¹ Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, Sher, George, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1979), p. 21.Google Scholar

² It is, of course, picturesque to imagine God having a theory. I am, however, taking the side of that dominant segment of theistic tradition which identifies God's will as moving in accordance with God's wisdom. For present purposes I am considering God's ‘utilitarianism’ to consist of judgements about human behaviour. The complicated issue of whether this kind of standard could apply to God's own behaviour is beyond the scope of this paper.

³ R. M. Hare has a two-level version of utilitarianism which urges the use of a set of prima facie principles which if taught and accepted would tend to produce actions and dispositions approximating those that would characterize one who was able to apply utilitarian doctrine directly without being limited by the usual human frailties. On his account, however, the level of moral thinking at which we use such principles is based upon another level (critical thinking) where we apply utilitarian doctrine directly to cases and to the choice of prima facie principles which will be used most of the time. See his Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method and Point (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

⁴ Thomas Nagel in his essay, ‘War and Massacre’ contrasts the attitudes toward the world that seem to fit best with utilitarianism and what he calls absolutism (a theory which limits the pursuit of results which are most desirable when considered purely as outcomes). He suggests that utilitarianism is associated with a conception of oneself as ‘a benevolent bureaucrat distributing … benefits’ and that absolutism is associated with a ‘view of oneself as a small being interacting with others in a large world’, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 53–74.Google Scholar

⁵ Notice how Mill's claim of the compatibility of utilitarianism with divine revelation is stated. It is a utilitarian who believes in the perfect wisdom and goodness of God who will believe that whatever God reveals fulfils the requirements of utility. Presumably if there are elements of the alleged revelation which do not quite fit in they will be interpreted in the light of a utilitarian understanding of right. This would allow for the possibility of a kind of dialectical correction of theory by revelation and vice versa. But seriously to attempt such a project with the Christian scriptures would require considerable interpretive skill.

⁶ It is not clear to me that Butler accepts this hypothesis. Possibly he entertains it in reply to those who drew what he believed were faulty conclusions from it. For theists who are more clearly utilitarians see Paley, William, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785)Google Scholar, Tucker, Abraham, The Light of Nature Pursued (1768)Google Scholar, Cumberland, Richard, De Legibus Naturae (1672)Google Scholar, and Berkeley, George, Passive Obedience (1712).Google Scholar

⁷ Butler, Joseph, ‘A Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue’, in Five Sermons, Stuart, Brown, ed. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950), p. 88.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ E.g. Adams, Robert, ‘Motive Utilitarianism’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 14 (12 August, 1976), 467–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Stocker, Michael, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 14 (12 August, 1976), 453–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Railton, Peter, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs XIII, 2 (Spring, 1984), 134–71Google Scholar. Langenfus, William, ‘Consequentialism in Search of a Conscience’, American Philosophical Quarterly, XXVII, 2 (April 1990), 131–41.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Johnson, Conrad, ‘The Authority of the Moral Agent’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXXII, 8 (August 1985), 399–413.Google Scholar

¹¹ Op. cit. n. 7, 89.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Smart, J. J. C., Utilitarianism For and Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Mill also speaks of the utilitarian agent as ‘strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator’, op. cit. n. 1, p. 16.

¹⁴ Smart, J. J. C., ‘Utilitarianism and Generalized Benevolence’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, LXI, 1 & 2 (January–April, 1980), 119.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid. 120.

¹⁶ Op. cit. n. 1, 11–12.

¹⁷ See Berger, Fred, Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 30–63.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Op. cit. n. 1, 11.

¹⁹ Ibid. 9.

²⁰ Mill, , On Liberty (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1956), p. 69.Google Scholar

²¹ Griffin, James, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11 ff.Google Scholar

²² Ibid. 38–9.

²³ Compare this to a scenario suggested by Schlessinger, George, ‘Suffering and Evil’, in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Steven, Cahn and David, Shatz, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 27.Google Scholar

²⁴ Slote, Michael, ‘Utilitarianism, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Cost’, American Philosophical Quarterly, XXII, 3 (April 1985), 163.Google Scholar

²⁵ Chandler, John, ‘Divine Command Theories and the Appeal to Love’, American Philosophical Quarterly, XXII, 3 (July 1985), 231–9.Google Scholar

²⁶ Amartya, Sen and Bernard, Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 4.Google Scholar

²⁷ Foot, Philippa, ‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’, Mind, 94 (April 1985), 196–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ Ibid. 206.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ An earlier version of this paper was written during my participation in a National Endowment for the Humanities Seminar on ‘Consequentialist Theories of Morality’ at Syracuse University in the summer of 1990. I wish to express my thanks to Dr Jonathan Bennett, the seminar director, for helpful suggestions and to N.E.H. for the opportunity.