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Irony and Argument in Dialogues, XII

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Scott Davis
Affiliation:
School of Religion, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-0355

Extract

Toward the end of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Philo catalogues the ‘frivolous observances’, ‘rapturous ecstasies’ and ‘bigotted credulity’ of ‘vulgar superstition’, concluding that ‘true religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: But we must treat of religion, as it has com monly been found in the world’ (Hume, 1947: 222–3). This would be a mild enough sort of caveat were it not nigh on impossible to determine exactly what counts as true religion, and how it figures in Hume's argument. Typically, answers to this puzzle have required identifying the positions of the discussants, and then arguing that one of them represents Hume's views. A catalogue of the options may prove instructive.

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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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