblique way that Murdoch has here: through a memory of reading a figure like Aeschylus’ Cassandra who has an extremely difficult relationship to time.
The second half of ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ examines the loss of cultural confidence, particularly in the disappearance of dependable religious foundations, whether Christian or Olympian. The allusions to the Agamemnon become looser than in the first half of the poem. Thus the image of the desecrated sanctuary (‘…bombed and lies / Open and unmysterious’, 45f.) implies that theological frameworks that used to provide meaning are no longer capable of doing so in the face of violence. In the same image, we might discern a glimpse of the warning that Clytemnestra gave not to defile the Trojan altars, a warning which the Greeks did not heed (Ag. 338–40). Murdoch's third stanza compresses various senses of historical and religious loss: ‘Delphi medizes and Apollo's face grows dim’ (52) with its allusion to the events of the end of the Persian War gives way to a more profound sense of doubt about the divine framework. While it is not my main quarry here to work out the network of imagery in the third stanza, Murdoch reprises the concern evident in the Agamemnon and in Greek tragedy more generally to test, extend, and rework the mythological nostoi narratives, especially the Homeric versions of these stories. If at the beginning of the stanza the present tense verbs ‘medize’ and ‘grow dim’ imply a seamless convergence of past and present, by the middle of the stanza, the language of reporting, as opposed to direct experience, becomes prominent (line 56 ‘they say’, line 58 Helen as ‘legend’, line 59 ‘a garbled tale’). Furthermore, in direct questions that are nestled in reported speech, Murdoch expresses concern about the meaning that can be derived from historical fact. Thus she indicates both a longing for a simpler and more confident relationship to the ancient and mythological pasts, as well as marking the distance between them.
In the final stanza of the poem, concerns about the capacity of language to recuperate the past return us to reading the Agamemnon, and ultimately to the broader argument that I have set out here for the interdependence of Murdoch's poetry and philosophy:
Murdoch has given us precise coordinates within the Agamemnon that establish the intertextual framework for her poem. Thus she marks out the disquieting moment when it is unclear whether Agamemnon has been killed. The two parts of Murdoch's comparison of Agamemnon's entry into the palace run temporal interference, making it hard to know where Agamemnon ends and the young men, like Frank Thompson who did not come home, start: the striking gloss of figuring tragedy as ‘machine’ (that generates meaning) butts up against ‘continued doom’. In what sense ‘continued’?Footnote 60 If we understand the poem as promising to read no further than line 1000 and thus providing that Agamemnon's doom is ongoing because the Agamemnon is never finished. Having framed and suspended us in this moment of high dramatic tension, Murdoch maps onto it an equally disquieting sense of cultural worlds having slipped away. She withholds any reassurances that the past can be redeemed, whether that is the mythological Trojan past (‘No one can rebuild that town’, 71) or the much more recent past, that is, specifically prewar Oxford or in the more general sense of the cultural innocence of a time before the World War(s). Her insistence that only the natural world remains ‘unpolluted and old / And godless with innocence’ (75f.) caps the dynamics of untimeliness operating throughout the poem. Revaluing ‘godless’ as ambiguously positive and directly invoking ‘innocence’ in line 76, Murdoch alludes to a disturbing logic—through the adjectives she attributes to nature—between pollution, age, and knowledge. The process of coming to sexual maturity, as well as arriving at historical knowledge, is conceived as a loss of innocence. ‘Old’ then is an odd term—it does not readily fit either these meanings of sexual or historical innocence, nor does it sensibly construe the Greeks themselves in biographical metaphor. I suggest therefore that we take ‘old’ to mean a fixed temporal marker in the past, in contrast with which human activity (the ancients as well as the moderns) might be properly recognized in their messy temporal relativity.
The final lines appear to address specifically the loss of antiquity. In the ‘fading’ of the ‘terrible bright Greek air’, we could choose to understand Murdoch offering a straightforward philhellenic lament for the historical distance that separates the twentieth century from the ancient past. Simultaneously, or additionally, we might choose to read this as a lament for the breaking of the scholarly traditions that transmitted ancient texts from generation to generation in a vital way. Murdoch could thus be commenting on the status of classical studies in the late 1970s and remembering Fraenkel as the last bearer of the scholarly baton. If the reading that I have offered here is persuasive, however, we might seek to make another interpretative choice and turn, once more, to construing these lines in light of the Agamemnon’s chorus. Thus we could understand Murdoch taking her cues from Agamemnon 1019–21 (cited above) in which the chorus doubt the perlocutionary force of song, that is, to have any effect on the world beyond itself.
And yet, while the poem ends with a pervasive sense of cultural loss, ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ has demonstrated what art can do. It can memorialize those who are gone, it can hold difficult feelings and experiences up for inspection, and it might console through loss. It illuminates how poetry, uniquely, knows about subjective experiences of history, and how it organizes that knowledge. If the limit of art, and of (great) poetry, is that it cannot restore that which is lost, Murdoch's poem embodies the best philosophical argument in its defence by showing that Aeschylus’ Agamemnon can take a place, right alongside the Platonic dialogues themselves, in helping us to understand the difficulties of living- and suffering-in-time. Thus, just as ‘Agamemnon Class, 1939’ airs out loss in poetry, Murdoch turns to the same image at the end of The Fire and the Sun to draw art and philosophy together, and stake out their limits:
Even at its most exquisite art is incomplete. Simone Weil, that admirable Platonist, said that a poem is beautiful in so far as the poet's thought is fixed upon the ineffable. Art, like (in Plato's view) philosophy, hovers about in the very fine air just beyond what has been expressed.Footnote 61
