^{page 109 note 1} ‘The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3 (07 1964), pp. 244–247.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 1} Also, it is false that ‘… lack of a proof that the problem of evil has a solution … provides prima facie support for atheism’. (Ibid. p. 244.) It would only provide prima facie support for the view that God, if he exists, cannot be both omnipotent and perfectly good, or to a non-theistic view. This leaves room for the belief in a ‘limited God’—a God limited in power—and even for the logically possible view that God is omnipotent but only imperfectly good. And so on. Only if these latter and other views which attempt to resolve the problem of evil and of suffering by rejecting one or the other or both of the two attributes in question are unsuccessful would we be justified in drawing the conclusion Schlesinger draws. Interestingly, the belief in a limited God, which, historically and logically, constitutes one main ‘solution’ of the problem of evil is not even mentioned by Schlesinger. For a recent consideration and rejection of this position—though with what cogency is debatable—see Roland Puccetti, ‘The Concept of God’, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 56 (July, 1964). Let me add that the position of the philosophical agnostic—the person who holds that we do not (or even, cannot) know whether or not God exists, and if he does, what is his nature—sidesteps the problem ofevil. But agnosticism itself may partly arise from the problem itself: if the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly good, omniscient and omnipotent God, then if God exists he must be different from what the theist conceives him to be. But how different, or different in what precise respects ? Or is it the case that God, as conceived by the theist, the deist, or the pantheist, etc. does not exist at all ?

^{page 110 note 2} Ibid. p. 244. But see p. 112 of this paper on ‘unnecessary suffering’.

^{page 110 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 110 note 4} Ibid. p. 245.

^{page 110 note 5} Part of his badness in this case would lie in his being an unjust God: in treating the innocent sufferer or the (few) innocent sufferers differently from the more fortunate majority.

It may be objected that God would then be completely and not merely partially bad; since, being omnipotent, he has all the power needed to prevent or end this unnecessary suffering. A human being would perhaps not be completely bad if he tolerates the unnecessary suffering of one individual or a few individuals, but does not tolerate it with regard to most other individuals. (Which would ensure, what is essential here, that the latter is not motivated by selfish reasons.) The same would be true if he causes unnecessary suffering to one person or a few persons, etc.—at least if the amount of suffering is not very great, or if the kind of suffering is not the worst or one of the worst kinds possible for man. For in the former case the individual, who has only limited power, may be unable to end the suffering. Similarly he may be unable to prevent the suffering he does cause, due to some limitation in his character, upbringing, and the like he is not responsible (or wholly responsible) for. Also in this, as in the former type of case, we make allowances, in our moral judgment of others and of ourselves, for the fact that we are ‘imperfect beings’. But of a perfect being—e.g. an omnipotent and omniscient being who has created the universe—we expect infinitely more, morally speaking. Whether or not this objection is valid, it dramatises the crying need for an adequate delimitation of the concept of perfection—of perfect goodness, perfect power, and so on. Without this, little headway can be made. (See also later.)

^{page 111 note 1} American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3 (07 1964), p. 245.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 2} The consciousness of our freedom from pain (which usually comes after a period of pain or a painful experience) is almost certainly pleasant. But this is not to be confused with the freedom from pain itself.

^{page 112 note 1} Some sceptics would be dissatisfied with this, and would retort that if God is omnipotent he could have created us in such a way that the good now obtainable through suffering could be obtained without it or any other disvalue. But in order to determine whether this objection is cogent—if it makes real sense at all—it is first necessary to determine whether the state of affairs envisioned by the sceptic can exist in any possible world. Second, the sceptic must define precisely the word ‘omnipotent’ as he wishes it to be applied to God. The same demand must be met by the theist, in claiming that God is ‘omnipotent’.

^{page 112 note 2} That will also raise the question as to what extent the human organism could have been different, with respect to the capacity for suffering and for evil, together with their actual preconditions, without any alteration (or any drastic alteration) in the physical, biological and psychological laws of nature that we now have. Also, a question will arise regarding the logical preconditions of suffering and of evil, which are logically independent of the foregoing laws and man's present make-up.

This relates to the sceptic's argument which Schlesinger expresses as follows: ‘Why did God not make nature's laws such that the amount of advantages we enjoy should remain exactly the same as at present but there be no need to pay for it in pain ? ’ (op. cit. p. 245). The immediate—and fundamental—reply to it is: Is this or is this not (a) logically, and (b) actually possible? Clearly the force, if any, of this complaint cannot be determined before we find out whether it is a reasonable demand. And this brings us back to the preceding queries.

^{page 112 note 3} Viz. considered in itself, as a state of affairs, and apart from the goodness or badness of its causes or sources, or its actual or possible effects on those who experience it or are affected by it.

