^{page 420 note 1} The empirical effects of holding a belief would sometimes be relevant in normative arguments; e.g. if the overstrenuousness of an ideal fostered perversions of it in practice. What is common but illegitimate in apologetic is to compare the ideal type of the view we favor with the unpleasant empirical reality of those we oppose.

^{page 420 note 2} Cf. Matt, . 23: 29–31.Google Scholar

^{page 422 note 1} To treat them as significant and illuminative does not mean they were enjoyable in themselves. Some were, others were not. To value them for their own sakes is a religious perversion which, in the language of Sec. IV, leaves the experiencer at the centre of his values (a man who goes on a religious trip because he likes being turned on), rather than changing the centre of his values.

^{page 422 note 2} Yet we should note how much sophisticated theology is negative. There is not only the ‘neti, neti’ (not thus, not thus') of Hindu descriptions of Brahman, but the via negativa tradition within Christianity and other higher religions.

^{page 424 note 1} Here the point about ideal types in Sec. II is most relevant, for the gap between what the traditions proclaim and how the adherents receive it is at its greatest.

^{page 425 note 1} I assume that a presentation which appeals merely to the usefulness of religion for achieving ordinary goals is a failure to grasp the need for a shift in the centre of concern. I cannot here discuss such apparent counter-examples as the very concrete Old Testament promises of apparently ordinary happiness if Israel is faithful to the Lord.

^{page 425 note 2} Cf. the sense of mystery and awe which evokes a need to worship. But to make this the central starting point, as do some treatments of the traditional proofs of God's existence, seems to me to start from too narrow a basis.

^{page 426 note 1} Cf. Gal, . 5: 22–3.Google Scholar

^{page 427 note 1} So, e.g. I have assumed the inadequacy of those sincere and ingenious reinterpretations of Christianity which reduce it to nothing but a doctrine of how to behave in this ordinary world. Even more important, my account is neutral as to the occurrence of miraculous events (which is not the same as denying them). I cannot justify this by appealing, as I did in Sec. II, to the great figures in the traditions, for in general they did take the miraculous to be essential. Of the many issues arising here, the place of the Resurrection in Christian belief is a vital one.

^{page 428 note 1} I must here assert, without defending, my view that the traditional arguments for—and against—the existence of God involve underlying assumptions of this sort.

^{page 429 note 1} The problem is rather less acute for the ‘internal’ approach, since it does not speak of God as an extra entity, and thus does not invite these three models so strongly. But it, too, has difficulties.

^{page 430 note 1} Particularly with the internal one. Yoga has always speculated on the physical processes involved in progressing towards enlightenment. Such current groups as Transcendental Meditation take keen interest in modern physiology. Theism has historically been more worried about ‘explaining away’ the ‘being-addressed’.