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Agency and Omniscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Tomis Kapitan
Tomis Kapitan
Affiliation:
East Carolina University, Greenville, North Caroline
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Extract

It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and direction of divine agency that has long been the lure of certain religious traditions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 105 - 120
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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