^{page 511 note 1} A partial exception to this tendency can be found in Richard Swinburne's The Coherence of Theism (Oxford, 1977), pp. 292–4, where holiness is regarded as a complex property of the divinity. This exception is only partial, since Swinburne shares the common assumption that holiness is exemplifiable only by God.

^{page 511 note 2} Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, 1973), trans. Frings, and Funk, , p. 108.Google Scholar

^{page 511 note 3} Otto, Rudolph, The Idea of the Holy (Oxford, 1953), trans. Harvey, , p. 5.Google Scholar Otto recognizes some complexity, however, inasmuch as he considers the numinous to be one element in the meaning of ‘holiness’ as currently used, the other element being the element of complete goodness.

^{page 511 note 4} Kielkopf, Charles, ‘The Sense of the Holy and Ontological Arguments’, The New Scholasticism LVIII (1984), 24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 511 note 5} Ibid. p. 25.

^{page 513 note 1} Smith, Quentin, The Felt Meanings of the World: A Metaphysics of Feeling (West Lafayette, 1986).Google Scholar

^{page 516 note 1} Kant recognized a sort of moral holiness inasmuch as he defined a holy will as a will perfectly in conformity with the moral law. Nevertheless, he did not recognize or did not clearly recognize the logical independence of moral holiness from religious holiness, for his conception of a holy will was developed within the framework of theism. See his Critique of Practical Reason.

^{page 521 note 1} Nakhnikian, George and Salmon, Wesley, ‘“Exists” as a Predicate’, The Philosophical Review LXVI (1957), 535–42;CrossRefGoogle ScholarKaplan, David, ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’, in Hintikka, J. et al. , eds. Approaches to Natural Language (Boston, 1973);Google ScholarPlantinga, Alvin, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974), chapter VII.Google Scholar

^{page 521 note 2} Frege, G., The Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford, 1950), trans. Austin, J., pp. 64–5;Google ScholarRussell, B., Logic and Knowledge (New York, 1956), ed. Marsh, R., pp. 228–41.Google Scholar

^{page 521 note 3} The Felt Meaning of the World, op. cit. chapter IV.

^{page 524 note 1} Morris, Thomas, ‘Perfect Being Theology’, Noûs XXI (1987), 19–30.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 2} Ibid. p. 26.

^{page 524 note 3} We know of course that some medieval theologians, such as Aquinas, claimed that God is identical with his omniscience and that his omniscience is identical with his omnipotence and that his omniscience and omnipotence are both identical with his existence. But this doctrine is plainly self-contradictory, and its hold on some people's minds testifies to the predominance of faith over intellectual coherence in some Christian circles.

^{page 525 note 1} The Felt Meanings of the World, op. cit. pp. 181–4 and n. 77 on pp. 344–5.

^{page 525 note 2} Meister Eckhart, trans. Blakney, R. (New York, 1941), p. 231.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 1} Munitz, Milton, Existence and Logic (New York, 1974), p. 197.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 2} Ibid. p. 203.

^{page 526 note 3} Munitz, , The Ways of Philosophy (New York, 1979), pp. 347–8 and 344.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 4} Munitz explained this to me in a letter of Nov. 30, 1981

^{page 526 note 5} The Ways of Philosophy, op. cit. p. 348.

* [Note added in proof: In a conversation in Sept., 1988, Munitz allowed that existence may be conceived as a property of a special sort, one that constitutes or indicates the ontological status of something.]

^{page 527 note 1} Existence and Logic, op. cit. p. 200.

^{page 527 note 2} Munitz, , Cosmic Understanding (Princeton, 1986), p. 234.Google Scholar

^{page 527 note 3} I am grateful to Susan Ament Smith and William Vallicella for helpful comments on an earlier draft.