^{page 97 note 1} The present argument is, of course, designed to refute only orthodox Judeo-Christian theism. I all not be concerned with other kinds of theism in this paper.

^{page 98 note 1} ‘God and the Good’, Religious Studies, Vol. 2 (04 1967), pp. 269–276.CrossRefGoogle ScholarSee also Brown, Patterson, ‘Religious Morality’, Mind, Vol. 72 (04 1963), pp. 235–44;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFlew, Antony, ‘The Religious Morality of Mr Patterson Brown’, Mind, Vol. 74 (10 1965), pp. 578–81;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCampbell, Keith, ‘Patterson Brown on God and Evil’, Mind, Vol. 74 (10 1965), pp. 582–584;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Brown, Patterson, ‘Religious Morality: A Reply to Flew and Campbell,’ Mind, Vol. 74 (10 1968), pp. 577–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 98 note 2} Indeed, as we shall see, Brown's critique yields the even stronger conclusion that the theist must, if he is rational, reject the atheist's argument, even if he cannot show that (3) is false and even if not being able to show it false is tantamount to being epistemically obliged to accept it.

^{page 99 note 1} Brown was here referring to the Judeo-Christian theist, but I shall, for convenience, omit this qualifier for the time being.

^{page 99 note 2} ‘God and the Good’, p. 274. A full and interesting explication of the sort of relationship which Brown believes to obtain between the moral judgments of the theist and God's will can be found on pp. 271–4 of this article.

^{page 99 note 3} Ibid., p. 276.

^{page 99 note 4} What I am calling ‘the atheist's argument’ is, perhaps, not exactly the argument which Brown meant to criticize. For it may well be that by ‘evils’ in the above quotation, Brown was referring to so-called physical, rather than moral, evils. (The atheist's argument refers only to the latter.) However, there is little doubt that Brown would accept the criticisms of the atheist's argument which I shall present, for it is plain that he holds the theist's judgments of moral evil are based on beliefs about God's will.

^{page 100 note 1} See, for example, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: 1953), pp. 125–6.Google Scholar

^{page 101 note 1} Another rebuttal consists of maintaining that, since he does not have adequate evidence for them, it is irrational for the theist to hold we beliefs on which he allegedly bases his moral judgments. If it is irrational for the theist to hold the beliefs in question, then, of course, the atheist can respond to the foregoing criticisms of his argument by saying that, since a necessary condition of their cogency is that the theist occupies an essentially irrational ethical position, the criticisms can hardly be taken to show that theism is not irrational. However, this objection plainly stands in need of elaboration and defence, and these would take me far beyond the intended confines of the present paper.

^{page 101 note 2} ‘God and the Good’, p. 274.

^{page 101 note 3} A similar point is made by Reeder, John P. Jr,., ‘Patterson Brown on God's Will as the Criterion of Morality’, Religious Studies, Vol. 5 (December, 1969), pp. 236–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 102 note 1} Of course, this does not hold if the identity in question is conceptual rather than contingent. (One who comes to believe that, for example, there are no four sided plane figures ipso facto comes to believe that there are no rectangles.) But, of course, the Biblical quotation in question does not support the claim that there is a conceptual identity between wrongdoing and sin. Nor does Brown himself believe that such a relation holds between them: ‘Jews and Christians use “sinful” and “morally wrong” interchangeably salva veritate (though not, of course, salva significatione) …’ (op. cit., p. 274). However, for some reason Brown apparently failed to see that this admission defeats his claim that the Biblical assertion under discussion supports his critique of the problem of evil.

^{page 102 note 2} For some criticisms of the arguments, see Reeder, John P. (op. cit.), p. 237.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 1} Liberal theists do not, of course, believe all of what the Bible says, but this consideration does not affect the argument.

^{page 105 note 1} An alternative interpretation of the claim that the Bible is morally insightful is that it sets forth propositions about God's will which can be seen to be true or probably true independently of knowledge of anything else. However, it is not, I think, likely that many theists are disposed to argue that there are some propositions about God's will which are self-evident, and, hence, I do not think that this interpretation correctly represents what most theists have in mind when they say that the Bible is morally insightful.

^{page 106 note 1} In ‘Religious Morality’ (op. cit., p. 241) Brown in effect claimed that the theist does have such a source. But see Flew, Anthony, ‘The Religious Morality of Mr. Patterson Brown’ (op. cit., pp. 580–1).Google Scholar In ‘Religious Morality: A reply to Flew and Campbell’ (op. cit., p. 579) Brown admits that Flew's negative comments on the matter are ‘penetrating’, but goes on to say in effect that the question whether the theist is an ethical supernaturalist with respect to all of his moral judgments is not affected by one's view of the theist's sources of knowledge of God's will. Here Brown seems to me to be plainly mistaken.

^{page 107 note 1} Or, at any rate, this follows from what has been said in conjunction with the claim that it would be irrational to deny (6). But (6) simply sets out a partial definition of the orthodox, Judeo-Christian God. And it is to the question of the existence of precisely this God that the atheist's argument is addressed.

^{page 108 note 1} Even many theists are willing to at that their belief in God is held, at least partially, on faith. Arguments that there is a necessarily existent ground of the contingent universe or super-natural designer of orderly structures within the empirical world do not, if cogent, establish that the creator and designer is omnipotent and omniscient, and, even if they did, they certainly would not establish that such a being is perfectly good. Moreover, (to return to an argument for God's existence mentioned in III), we can say that even if the moral insightfulness of the Bible is evidence that the Bible is the revealed world of God and a fortiori evidence that God exists (and, whatever theists may say to the contrary, this is doubtful) it is surely true that it is nothing like solid evidence.

^{page 109 note 1} What Moore failed to point out when attacking sceptical arguments in the manner mentioned earlier (in Section I) is that if the sceptic's argument is valid, then it may be highly disturbing, since we may firmly believe—and be loathe to abandon—any of its premisses. (And, indeed, the sceptic frequently purports to be arguing from premisses which we firmly believe.)

^{page 109 note 2} I am assuming, once again, that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being is not so strongly evidenced that it would be irrational for the theist to make this move.

^{page 110 note 1} One who did not recognize that he is thus committed would not ipso facto be irrational in believing all of the members of S₂. However, the atheist can easily bring the theist to recognize that belief in (1)prime;, (3)prime; and (7)prime; logically commits one to accepting (1), (3)prime; and (7)prime; by pointing out step b) of the above argument.

^{page 112 note 1} A way of bringing ethical supernaturalism even closer to the intuitions of the non-theist is to add the following (further) qualification: In case such a difference does obtain (in case, e.g. P₁, is able to do X and P₂ is not) then if God wants P₂ to do X anyway, His wanting P₂ to do X is not sufficient for P₂'s being morally reprehensible when he fails to do X. However, I shall, for simplicity's sake, ignore this qualification.