^{page 113 note 1} American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3 (07 1964), p. 246.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 113 note 3} ‘Suffering, Happiness, Evil’, Sophia, vol. iv, no. 2 (07 1965), pp. 10–16.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 4} The assumption that God is omniscient here is essential. For if the theist were willing to eliminate omniscience from God's attributes, he could perhaps avoid the problem of evil by maintaining that the existence of evil is due to God's ignorance of its existence, or its extent and actual forms, not to unwillingness or inability to eliminate or prevent it. Of course the question would then be whether it is (a) logically or (b) actually possible for a being to be ignorant of certain things pertaining to his creation and be perfectly good. For example, it would be interesting and instructive to speculate as to whether Aristotle's Self-thinking Thought, which lacks all knowledge of the world, could be perfectly good (in the sense(s) in which the Christian theists, say, hold that God is perfectly good) if he were supposed to be the creator of the world and not merely the Unmoved Mover, etc.

^{page 113 note 5} Whether or not it is actually possible for suffering and other positive evils not to exist at all. This question is of some interest, but is plainly immaterial for the above point.

^{page 114 note 1} Op. cit. p. 11. Italics in original.

^{page 114 note 2} Op. cit. p. 246.

^{page 115 note 1} This may not apply to the Christian conception of God, insofar as it involves a belief in the Incarnation. (Even then the situation is theologically quite complicated.) But some or all of the other things stated above do apply even to Christian theism. Further, all of the above would apply, as far as I can see, to Judaism and Islam, and other forms of theism.

^{page 115 note 2} Op. cit. p. 246. Italics in original.

^{page 116 note 1} Op. cit. p. 246.

^{page 117 note 1} Op. cit. p. 15.

^{page 117 note 2} Ibid. Note that this argument, as actually presented by La Para, rests on the assumption that Schlesinger's fundamental premise—namely, that the greater possibilities for happiness are not finite—is true. But we have already criticised this premise.

^{page 117 note 3} Ibid. Italics in original.

^{page 117 note 4} For example, if this person's creation, or his happiness, is not at the expense of God's not creating a greater good.

^{page 117 note 5} It can be argued that this would not restrict or destroy God's freedom not to create, and therefore can still make the creation of the universe the result of a free act of divine will. Positively, it would be in conformity with the general Christian view that God creates because of the superabundance of his fecundity and goodness.

A stronger case can I think be made for the view that what is essentially incumbent on God, morally speaking, is not the creation of any particular persons or things but of a world that would contain the greatest possible good. This would entail the creation of human beings and objects, and of particular persons and objects, only to the extent to which they would realise or help realise that goal. (This seems to entail the creation of only those persons and things that would serve the overall moral goal. If so, a further aspect of the problem of evil arises: why God has created men who, he knows (being omniscient and hence possessing perfect foreknowledge) will lead an evil life and bring harm and suffering to others. (Compare and contrast this with La Para's ‘Problem of Existence’.)

On the other hand, if the theist objects that this would limit divine freedom, that God did not have the obligation to create at all, even a perfect world, then he will be faced with La Para's Problem of Existence. The fact that it would then also not be incumbent on God to refrain from creating any universe, even a partly or wholly imperfect one, would not help to justify the presumed fact that, having freely willed to create, God created an imperfect universe.

^{page 118 note 1} Op. cit. p. 16.

^{page 118 note 2} This brings out the important point that the notion of ‘perfect goodness’, as applied to God, makes sense only in relation to, and cannot be separated from, the notions of ‘omniscience’ and ‘omnipotence’ (as applied to God). Similarly, mutatis mutandis, with the analogous notion of ‘perfect goodness’ in the case of men and the notions of their perfect or imperfect knowledge and power qua men.

^{page 118 note 3} It can be rightly maintained I think that our first duty as individuals is, generally speaking, to the living—to ourselves, our family, and others. But both as individuals and collectively, we also have a moral responsibility toward future generations, to the extent to which our actions can influence them. For example, it is clearly our collective duty to prevent the birth of children defective through atomic irradiation by preventing the contamination of the earth's atmosphere by atomic fallout. Also, our hypothetical couple will have the duty to conceive children that have a good chance of being healthy and happy, if and when they decide to have children; and, on the other hand, to do everything they can not to have children, if any children that they might have will probably be defective. (Compare and contrast this with our remarks about God in footnote 2, p. 117.) Similarly God, having freely chosen to create a universe that contains human beings, has at least the obligation to create men who will be healthy in body and mind, with opportunities for self-realisation and happiness. Similarly with the negative of this obligation.

^{page 119 note 1} La Para may of course wish to replace the everday concepts of good, moral obligation, etc., with partly or wholly different concepts. But if he wishes to do so, he must convince us of its desirability.

^{page 119 note 2} Op. cit. p. 16.